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ABSTRACT
MEASURING CITIZENS’ PREFERENCES FOR PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTAL
RESOURCES: APPLICATIONS OF CHOICE EXPERIMENT SURVEYS, SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS AND DELIBERATIVE CITIZENS’ JURIES
Many reasons have been suggested as explanation for observed differences in citizens’
environmental conservation projects policy choices and willingness-to-pay (WTP) values.
Some people attribute this distinctive decision behavior to contrasts in the overall policy
outcome expectations (preference heterogeneity) and/or differences in reactions to the
changes in the environmental attributes (response heterogeneity). Others attribute this to
differences in individual choice rationales, personalities, encounters, and past and present
experiences. In other words, regardless of the possibility that outcomes are the same, people
do not have the same emotions, convictions, disposition, or motivations.
In three separate essays, I investigate the possible reasons for the observed differences
in citizens’ environmental conservation policy choices and examine how preference and
response heterogeneity arise. In the first essay, I ask if a priori environmental damage
perception is a source of heterogeneity affecting conservation option choice decisions. In the
second, I investigate if social networks (interactions among decision-making agents) affect
choice decisions. In the third, I investigate if preferences change when decision making
agents are allowed to deliberate among peers.
For the first essay, I conducted an on-line choice experiment (CE) survey. The survey
asked questions that help measure citizen preference for protecting environmental public
goods, ascertain the value local residents are willing-to-pay (WTP), and determine how
preference heterogeneity arises. CE attributes included groundwater use (measured by share
of total water use from groundwater), aquatic habitat (measured by count of spawning
kokanee salmon return), natural habitat health (measured by the sensitive ecosystem area
reclaimed), and rural character (measured by a decrease in urban sprawl and/or a decrease
in population density in rural areas). I used a special property levy as the vehicle of
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payment. Random parameter logit (RP) and latent class (LC) models were estimated to
capture response and preference heterogeneity. The results suggest that (1) both preference
and response heterogeneities were found for the choices and all environmental attributes
respectively (2) respondents who have a higher value for one environmental good will have
a higher value for other environmental goods, and (3) a priori damage perception could be
one of the sources of response and preference heterogeneity.
In the same survey, I included people’s egocentric networks, interactions, environment
related activities and perceptions to empirically evaluate whether social network effect
(SNE) is a source of systematic differences in preference. I estimate consumer preferences
for a hypothetical future environmental conservation management alternative described
by its attributes within a Nested Logit Model: nesting broader and distinct conservation
options within choices impacted by individuals network structure. The results show that
some network centrality measures capture preference heterogeneity, and consequently the
differences in WTP values in a systematic way.
Third, I compare the value estimated based on the traditional choice experiment (CE)
with the results obtained using the citizen jury (CJ) approach or a group-based approach
or also called the ‘‘Market Stall” in some literature. I estimate the effect of deliberation on
conservation choice outcomes by removing any significant differences between the people
who participated in the CJ (people who volunteered to be contacted again after deliberation
treatment) and those people who did the survey twice but did not volunteer for CJ (control
group) in terms of their socioeconomic status and be able attribute the changes in preferences
to deliberation treatment only. CJ approach involved two 90 minute deliberations held over
two days to discuss and consider their preferences and WTP values with other household
members. Results show that deliberation improves individuals’ valuation process and there
is observed difference in choice outcomes between the deliberation treatment and control
groups. Both preference and response heterogeneity relatively vanish when people were
given more time and allowed to deliberate among peers.
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This dissertation includes three separate essays that empirically measures citizens’
preference for conserving environmental natural resources using three interrelated and
widely used methods in natural resource and environmental economics. The data utilized
in these essays comes from the Choice Experiment (CE) survey conducted in the Regional
District of Central Okanagan (RDCO) in the Province of British Columbia, Canada, between
January - May, 2015.
The first essay, Incorporating Preference Heterogeneity into a Choice Experiment:
Valuing Watershed Protection, investigates the source of preference heterogeneity using
Random Parameter (RP) and Latent Class (LC) models. Random Parameter (RP) and/or
Latent Class (LC) models are state-of-the-art econometric methods commonly used to
capture unobserved heterogeneity, incorporating variables that are believed to be correlated
with preferences (taste parameters) and responses (choice attributes). Preference and
response heterogeneity are commonly mentioned as reasons for the observed differences
in policy choices and the willingness-to-pay (WTP) values in the literature. The results
show that households with the same demographic and socioeconomic characteristics display
different choice decisions, likely due to the overall policy related outcome expectations,
personalized reactions to the changes in the environmental attributes, and a priori perception
about environmental damage.
The second essay, On Measuring Social Network Effect in Conservation Option Choices:
The Random Utility Maximization Nested Logit Approach, explores people’s choice decisions
for a hypothetical future environmental conservation management alternative, introducing
social network centrality measures into the model. The results show a significant interaction
effect comparable to the traditional choice experiment result. Here, it was possible to
measure citizens’ preference for conservation options using a Nested Logit Model (NLM):
nesting broader and distinct conservation options within choices impacted by an individual’s
1
egocentric network structure. The clustering coefficient and closeness centrality performed
better than the degree, transitivity and eigenvector centrality measures, implying that if
two people in a social network have a friend in common, then information spreads fast
from a given node to other reachable nodes in the network and that there is an increased
likelihood they all will become friends themselves at some point in the future and their
decisions and future choices will most likely be interdependent.
The third essay, On Using Deliberative/Citizens Juries Approach to Measure Preference
Heterogeneity within Choice Experiment Surveys, compares the values estimated in the
traditional choice experiment (CE) approach with the results obtained using the citizen jury
(CJ) experiment within the same hypothetical conservation option scenarios. The experiment
involved two 90 minute sessions of CJ deliberation held over two days. Participants were
recruited from those volunteers who showed interest in participating after completing the
original choice experiment survey. During the deliberation, participants were given more
time to consider their preferences and to discuss their WTP values with other household
members. The result shows that CJ deliberation improves individuals valuation process and




Incorporating Preference and Response
Heterogeneities into a Choice Experiment:
Valuing Watershed Protection
2.1. Introduction
Preference and response heterogeneities are often important reasons for the observed
differences in environmental conservation project policy choices and the willingness-to-pay
(WTP) values. Households with the same demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
and facing similar choice decision scenarios might show distinctive decision behavior because
of contrasts in the overall policy outcome expectations (preference heterogeneity), and
differences in their reactions to the changes in the environmental attributes (response
heterogeneity).
In environmental economics, random parameter (RP) and/or latent class (LC) type
models have been utilized widely to capture these unobserved heterogeneities by incorpo-
rating variables that are believed to be correlated with preferences (taste parameters) and
responses (choice attributes). Other studies have investigated many other econometric
methods in the estimation procedure within Daniel McFaddens utility-maximization based
multinomial response models (Train, 2009, Morey et al., 2008, Adamowicz et al., 1998a,
Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b, Boxall et al., 1996, Louviere et al., 2000, Hanley et al.,
2006, Bennett and Blamey, 2001, Hanemann, 1989, Dissanayake and Ando, 2014).
One of the survey methodologies employed is choice experiment.1 It is a survey method
used for modeling preferences for a good, where the good is described in terms of its attributes
and the levels that these attributes take (Powe et al., 2005, Adamowicz et al., 1998b, Álvarez-
Farizo and Hanley, 2006b, Boxall et al., 1996, Louviere et al., 2000, Hanley et al., 2006,
1In the context of environmental valuation methods, its essential elements include: the presentation of the
scenario and good valued; the payment vehicle; and the transaction method (Powe et al., 2005).
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Bennett and Blamey, 2001). Unlike the contingent valuation method2, where respondents
are required to express the maximum willingness-to-pay or the minimum willingness-to-
accept for a hypothetical change in the level of provision of a good in its totality, respondents
are required to repeatedly choose the best option from a few hypothetical choices described
in terms of their individually valued attributes (Powe et al., 2005, Hanley et al., 2001,
Dissanayake and Önal, 2011). Within this model, policy specific attributes are allowed
to vary systematically to uncover unobserved heterogeneity from parameter estimates.
To recover WTP from peoples choices, price (cost) is included as one of the attributes
(Adamowicz et al., 1998a, Hanley et al., 2001, Hensher and Greene, 2003, Adamowicz et al.,
1994b).
Experimental design techniques are used to identify combinations of attributes and
levels to create the question sets appearing on each survey. The design objective is typically
to find a small set of choice combinations that provides enough coverage to identify the
influences of changes in the levels of each included attribute. However, all valuation studies
are limited by the accuracy with which they represent the preferences of those included
in the study. There is a trade-off between parsimony and data collection cost on the one
hand, and the risk of omitting important variables on the other.3
Moreover, individual choices are based on numerous rationales, personalities, encounters,
and past and present experiences. People do not have the same emotions, convictions, or
disposition, and even if decisions are the same, people have different motivations (Fishbein
and Ajzen, 1975, Koundouri et al., 2014). In particular, there are similarities and differences
in individuals perception of the economic, human health, and ecosystem consequences of
these environmental issues (Farizo et al., 2014).
2See Adamowicz et al. (1994b), Boxall et al. (1996), Adamowicz et al. (1998a), Hanley et al. (1998), Blamey
et al. (1999), Bateman et al. (1994), Hausman (2012) for comparisons between contingent valuation and
choice experiment.
3 See Farber et al. (2002), Hanley et al. (2001), Hensher et al. (2005), Hoyos (2010), Carson et al. (2014b,a),
Carson and Louviere (2010) for reviews of the choice experiment methodology and for some discussion of
the wider context within which stated preferences can be used in environmental valuation.
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The goal of this chapter is to show how a choice experiment survey technique can likewise
be utilized to quantify individuals trade-offs among conservation attributes considering
individuals socio-economic differences and a priori heterogeneous subjective evaluations
of the degree or level of environmental damage. I specifically inquire whether individuals
level of concern matters in the trade-off among conservation options and in the amount
of stated WTP for the attributes. I do this by estimating consumer preferences for
environmental conservation options described by multiple environmental attributes within
random coefficients and latent class models.4 Within these frameworks, ‘‘it is possible to
incorporate additional individual difference measures to capture observable heterogeneity in
systematic (deterministic) utility components, instead of leaving them to random components
exclusively (Farizo et al., 2014)’’. I use data from a choice experiment survey I conducted
in the Regional District of Central Okanagan (RDCO) between January - May, 2015. In
this survey, respondents were asked to state their preferences for a hypothetical policy
alternative targeting environmental conservation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a regional context.
Part 3 reviews the literature. Part 4-6 addresses the valuation scenario, experimental
design and survey instrument. In parts 7 and 8, I discuss the econometric and estimation
methodology: the Mixed Logit (RP) and Latent class (LC) models used to obtain parameter
estimates. Part 9 reports and discusses the results of my analysis. I draw some conclusions
and reflect on limitations of this study in part 10.
4see Farizo et al. (2014), Hanley et al. (2001), Dissanayake and Önal (2011), Lundhede et al. (2015) and
many others for similar analysis.
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2.2. Regional Context
The Regional District of Central Okanagan (RDCO), part of the southern interior of
British Columbia, Canada, is located approximately 400 kilometers east of Vancouver in
British Columbias interior plateau. It is largely defined by its mix of mountains, lakes,
wetlands, watercourses, forests, grasslands, vineyards and orchards (Okanagan Water
Stewardship Council, 2008). It includes an area extending from Oyama in the north
to Peachland in the south and easterly and westerly to the Okanagan basin watershed
boundary.5 Okanagan Lake is the main central feature in the Central Okanagan, providing
a unique and beautiful landscape as well as the basic sustenance needed for a vibrant
community and economy (Okanagan Water Stewardship Council, 2008). Valleys of the
Okanagan Lake chain run north and south between high plateaus, which contain the source
of many streams draining into the Okanagan lakes. The climate of the Okanagan Basin is
somewhat less continental than the rest of the interior of the province (Okanagan Water
Stewardship Council, 2008). It is characterized by cool humid air and cloudy skies in
winter and by dry air with bright skies in summer. The warm summers with fairly low
humidity and the relatively mild winters provide an attractive environment for agriculture
and recreation (Wikipedia, 2012, Regional District of Central Okanagan, 2012, 2013).
Population growth, about 1.8% annualized change between 2001-2015 (BCstats, 2012),
regional economic growth, and climate change are placing pressure on environmental
resources of the Okanagan. Some of the highly impacted environmental resources include
foreshore areas, groundwater resources, aquatic species, natural habitats and rural character.
Most worrisome is the shoreline of Okanagan Lake which contains habitats that are critical
for wildlife, rare plants and terrestrial communities, and fish populations (e.g. Kokanee,
rainbow trout, etc.) (Regional District of Central Okanagan, 2005, 2011). Aquatic health
is threatened by shoreline development, invasive species, pollution, etc. For instance, the
Biophysical Characteristics of Okanagan Lake Foreshore Inventory and Mapping which was
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Document Path: G:\gis_presentation\rdco_maps\general\RDCO_wall_map.mxd Created: January 06, 2016
Cartograhic Data Sources and Projection Information
     Data Source Information:
          Regional District Boundaries: CDMS - Crown Land Registry Services, 1999;
          Regional District Electoral Area, Municipal Area Boundaries and First Nation Reserve
               Boundaries: Letters Patent of the Regional District of Central Okanagan, 2002;
          Regional Park Boundaries: Regional District of Central Okanagan Cadastral Base -
               Regional District of Central Okanagan, 2002;
          Provincial Park/Protected Area and Recreation Management Zone Boundaries:
               Okanagan - Shuswap LRMP - Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management, 2002;
     Projection Information:
          Projection: UTM; Datum: NAD83; Spheroid: GRS80; Zone 11.
     Map produced and published by:
          GIS Services, Regional District of Central Okanagan.
          Kelowna, B.C.
          Jan 06, 2016
Regional District of Central Okanagan: Physical Geography
     Land and Water Surface Area:
          Regional District of Central Okanagan: 314,226 ha
          Central Okanagan West Electoral Area: 124,756 ha
          Central Okanagan East Electoral Area: 127,109 ha
          City of Kelowna: 26,168 ha
          Lake Country District Municipality: 16,354 ha
          City of West Kelowna: 15,633 ha
          Peachland District Municipality: 1,798 ha
          First Nations' Reserves: 2,404 ha
     Lake Surface Area:
          Total (within RDCO boundary): 24,041 ha
          Okanagan Lake (within RDCO boundary): 19,537 ha
          Wood Lake: 914 ha
          Kalamalka Lake (within RDCO boundary): 629 ha
          Swalwell (Beaver) Lake: 301 ha
     Parks and Protected Areas:
          Provincial Parks and Protected Areas: 21,714 ha
          Regional Parks: 908 ha
Figure 2.1. Regional District of Central Okanagan.
Source:http : //www.regionaldistrict.com/media/192361/rdmapsmall.pdf ,2016.
completed on 289 km of shoreline on Okanagan Lake showed that the total length of disturbed
shoreline was 164 km, which represents 57% of the total natural shorelines length (Regional
District of Central Okanagan, 2005, 2011). The single family residential, transportation,
agriculture, recreation (i.e., campgrounds, etc.), and urban parks are the major land use
type significantly contributing to the disturbance of the shoreline ecosystem (Regional
District of Central Okanagan, 2005, 2011). The riparian vegetation have been completely
removed or replaced with non-native species (Regional District of Central Okanagan, 2005,
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2011). Modifications to the foreshore are extensive and likely continuous and include a
large number of docks (Regional District of Central Okanagan, 2005, 2011). A review of the
natural and disturbed areas within the Okanagan Large Lakes protocol shows that Kokanee
shore spawning areas are substantially disturbed (Regional District of Central Okanagan,
2005, 2011, Shepherd, 1999). Spawning kokanee numbers have fallen from over 1 million to
about 40,000 between 1973 and 2010, a decrease of 90% (Shepherd, 1999). In addition to a
variety of other factors that may have contributed to the situation, the introduction of an
exotic species, the opossum shrimp (Mysis relicta) is likely to have aggravated the decline
(Shepherd, 1999). Currently, only 43% of this shoreline lake is estimated to remain natural.
Much of these natural shorelines occur in rural areas that are prone to future development
(Regional District of Central Okanagan, 2005, 2011).
Moreover, the total annual hectare decline of permanent wetlands, old growth forests,
foreshore ecosystems has been tremendous. Most surface sources of water in the Okanagan
are fully allocated and there is an increasing groundwater use to the extent that threatens
springs and wetlands that are important for natural habitats. For example, more than
90% of the wetland area and 73% of foreshore area has been either lost or disturbed in the
Okanagan Valley since 1800 (Okanagan Collaborative Conservation Program, 2014). In
addition, growth and development combined with urban expansion contributed to rural
areas losing their unique ‘‘country character”, history, and close ties to the land. The
amount of open space and farm land is shrinking and conflicts between farmers and non-farm
residents is on the rise. The context shown above highlights the importance of implementing
long term projects to conserve remaining important natural areas and prioritizing habitat
improvements where feasible. Local governments have a number of choices they can make
to balance the demands for development against the environmental impacts. These include:
undertaking research to better understand impacts on the environment and identifying
protection strategies; modifying local building requirements to control groundwater pumping
and potential contamination sources; investing in better monitoring of water quality, habitat
health, groundwater levels, etc.; strengthening regulations and increasing enforcement to
8
limit development on agricultural and rural lands; pursuing easements, covenants and
similar arrangements with property owners to protect sensitive habitats and rural character;
acquiring properties important for protecting habitats and/or providing recreational oppor-
tunities; and tightly enforcing zoning to limit development that harms the environment
and/or changes rural character.
2.3. Literature Review
The literature in the field of non-market valuation is numerous and cannot be exhaustively
listed here. Some samples from studies over the years include: the reduction of old growth
timber harvests (Knowler and Dust, 2008), preserving the northern spotted owl (Rubin
et al., 1991), benefits of phosphorus pollution reductions (Mathews et al., 2002), valuing
water quality improvements (Van Houtven et al., 2007, Stumborg et al., 2001), the values
of restoring an impaired river basin (Loomis et al., 2000), the value of preserving urban
open space (Kovacs and Larson, 2008), total economic value of restoring ecosystem services
(Zhongmin et al., 2003), benefits of woodland restoration in native forests (MacMillan and
Duff, 1998), benefits of riparian wetland restoration (Meyerhoff and Dehnhardt, 2007), and
benefits of mangrove restoration (Stone et al., 2008), among others.67
However, not much of the literature has examined the non-monetary motives of hetero-
geneity in eliciting willingness to pay amounts. Some have considered social-psychology
techniques in the CV method (Spash, 2008, Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). Kellert and Berry
6see Hanley et al. (2001), Adamowicz et al. (1998a), Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley (2006b), Boxall et al. (1996),
Louviere et al. (2000), Hanley et al. (2006), Bennett and Blamey (2001), Meldrum (2015), Meyerhoff (2006),
Breffle et al. (2011), Choi and Fielding (2013), Bujosa et al. (2010), Scholte et al. (2015), Dissanayake and
Ando (2014), Haan and Uhlendorff (2006), Dissanayake and Ando, Csuti et al. (1997), Ando et al. (1998),
Önal (2004), Kharouba and Kerr (2010) for many more illustrations.
7Quite a bit of these literature focuses on single measure of conservation successes using CV methodology
and consequently is not able to identify the sources of citizens’ preference heterogeneity. Exceptions
are studies by Loomis and Larson (1994) and Dissanayake and Ando (2014) which goes beyond single
conservation success and show that wildlife population density is also an important variable affecting the
public’s WTP for habitats. Christie et al. (2006) study public preferences and WTP for biodiversity in
general, and Meyerhoff et al. (2009) find that the species richness is a significant attribute that determines
the WTP for forest conservation.
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(1980) suggested affection as one of the motivational considerations; Serpell (1996) identi-
fied affection and sympathy for animals as drivers; others identified species size (Bitgood
et al., 1988) or morphology (Lorenz, 2013, Mart́ın-López et al., 2007) influencing human
preferences, and others focused on perceptions affected by past and present interactions
with particular species, including cultural factors, such as religiosity or traditional practices,
and social factors, such as property relationships or recreational use (Mart́ın-López et al.,
2007).
Several other studies have demonstrated the influence of socioeconomic variables in
attitudes towards non-human species. For instance, women tend to show stronger affective
and weaker utility orientations than men (Kellert and Berry, 1980), other studies have
discussed urban versus rural residents, more educated versus lower educated (Kellert and
Berry, 1980) and peoples knowledge of species influencing attitudes (Mart́ın-López et al.,
2007) such as experience with the good. For example, Carson et al. (2001) discuss how
marginal WTP will decrease with experience or as more of a public good is provided. This
follows from the idea of a downward sloping demand function. That is, the presence of
an environmental public good can lead to learning, experience, and appreciation such that
agents who currently experience high levels of the public good may have a higher WTP for
more of that good (Cameron and Englin, 1997, OHara and Stagl, 2002). This was explained
using endogenous preference theory, which argues that consumers who are familiar with a
good may be willing to pay more than consumers who are unfamiliar with the good (Bowles,
1998, OHara and Stagl, 2002, Zizzo, 2003, Gowdy, 2004). Cameron and Englin (1997)
confirm this that experience can lead to higher resource values using a CV study of WTP
for trout fishing. They find that experience, measured by the number of years in which the
respondent has gone fishing, has a significant positive impact on the WTP. A related theory
of planned behavior proposed by Ajzen (1991) states that WTP is expected to increase with
a more favorable attitude toward paying for a good.
However, none of the above studies include a priori perception and subjective individual
assessment of the degree of environmental damage as a source of preference and response
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heterogeneity. This makes it difficult to understand why respondents with the same
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and facing similar choice decision scenarios
choose the alternative associated with a change or no change from the ‘‘no action” status
quo situation distinctly. This is an important issue because if such a priori individual
damage appraisal exists, then it should be expressly addressed in the empirical model.
In this chapter, I use mixed logit, also called Random Parameter (RP) and Latent Class
Models (LC) 8 to measure preference and response heterogeneity and to see if they are related
to individual a priori subjective appraisal of environmental damage. To the best of my
knowledge, no past study has examined endogenous preferences in the context of respondents
a priori subjective evaluation of damages applied to many environmental goods at a time.
Methodologically, it is an extension of previous stated preference based environmental
valuation literature attempting to address sources of preference heterogeneity. The most
closely related studies are papers by Morey et al. (2008), Boxall and Adamowicz (2002),
and Lundhede et al. (2015). Morey et al. (2008) examined the likelihood of heterogeneity
in preferences for landscape preservation in the context of a latent class model under the
assumption of the existence of some finite number of preference classes/groups. Here, class
probabilities were a function of observable characteristics of individual attitude related
to the importance of preservation and why they think that preservation is (or is not)
important. Their results show four distinct preference classes varying in the level of
importance attached to preservation and the motivation for preservation (e.g. use vs
non-use motivations). Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) examined welfare measures of some
hypothetical policy changes using finite mixture conditional logit models (RP) in which
latent classes (LC) was used to identify systematic heterogeneity. The model was applied
to wilderness recreation in a branded choice experiment involving the choice of one park
from a demand system, and was administered to a sample of recreationists. Attitudinal
measures of motivations for taking a trip, as well as their stated preferences over wilderness
8see Train and Weeks (2005), Dissanayake and Ando (2014), Morey et al. (2006), Johnston et al. (2007),
Munizaga and Alvarez-Daziano (2001) for RP and LC applications among many others.
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park attributes, determined class membership. A paper by Lundhede et al. (2015) considers
respondents a priori assessments of outcome uncertainty in a choice experiment eliciting
respondents preferences for conservation policies under climate change. Their findings show
that higher outcome uncertainty reduces utility and that prior beliefs play a significant role
in the cost of uncertainty.
2.4. Valuation Scenario
Households were required to compare the various possible consequences and trade-offs
that could result from the local government’s environmental conservation policy menu. The
policy menu presents three hypothetical alternative conservation measures. It includes the
‘‘no action” status quo option which reflects the continuation of the prevailing environmental
condition to 2045. The other two options involve additional management actions that would
lead to different environmental goods and services outcomes by 2045. The alternatives were
presented in the form of choice cards with sets of three future scenarios to compare, described
by a short list of environmental attribute and attribute levels. Indicators were used for
each attribute to provide a sense of how well their choices would achieve environmental
conservation goals. The environmental attribute indicators were chosen in conversation with
local experts, and all were field tested for relevance. All attributes and levels were illustrated
using images where the number of images shows the direction of the change. Figure 2.2
presents the attributes and attribute indicators used in the survey. Each attribute has three
levels and the levels are presented in the order of presumed value, with the highest-valued
level presented first for all attributes (See table 2.1). For example, for the share of total
water use from groundwater, the best level is 10%, which is a 50% reduction in the share
of total water use from groundwater; levels 15% and 20% are the next best and current
groundwater uses, respectively. All other attributes and attribute levels are interpreted
similarly, demonstrating how environmental attributes change over the planning period.
The part of the environmental costs that cannot be acquired through other channels-such
as development cost charges-will need to be paid for through household annual payments.
12
 
Figure 2.2. Environmental attribute indicators and attribute descriptions.
Therefore, cost is the most important attribute. Unlike utility charges most studies use,
property tax was chosen for the payment vehicle. It was picked in light of the fact that
property taxes have been utilized in the region as a method of raising cash in many
jurisdictions for many environmental activities and projects. For example, the H2O aquatic
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center in Kelowna was funded in part by a levy on Kelowna properties of about $0.21
per $1,000 value for twenty years, and ongoing activities to control Eurasian Milfoil in
valley lakes is paid for by a $0.057 per $1,000 collected for Okanagan Basin watershed
issues. This latter levy has been adjusted as needed, and was as low as $0.21 per $1,000
in the 70s, when valley waste water collection and treatment systems needed upgrades to
protect Okanagan Lake water quality. In the 70’s, community leaders in the Okanagan
also opted to implement a levy on all properties in the Okanagan basin to fund waste
water treatment upgrades, upgrades that have successfully improved lake water quality.
Therefore, in all the scenarios, two different increases in a special levy on property values
were proposed, with the money collected to be directed to achieving the environmental
changes described. These increases are $0.05 per $1000 and $0.10 per $1000 property
value. Per property, the average additional charge would be about $20 or $40 per year,
respectively. This levy will be in effect starting 2015 and continuing into the future for 30
years. Each section of the survey questionnaire started with clear instructions that sets out
Table 2.1. Attribute Levels and Descriptions
Variable Attribute Levels Description
β2 [Groundwater] (10%, 15%, 20%) Share of total water use from groundwater
β3 [Aquatic Health] (60, 000, 50, 000, 40, 000) Count of spawning Kokanee Salmon return
β4 [Habitat Loss] (0, 50, 100km
2) Sensitive ecosystem area lost
β5 [Rural Character] (60, 70, 75persons/km
2 Population density in rural areas
β6 [Cost] (0.00, $20/$400, 000, $40/$400, 000) Special property levy
the context very carefully. First was a short introduction followed by an environmental
status description, basic prior subjective damage assessment questions, then the valuation
tasks, elicited discrete choice experiment(CE) values, and follow-up questions. The final
section asks demographic questions.
Each respondent was told what the consequence of their choice would be related to
household income specifically. That is, property and other taxes and household expenses
14
may increase in the future for reasons unrelated to this conservation project. In addi-
tion,respondents were informed of the possible ways the local government could spend the
money. These include: undertaking research to better understand impacts on the environ-
ment and identifying preservation strategies; modifying provincial regulations to control
groundwater pumping and potential contamination sources; investing in better monitoring
of water quality, habitat health, groundwater levels, etc.; strengthening regulations and
increasing enforcement to limit development on agricultural and rural lands; pursuing
covenants, incentives, and other voluntary arrangements with property owners to protect
sensitive habitats and rural character; acquiring land with important habitats and/or that
provides recreational opportunities; tightly enforcing official community plans and zoning
to limit development that harms the environment and/or changes rural character. Finally,
respondents were walked through an example choice card before moving on to the choices.
See Appendix ‘‘B” for the complete survey questionnaire.
15
2.5. Experimental Design
The standard approach to designing choice experiments is to hold the status quo situation
constant at the baseline attributes and zero cost level over all the choice sets.9 Similarly,
efficient designs in contrast to orthogonal designs was used, keeping the status quo situation
at the baseline level over all the choice sets. Efficient design is widely used mainly because
it is good at maintaining attribute level balance and that an attribute occurrence is equally
likely exact number of times.10 According Rose et al. (2009), ‘‘experimental design is
efficient if the design yields data that enables estimation of the parameters with as low
as possible standard errors. These standard errors can be predicted by determining the
Asymptotic Variance-Covariance Matrix (AVC) based on the underlying experiment and
some prior information about the parameter estimates. Efficient designs do not merely try
to minimize the correlation in the data for estimation purposes, but aim to result in data
that generates parameter estimates with as small as possible standard errors.’’
This survey design is a 60 profile in 30 choice situations. All were generated from the
prevailing ‘‘no action” status quo condition using Ngene software (Metrics, 2014). Ngene
software is one of the stated choice (SC) experimental design software widely used with
extensive range of features, outputs and flexibility. The Ngene design syntax comprises
three elements: alts (for alternatives), rows (the number of choice profiles) and model
(utility functions). The alts property defines which alternatives are present in the choice
model. The rows property defines how many choice situations need to be generated. The
model property defines the choice model by describing the complete utility function for
each alternative (Metrics, 2014).11 Essentially, it pivots the baseline initial quantity or low
quality of the attributes up or down by a predetermined amount, say 10%. That gives us
60 treatment combinations of choice tasks, which were blocked into 10 designs of 6 choices,
9 A novel approach is to incorporate heterogeneity into the design of the status quo scenario alternative.
See Dhar (1997), Kontoleon and Yabe (2003), Street et al. (2005), Domı́nguez-Torreiro and Soliño (2011)
for the details.
10see Rose et al. (2009) for more on this.
11See Metrics (2014) for basic syntax structure and the choice generating functions for any number of
attribute and attribute levels.
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out of which 30 treatment combinations were randomly chosen and blocked into 5 designs
of 6 choice tasks similar to Sandor and Wedel (2001), Ferrini and Scarpa (2007), Rose
and Bliemer (2009). Here, the alternative that clearly dominates was avoided because it
will not give us useful information about the trade-offs. For example, in a choice situation
where one of the alternatives has both better or the same environmental condition as all
other alternatives, and a lower levy (cost) makes it clearly the preferred alternative and we
exclude it. In other words, in all choice situations, there is no strictly dominant alternative
and the respondent has to make a trade-off between environmental management options
considering each attribute levels and property levy, which will affect the household budget.
This will compromise the efficiency of the choice sets to some degree but it is what is
called ‘‘balancing the utilities of alternatives (i.e., having no alternatives that are clearly
dominating the others)” in the literature (Hensher and Greene, 2003, Rose et al., 2009).12
Crabbe and Vandebroek (2012) suggests the use of prior information to avoid choice sets
with a dominant alternative from statistically efficient designs. Moreover, within each
version, the order of the choice situations has been randomized to control for order effect
(Hensher and Greene, 2003). For example, the levels appearing for alternative 2 in choice
card one should always be different from those of alternative 2 appearing in choice card 3
for the same respondent. See the sample choice card in figure 2.3 and all cards including
respondent’s choice options amongst the three stated choice alternatives in Appendix ‘‘B”.
2.6. Survey Instrument: On-line Survey and sampling
Survey participants were randomly recruited from a list of Central Okanagan addresses
using directories available on the Internet (Canada 411). Households were chosen over
individuals as the target population, mainly because budgetary consumption decisions are
12Note that, ‘‘this could lead to the understanding that in the most efficient design, all the choice situations
are perfectly utility balanced. If all alternatives have an equal observed utility, then the random unobserved
component dominates. In other words, then the respondent has no clear preference for any of the alternatives
and randomly selects one. This too does not give information. Therefore it can be concluded that an
efficient design has some degree of utility balance, but not too much, and not too little. Utility balance of a
choice situation and a whole design can be expressed in a percentage (Rose et al., 2009).’’
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Figure 2.3. Sample Stated Choice Screen
often made at a household rather than an individual level and property taxes are paid at
the household level rather than the individual level. The survey was conducted online,
with face-to-face interviews left open given the complexity of the survey instrument and its
length and for those individuals unable to do the online survey using computers.
Since engaging with residents has an important impact on how people relate to the
environment, we extensively communicated and, consulted with residents and advised
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experts to identify and prioritize important local environmental issues. The first step
was introducing the project to regional stakeholders so that proper information would be
available and issue identification could be performed. Hence, we sent a letter to the Regional
District of Central Okangan officials (RDCO). In the letter we outlined the objectives,
stated who is funding and supporting the project, who the research team comprise, and
what exactly the survey would look like and want to achieve. Five broad issue areas
were identified, discussed, and ranked in terms of local sustainability, importance to local
residents and motivated by our intent to explore endogenous preferences regarding common
measures of conservation success.
The second step was a pre-test of the draft questionnaire. Prior to the main online
survey, a pre-test of the questionnaire was conducted with a sample of residents both
face-to-face and online. This led to the final adjustments to the presentation and wording
of the questionnaire so that respondents could fully understand the questions. Then, the
letter of invitation together with the link and access code to the online survey was sent to
the general public sample participants. The online survey was made available from January
to May, 2015. See Appendix C to F for the sample invitation and reminder letters.
The online survey was deemed to be an appropriate and cost-effective tool on the
conviction that the use of computers and internet among RDCO residents is high.13 Similar
online Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) survey was administered by Breustedt et al.
(2008) in Germany to explore the factors affecting farmer’ willingness to cultivate genetically
modified oilseed rape. Schulz et al. (2014) applied a similar online DCE approach to
investigate farmers preferences for alternative greening provisions. We executed some
laptop-based face-to-face and over the phone interviews at interviewee request. In these
cases, each respondent was asked to complete the survey in the presence of an interviewer
at their residence or over the phone with the help of employed student.
13According to Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd (2016) ‘‘Canada has one of the highest broadband
penetration rates among the OECD nations. Government policy has encouraged widespread broadband
availability, particularly in rural and regional areas, resulting in 98% of Canadians being able to access
broadband services.”
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Accordingly, each sampled respondent evaluated 6 stated choice situations, making
two choices: the first involving choosing amongst three labeled stated choice alternatives
including the the ‘‘no action” status quo alternative, and the second involving choosing
amongst the two stated choice alternatives (Options 1 and 2), status quo alternative
excluded. A total of 3000 households were invited, 550 started the on-line survey, which
yielded 468 completed questionnaires (16% response rate), producing 2808 observations for
model estimation (i.e. 468× 6 choice situations). Although, administering the survey online
resulted in a lower response rate compared to the total number of invited households, the
sample’s demographic characteristics are not statistically different from region’s population
profile. For example,in 2015,81% of the province’s population is 19 years and above old;
45 years and above old make up greater than 50%. Similarly, our respondents age group
is 19 years and above old; 75% are 45 years and above old. The proportion of males and
females in the province is 50% while our data comprise about 65% male and 35% female
respondents. Therefore, this data is fairly representative and the sample size is comparable
to Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010), who interviewed 100 farmers in the region of Andalusia and
200 farmers in the Aragon region of Spain with similar demographic profile. However, this
survey is not free of some of the undesirable respondent behaviors faced in online surveys:
speeding, random responding, and survey fatigues or premature termination. Moreover, the
use of mobile phones, which are mostly private and unaccessible through public directories
such as Canada 411, and other technical glitches could have contributed to lower response
rate.
2.7. Methodology
The theoretical premise of individual or homogeneous population choice behavior in the
choice experiment approach comes from Lancasters model of consumer choice (Lancaster,
1966). The technical novelty of Lancaster (1966)’s approach ‘‘lies in breaking away from
the traditional approach that goods are the direct objects of utility and, instead, supposing
that it is the properties or characteristics of the goods from which utility is derived.”Hence,
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a good can be described by the attributes that generate utility or disutility to individuals
(McFadden et al., 1973, Ouma et al., 2007, Thiene et al., 2014). In other words, consumers
get satisfaction not from goods themselves but rather from its attributes. In this way, it
utilizes the random utility model concept to explain individual’s choice decisions making
functional assumptions for the utility derived from the available alternatives (Thiene et al.,
2014, Ouma et al., 2007, McFadden et al., 1973).
According to this framework, the rational choice for the subject i is to choose the
alternative for which his or her utility is the highest (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012,
Adamowicz et al., 1998a). That means, alternative j is chosen by subject i if the utility of
this alternative is greater than the utility of any other alternative k:
U ji > U
k
i for all j 6= k(1)
Assuming the utilities U ji are a linear functions of subject-specific covariates xi and alterna-
tive specific covariates zji , it can be formalized as:









Equation (2) can be decomposed into the deterministic part, defined by linear-in-parameters






i of observable characteristics xi of the decision-making
individual and observable attributes zji of the choice alternative for a given decision-making
individual, and the stochastic part ǫji , that varies over both alternatives and subjects. This
stochastic part represents the unobservable influence on individual choice (unobserved
heterogeneity) (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, Adamowicz et al., 1998a). ‘‘Such
unobserved heterogeneity may arise from unobserved attributes of the choice alternatives,
unobserved characteristics of the decision-making entities, or simply measurement errors in
observed characteristics and/or attributes (Adamowicz et al., 1998a).”14
14Also, in the case where instrumental variables are used as a proxy for variables which are not observable,
the error term is relevant for capturing unobserved heterogeneity (Adamowicz et al., 1998a, Dugundji and
Gulyás, 2008)
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are identified. However, the intercepts and subject-specific coefficients are identified once
we fix the intercepts and coefficients for a base or reference category (status quo alternative
to zero in this case) (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, Adamowicz et al., 1998a).16
2.8. Econometric Model and Estimation
The assumption of conditional logit models (CL) that conservation option choices are
independent over choice repetition, given all the attributes and individual characteristics is
unrealistic. Individuals make repeated choices and there is longitudinal dependence. To
accommodate this dependence, we introduce household and choice specific random effects
similar to Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012). In the random effects specification, the
micro-level parameters are assumed to be randomly distributed across households following
15The term β
[j]
1 is an alternative specific constant included to explicitly account for any underlying bias for
one over another alternative.
16The assumption in the rational Choice framework is that choices are independent over choice occasion,
choice repetitions and households. That means, the Status Quo alternative is chosen by household i at




























a multivariate probability distribution (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, Jain et al., 1994,
Rossi and Allenby, 1993).
Therefore, the random effects represent unobserved heterogeneity related to individuals
preference for one conservation option over the other or household specific responses to
conservation attributes related to one’s experience such as interaction with local environment,
available information, occupation, perceptions and/or other effects and variations.
2.8.1. Conservation option-specific intercepts: Preference Heterogene-
ity. Closely following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) and considering the status quo
option as reference category, I use the following logit formulation for conservation option
choice behavior, where superscripts [1,2,3] stand for status quo, option 1 and option 2
respectively:




































where P (yit = j) is the probability that the i
th household chooses alternative j in the
choice occasion t, i = 1, 2, ..., N ; zjkt is a vector of attributes faced by household i under
conservation option j in the tth choice occasion; βj1 is the alternative specific intercept
terms included using the dummy variables φj1 and φ
j
3 for conservation options 1 and 2
and representing the preference of the household i for conservation option j, and βk is
the response coefficient of household i for the kth attribute (covariate), (k = 1, 2, ..., K).
The logit model formulation above is equivalent to the linear model for the utility U jit of
alternative j for household i at the tth choice occasion.


















Equation 5 takes the following form when preference heterogeneity or conservation option
specific random intercepts ξj1i is introduced :














































1i is the total alternative-specific intercepts for alternative j, composed of
the sum of the fixed alternative-specific intercepts βj1 and random deviation ξ
j
1i for household
j. This formulation is equivalent to the linear model for the utility U jit of alternative j for
household i at the tth choice repetition (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012).





















Equation 7 states that utilities are no longer independent and the assumption of
independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) is relaxed and ξ
[j]
1k is the random alternative-
specific intercepts that are shared among conservation choice options over choice occasions
of a household.The error term has a Gumbel distributions (with Variance π2/6) that are
independent over alternatives, choice occasions,and households (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal,
2012).17
2.8.2. Conservation Attributes with Random Coefficients: Response Het-
erogeneity. The effects of environmental attributes may also vary over households. For
instance, some households may be more concerned about groundwater than natural habitats
and others may be more or less responsive to policy that affect natural habitats. This allows
the coefficients to vary randomly over households i, but not over alternatives j. Following
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) again and treating the alternative specific-intercepts
as fixed, the logit formulation with random coefficients would take the following form
considering the status quo option a reference category.
17See Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) for the exposition of the covariances between the random intercepts
for conservation options pair and correlation between utility differences.
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P (yit = j|z
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The logit model formulation above is equivalent to the linear model for the utility U jit of
alternative j for household i at the tth choice repetition as before.

















Similarly, the random coefficients have a bivariate distribution and the assumption
of the distribution of the error term is the same as section 2.8.1 and independent over
alternatives, choice occasions, and households.
Both preference and response heterogeneity models allows us to capture the possible
observed and unobserved heterogeneity which is shared among the elemental alternatives.
A shared attribute not observed in the data, for example, might be that some individuals
are more concerned about groundwater use than aquatic habitat health, natural habitats
or rural character based on occupation, place of residence, affiliation with other groups
concerned with groundwater use, and a priori perception. This is the context of my
hypothesis ‘‘that a priori subjective damage assessment of a citizen affect choice preferences,
and consequently WTP/WTA” values. I expect that the higher the degree of individual
concern (or environmental damage assessment), the more the possibilities for a respondent
to choose an option other than the ”no action” status quo alternative.18
2.8.3. Estimation Procedure. I use the maximum likelihood adaptive quadrature
approach for estimating the model parameters. The adaptive quadrature approach starts
18In conditional logit models, the covariates characterize the alternative instead of characterizing subjects as
in the multinomial logit models. The covariates are often called the attributes of the different alternatives.
A change in any of the attributes, such as share of total water use from groundwater, aquatic and natural
habitats health, population density and the cost are assumed to have the same effect β for all alternatives
and there are no alternative-specific coefficients for the attributes. Therefore, prediction of marginal
probability for a hypothetical alternative is straight forward.19 In contrast to the multinomial logit models,
where the covariate xi has alternative specific effects β
j , the covariate zji (attributes) has a coefficient β
that does not vary over alternatives j.
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with a set of initial or starting values of the parameters and updates the parameters until
the likelihood is maximized, adapting data to the individual clusters (Rabe-Hesketh et al.,
2004). It is computationally more efficient than Gauss-Hermite quadrature to evaluate and
maximize the marginal log likelihood since it requires fewer quadrature points to achieve
the same precision. Therefore, it provides unbiased estimates for random component models
such as random coefficients and random intercepts (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2005, 2004).
As shown in the econometric specification Equation (7) above, I incorporate preference
heterogeneity in such a way that alternative-specific intercept βj1 are randomly distributed,
ξj1i (i = 1,2,..., N), across households while the response coefficients βk, (k = 1, 2, ..., K) are
treated as fixed and identical for all households. In equation (9), the response heterogeneity
is incorporated as random variables distributed across households following some form of
joint distribution, while alternative-specific intercepts are treated as fixed.
To see this, I follow Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012), Jain et al. (1994), Rossi and
Allenby (1993) and construct the marginal likelihood for a random intercept logistic regres-
sion model with one covariate zjkt. The responses are assumed conditionally independent
given the random intercepts, random coefficients ξjik and the covariates z
j
kt. Therefore,
the joint probability of all the responses P (yit = j), i = 1, ..., N , given random intercepts,
random coefficients and covariates is simply the product of the conditional probabilities of
the individual responses:




































To obtain the unconditional marginal joint probability of responses, we integrate out the




















P (yit = j|z
j
kt, ξ1k) ∆(ξ1k; 0, ζ) dξ1k
where, ∆ (ξj1k; 0, ϕ) and ∆(ξ1k; 0, ζ) are the normal density of ξ
j
1k and ξ1k with mean 0 and
variance ϕ and ζ respectively. However, we do not have a closed form expression for the
integral and therefore the likelihood function is estimated/approximated with initial guesses
using adaptive quadrature technique. The marginal likelihood is the joint probability of all
observed responses given the covariates. The joint responses are assumed to be mutually
independent and the likelihood is given by the product of the marginal joint probabilities
for all individuals conditional on the value of the vector ξj1k for all (Revelt and Train, 1998,
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012):




P (y1t, ..., ynt|z
j
kt).
Equation 14 is a function of the parameters and estimated by finding the values βj1, βik, ϕ
that maximizes the likelihood. The search for the maximum is iterative using the Newton-
Raphson or expectation maximization (EM) algorithm (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012,
Jain et al., 1994, Rossi and Allenby, 1993).
2.9. Data and Empirical Results
Using a choice experiment survey conducted in the Regional District of Central Okanagan
(RDCO) between January - May, 201520, I estimate standard conditional logit, random
effects mixed logit and latent class models to see if one better fits the data than the other. I
use Log-likelihood function (LLF), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) and Consistent AIC (CAIC) values to determine the number of latent classes
needed for the latent class model estimation. Latent classes are defined and characterized
based on respondents’ response scores to a priori environmental damage perception questions.
20See Appendix A for the data summary
27
All coefficients were assumed to be independently normally distributed and vary in the
random effects models. The willingness to pay for each attribute (the ratio of the attributes
coefficient to the levy coefficient) is also assumed to have normal distribution, which is
convenient for interpretation.21
2.9.1. Standard Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Model. Table 2.2 presents
the standard alternative-specific conditional logit model coefficient estimates and standard
errors for the parameters. The two fixed coefficients (alternative-specific intercepts) represent
the estimated likelihood of choosing ‘‘Option 1” and ‘‘Option 2” versus the ‘‘no action”
status quo option when alternative-specific attributes and individual-specific covariates
are kept constant. We see that the coefficient on ‘‘Option 2” is statistically significantly
different from zero and has a negative sign, implying that on average people will not prefer
Option 2 (much improved conservation alternative) compared to the base outcome ‘‘no
action status quo option.
Alternative-specific attributes regression coefficients do not vary over alternatives while
individual specific covariates do. That means, only the changes in the levels of the attributes
matter (Revelt and Train, 1998, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). Hence, the coefficients
on aquatic habitat health and natural habitat loss are statistically significantly different
from zero and have the expected sign, implying that respondents would prefer to choose any
of the options that involve a greater return in Kokanee Salmon (indicator of aquatic habitat
health) and a decrease in the sensitive ecosystem area lost (indicator of natural habitat loss).
In other words, the likelihood of choosing ‘‘Option 1” or ”Option 2” (both are better options)
for a unit change in those attribute levels compared to the ‘‘no action” option will be higher.
For example, controlling for other household specific factors, increasing the return of the
Kokanee Salmona by 10,000 and decreasing the natural habitat loss by 50 km2 every year
over the planning period, would increase the odds of choosing any of the alternatives by an
estimated 113% [(2.129− 1)× 100%] and 170% [(2.702− 1)× 100%] for higher income group
21See Revelt and Train (1998) for more on this.
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Table 2.2. Alternative and Individual Specific Covariates
Covariate Option
Conservation Options
Option 1 Option 2
Alternative-specific intercepts [Fixed]





β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0000129**
(3.25)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00481***
(-6.93)





β7 [Lower Middle Income] 0.145 0.361*
(0.99) (2.23)
β8 [Upper Middle Income] 0.145 0.595***
(0.96) (3.63)
β9 [High Income] 0.756*** 0.994***
(3.81) (4.68)
χ2 (df m) 113.4 (11)
N 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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compared to the lower income group, respectively. That means individual’s willingness to
pay depends on utility which is a function of these attributes and households overall budget
and other factors and ‘‘ Options 1 and 2” constitute environmental attributes which are
normal goods from the perspective of the respondent. Only income dummy coefficients
are reported and interpreted from among the individual-specific covariates because other
covariates are statistically insignificant.
2.9.2. Random Alternative-Specific Intercepts: Preference Heterogene-
ity. In contrast to the estimates of the standard conditional logit model shown in tables
2.2, which are the marginal or population-averaged coefficients, the estimates in table 2.3
are based on the assumption of dependence of alternative choices across choice occasions by
households. That means, there are random-alternative specific intercepts shared among dif-
ferent alternative choice occasions that have conditional or household-specific interpretation.
Table 2.3 presents estimated standard deviations [SD] of the random alternative-specific
intercepts and covariates. The estimated coefficients in the upper part of the output
represent conditional or household-specific effects on the likelihood of choosing any of the
alternatives compared with the ‘‘no action base outcome status quo alternative. Model 1,
the preference heterogeneity only model, shows the total alternative-specific intercept for
each conservation option. It is composed of fixed alternative specific intercepts (Mean) and
the random intercepts (SD). The SD measures the degree of deviation from the population
average and the coefficient estimates have a citizen-specific preference interpretation. We
see that the random effects, measured by the standard deviation (SD), are statistically signif-
icant, providing a strong evidence for the presence of citizen specific preference ‘‘preference
heterogeneity” in contrast to the marginal or population-averaged estimates of the standard
conditional logit model. From the magnitudes of the standard deviations relative to the
mean coefficients, 39% prefer ‘‘Option 1” (improved conservation option) and 46% prefer
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‘‘Option 2” (much improved conservation option), compared to the ‘‘no action” status quo
condition, respectively.22
Intuitively, people would prefer an option that offers relatively better environmental
attributes, implying individuals willingness to trade-off higher payment for better envi-
ronmental condition, keeping all other determinants of demand such as income constant.
Further, the presence of preference heterogeneity could be justified based on the fact that
‘‘Options 1 and 2” seem to be similar in terms of the absolute attribute levels and therefore
utilities could be dependent. The more similar the alternatives seem, the more correlated
their utilities would be expected to be (Revelt and Train, 1998). That means, the assump-
tion of conditional logit model that choices are independent over choice occasions fails.
Such unobserved heterogeneity could be because of the variation in the household specific
characteristics, differences in understanding of an option’s attribute levels, differences in
preferences depending on an individual’s perception or household-specific interaction with
the environment, and etc. Moreover, a likelihood-ratio test for the joint significance of the
standard deviations of the random intercepts (SD), reported in the lower row of table 2.3
(Prob > χ2), shows that the associated p-value is very small, implying that we can reject
the null hypothesis that there is no preference heterogeneity.
2.9.3. Random Alternative-Specific Coefficients: Response Heterogene-
ity. The degree of the changes and effects of environmental attributes may vary over
households. For instance, some households may be more concerned about groundwater than
natural habitats and others may be more responsive to a policy that affects the natural
habitat. Therefore, I allow the coefficients to vary randomly over households (Model 2)
(i.e. the random deviation from each fixed effect coefficients of the attributes) but not over
alternatives and treat the alternative specific-intercepts as fixed in contrast to the random
intercept model (Model 1). This random deviation captures response heterogeneity. Similar
to the random intercepts model, the random coefficients are shared for different choice
22These figures are given by 100×Φ(−βj/σj), where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution and
βj and σj are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the j
th coefficient (Hole, 2007)
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Table 2.3. Preference Heterogeneity and Response Heterogeneity
Covariate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Random Intercepts [Mean + SD]
β1 [Option 1] 0.697*** 2.477*** 2.878*** 2.857*** 1.292***
(3.73) (15.97) (14.54) (11.40) (-4.78)
β1 [Option 2] 0.226 2.579*** 2.396*** 2.200*** 1.742***
(1.19) (15.23) (12.82) (8.84) (-8.71)
Random Coefficients [Mean + SD]
β2 [Groundwater] -0.0121 -0.0147 0.0736*** -0.0113 0.118***
(-1.32) (-1.25) (-3.70) (-0.75) (-4.81)
β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0000258*** 0.0000210** 0.0000441*** 0.0000281*** 0.0000347*
(4.81) (3.16) (4.59) (3.67) (-1.96)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00750*** -0.00803*** 0.0168*** -0.00958*** 0.0205***
(-8.05) (-5.57) (-9.18) (-5.31) (9.19)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.0122 -0.0155 0.112*** -0.0175 0.0948***
(-1.83) (-1.60) (8.17) (-1.67) (5.40)
β6 [Cost] -0.00144 -0.0397*** 0.136*** -0.0408*** 0.146***
(-0.33) (-4.61) (15.98) (-3.91) (13.93)
χ2 (df m) 898.7 (2) 1456.3 (5) 1625.6 (7)
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 8424 8424 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
occasions and the utilities are no longer independent and the assumption of IIA is relaxed
(Hensher and Greene, 2003, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, Revelt and Train, 1998).
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table 2.3 under Model 2
(Response heterogeneity fixed intercept). The mean coefficients on both fixed and random
effects are statistically significant and all have the right sign. On average, respondents
prefer a conservation option that provides a decrease in the share of groundwater use, more
salmon return, a decrease in natural habitat loss and a decrease in rural density. From
the magnitudes of the standard deviations relative to the mean coefficients, 54% of the
respondents prefer a decrease in the share of groundwater use, 32% prefer an increase
salmon return, 32% prefer an option that provides protected natural habitat, and 56%
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prefer an option which provides a better rural character. The likelihood ratio test for the
joint significance of the standard deviations yields a very small p-value, implying the null
hypothesis that all the standard deviations are equal to zero is rejected and providing clear
evidence for preference heterogeneity in the model.
Model 3 (preference and response heterogeneity) in table 2.3 presents the combined
estimated coefficients of preference and response heterogeneity (random-intercepts and
random-coefficients) models. Here it is noticeable that mean coefficients of the random
variables are consistently larger than the fixed coefficients in the standard logit model.
This reflects the fact that the mixed logit includes the unobserved portion of utility and
normalizes parameters based on part of the unobserved portion.23 Further, the coefficients
on the standard deviations are highly statistically significant as expected and as we move
from standard logit to the preference and response heterogeneity only to a model which
combines both, providing strong evidence for preference and response heterogeneity and
that choices in fact vary in the population. The likelihood ratio test on a combined estimate
confirms that the joint standard deviations are not equal to zero and we reject the null that
there is no heterogeneity in the model.
The test conducted so far in all models above is the likelihood ratio test on a separate
and a combined estimate and the standard deviations. We can also evaluate if the means
of each attribute across the three alternative choices which I coded 0, 1 and 2 (for Status
quo, Option 1 and Option 2 respectively) are significantly different from each other. To do
this, I conduct One way Analysis Variance (ANOVA). I present the result in Table 2.4 and
figures 2.4-2.8.
23see Revelt and Train (1998) for more on this
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Table 2.4. Oneway Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): summary of fit of
attributes by Options
Attribute Level Number Mean SE Lower 95% Upper 95% SS MS F Ratio Prob > F
β2 [Groundwater]
High 4686 0.60 0.01 0.59 0.62
1647.8 823.9 1748.5 < .0001∗Low 1878 1.49 0.02 1.46 1.52
Moderate 1860 1.50 0.02 1.47 1.53
β3 [AquaticHealth]
High return 1861 1.52 0.02 1.48 1.55
1742.5 871.2 1894.0 < .0001∗Low return 4673 0.59 0.01 0.57 0.61
Medium return 1890 1.50 0.02 1.47 1.53
β4 [HabitatLoss]
High Loss 4668 0.60 0.01 0.58 0.62
1655.2 827.6 1759.5 < .0001∗Low Loss 1859 1.49 0.02 1.46 1.52
Medium Loss 1897 1.50 0.02 1.47 1.53
β5 [RuralCharacter]
Above Average Density 4575 0.59 0.01 0.57 0.61
1695.8 847.9 1821.3 < .0001∗Average Density 1711 1.45 0.02 1.42 1.48
Below Average Density 2138 1.52 0.01 1.49 1.55
β6 [Cost]
High Cost 2808 1.47 0.01 1.45 1.48
4218.4 2109.2 12709.0 < .0001∗Low Cost 2808 1.53 0.01 1.52 1.55
No Cost 2808 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02
The ANOVA summary of fit reported in Table 2.4 provides overall information about
the analysis including the mean, sample size, and standard error (SE) for each attribute. It
shows that the Prob > F (the p-value) is 0.0001∗ for all attributes, which implies that there
are significant differences in the mean level of the attributes that constitute each options. In
other words, the mean groundwater level, aquatic habitat, habitat loss, rural character, and
cost that constitute ‘‘Option 1” are statistically significantly different form the mean levels
that constitute the ‘‘no action” status quo and ”Option 2” alternatives. Same information
is demonstrated in figures 2.4-2.8. The diamond represents mean attribute levels. The
vertical span of each diamond represents the 95% confidence interval for the mean of each
attribute level across the three alternatives. The line near the center of each diamond
represents the group mean. The length between the ticks is proportional to the number
of observations for each attribute level. At a glance, we can see that the mean for each
attribute levels over the choice options looks significantly different. The mean attribute
value for ‘‘Option 2”, for instance (higher option score close to 2), is either equal in some and
better in others compared to the other better alternative, ‘‘option 1”. The mean attribute
level is consistently low for the ‘‘no action” status quo alternative supporting the same




Figure 2.4. Mean attribute levels by Options. The diamond represents
mean groundwater aquatic health levels. The vertical span of each diamond
represents the 95% confidence interval for the mean across the three alterna-
tives. The line near the center of each diamond represents the group mean.




Figure 2.5. Mean attribute levels by options. The diamond represents
mean habitat loss and rural character levels. The vertical span of each
diamond represents the 95% confidence interval for the mean across the
three alternatives. The line near the center of each diamond represents the




Figure 2.6. Mean cost level by options. The diamond represents mean
cost levels. The vertical span of each diamond represents the 95% confidence
interval for the mean across the three alternatives. The line near the center
of each diamond represents the group mean. The length between the ticks is
proportional to the number of observations.
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Table 2.5. Correlated normally distributed coefficients
Groundwater Aquatic Habitat Rural Cost
β2 [Groundwater] 0.134***
(6.54)
β3 [AquaticHealth] -0.0000165 0.0181***
(-1.29) (6.03)
β4 [HabitatLoss] -0.000924 0.0280* -0.0000603***
(-0.06) (2.41) (-6.31)
β5 [RuralCharacter] 0.0144*** -0.0247 0.00341 -0.0116***
(5.33) (-1.39) (0.34) (-3.62)
β6 [Cost] -0.0731* 0.00488 0.0780* -0.0182 0.0868***
(-2.53) (0.42) (2.50) (-1.06) (12.38)
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
In addition, it worth looking at whether there is any correlation in the random parameters
of the attributes implying that individuals consider more than one attribute in making choice
decisions. Table 2.6 shows covariance matrix for the random coefficients and the elements
of the lower-triangular matrix (L), where the covariance matrix for the random coefficients
is conventionally given by Σ = LL
′
, the Cholesky factorization of the covariance matrix V
(Hole, 2007, Hensher and Greene, 2003). Diagonal values are the variances of the variables
and the off-diagonal elements are the covariances. For example, the covariance on natural
habitat and aquatic health is positively correlated and statistically significantly different
from zero, implying that a respondent who prefers an option with higher salmon return
would also prefer more natural habitat protected. The covariance on natural habitat and
rural character is negatively correlated and statistically significant, implying a respondent
who prefers an option with less population density or better rural character also prefers
more natural habitat protected and vise-versa. The covariance on natural habitat and
groundwater is positively correlated, implying that a respondent who prefers a natural
habitat protected also prefers an option which offers a lower share of total water use from
groundwater and vise-versa. Moreover, the magnitudes on the coefficients of the covariances
are relatively higher, reflecting the fact that allowing for covariances capture more variance
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in the unobserved portion of utility, such that error term ǫij has less variance and therefore
raises the parameters. Following Hole (2007) , we can test the joint significance of the
off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix using the likelihood ratio test. The test
statistic is chi-squared distributed with 10 degrees of freedom under the null of uncorrelated
coefficients, and it is given by 2× (2322.7199− 2300.2773)) = 44.8852, implying rejection of
the null hypothesis. Individual coefficient variations kernel density estimators confirm that
the joint significance of the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are significantly
different from each other. An estimate of the individual coefficient variations density of the
parameters in our sample is presented in Figure 2.10.24 Given the fact that kernel density
estimators are spread over some interval, we conclude that there is substantial explained
variation in the individuals choice decisions in the sample.
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Figure 2.7. Coefficient variations kernel density. The kernel density esti-
mators are spread over some interval, and that there is substantial explained
variation in the individuals choice decisions.
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2.9.4. Latent Class Model. In all models above, I assumed that the distribution of
the coefficients was continuous.25 However, the coefficients may be discrete, which leads to
the latent class model where each respondent is assumed to belong to a class and preferences
vary across, but not within, classes. We know that class membership is unknown and is
latent from the perspective of the researcher, not the individual, and the probability that
an individual belongs to class is estimated as a function of characteristics of the individual’s
covariates (Greene and Hensher, 2003). According to Greene and Hensher (2003), ‘‘the
underlying theory of the LCM posits that individual behavior depends on observable
attributes and on latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are unobserved by the
analyst. Thus, individuals are implicitly sorted into a set of different classes, but which class
contains any particular individual, whether known or not to that individual, is unknown to
the analyst.”
Hence, I follow the conventional maximum-likelihood method of estimating latent classes
to determine class-membership probabilities, and the probability that an individual in a
given class will have specific a priori environmental damage perception. This is possible in
the latent-class model in the sense that the sample consists of random draws from a mixture
of population density functions, one for each class (Magidson and Vermunt, 2002). The first
step in this direction would be determining the optimal number of latent classes. Based on
Log-likelihood function (LLF), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) and Consistent AIC (CAIC) model selection criterion, five latent classes
are needed as the best fit from 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 classes. Table 2.6 presents latent class
selection criterion. 26 Higher LLF value and lower values of AIC, BIC and CAIC indicate
better fits.
25see Hole (2007), Danthurebandara et al. (2013) for more on this
26See Porcu and Giambona (2016) for the introduction to latent class analysis with applications.
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Table 2.6. Latent Class Selection Criteria
Classes LLF Nparam AIC CAIC BIC
2 -2368.136 12 4760.272 4822.053 4810.053
3 -2308.114 19 4654.229 4752.05 4733.05
4 -2266.599 26 4585.198 4719.058 4693.058
5 -2232.72 33 4531.44 4701.339 4668.339
6 -2227.248 40 4534.497 4740.436 4700.436
7 -2279.943 47 4653.887 4895.865 4848.865
Before estimating the LCM, I will explore the inherent characteristics of the data based
on answers to the a priori environmental damage perception questions. I do this to find
out if an individual in a given class behaves specific to a priori environmental damage
perceptions in line with my hypothesis that ‘‘a priori environmental damage perception
actually matters in people’s conservation options choice decisions.” I use the attitudinal a
priori environmental damage perception data based on answers to Likert-scale questions
2-7 in the main survey (see Appendix B for a priori environmental damage perception
questions 2-7). These questions are easy to relate to from the perspective of the respondents
and indirectly ask their perceived perception about the degree of environmental damage.
The answers to these questions range from yes/no type to a 5-6 level likert-scaled answers.
These answers were clustered into five latent classes based on model goodness of fit using
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), binning likert-scaled answers of question 3-7 together
into three a priori damage perception categories above and below some threshold value.
Then each answer was assigned a score of 0, 1 and 2 for latent class definition according to
the degree of damage perception, 0 being ‘‘no damage” and 2 being ‘‘high damage” (see
table 2.9 for class definition and analysis summary). For instance, ‘‘Panel A” presents
perception question 1 and its associated answers. Class 1 has more ‘‘No” answers (81%)
and it gets a score (LCS) of 0; more answers for ‘‘sometimes” in ‘‘Panel B” (50%) and it
gets a score of 1; more answers for ‘‘disturbed” in ‘‘panel C” (45%) and gets a score of
1. I do the same for all perception questions for each class. Then, I renamed the classes:
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‘‘unconcerned”,‘‘concerned”, ‘‘very concerned”, ‘‘worried” and ‘‘very worried” based on the
total class proportions score or column sum.
Table 2.7. A Priori Environmental Views and Damage Perception based Classes
Category LCS
Unconcerned Concerned Very Concerned Worried Very Worried
Class 4 Rank Class 1 Rank Class 3 Rank Class 2 Rank Class 5 Rank











Yes 1 0.1873 0.9273 0.9336 0.9999 0.8986










1Never 0 0.4546 0.0223 0.0004 0.0197 0.1293
All the time 2 0.047 0.0005 0.9944 0.5448 0.2754










2Undisturbed 0 0.3179 0.124 0.1561 0.1557 0.2234
Very Disturbed 2 0.2324 0.4515 0.5961 0.6344 0.5401










2No Original 2 0.6304 0.6989 0.869 0.6631 0.7029
More 0 0.0361 0.0396 0.000 0.0306 0.1452










2All 2 0.2199 0.3841 0.4125 0.0027 0.714
Few 0 0.4577 0.4113 0.4326 0.7889 0.0002










2Few 0 0.2425 0.1483 0.1764 0.1741 0.0003
Many 1 0.5192 0.7232 0.5235 0.7673 0.5329










2Neutral 1 0.3826 0.0969 0.0777 0.0901 0.0002
Positive 0 0.3332 0.7158 0.9215 0.0008 0.0007
Total LSC 6 7 8 10 12
The above perception analysis is demonstrated in Figure 2.11 using Multidimensional
Scaling (MDS) plot.27 It is also called ‘‘perception configuration map’’, with each group
represented as points. The points are arranged in such a way that their distances correspond
to perception similarities: similar people in a priori perception are represented by points
that are close to each other, dissimilar people by points that are far apart.
What we see here is that ‘‘distance is nonmetric and therefore MDS only assumes that
the order of the proximities is meaningful. In nonmetric MDS, only the ordinal information
27Multidimensional scaling (MDS)‘‘ is a statistical approach of determining the perceptual space of subjects
to the problem of finding underlying attributes or dimensions, which influence how subjects evaluate a
given set of options (Wickelmaier, 2003).”
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in the proximities is used for constructing the configuration. The order of the distances in a
nonmetric MDS configuration reflects the order of the proximities as good as possible while
interval and ratio information is of no relevance (Wickelmaier, 2003).” Therefore, the three
points ‘‘concerned”, ‘‘unconcerned”, and ‘‘very concerned” seem to be similar and closer in
perception, since they are closer to each other than ‘‘very worried” and ‘‘worried” looked
at from the Latent Class Analysis MDS 2 (LCA MDS 2) dimension. The ‘‘very worried”
and ‘‘very concerned” seem to be two very distant groups looked at from dimension LCA
MDS 1, but rather closer/similar in perception on dimension LCA MDS 2.28 The next step
 
Figure 2.8. Perception Dissimilarity (MDS) plot. It is also called ‘‘percep-
tion configuration map’’, with each group represented as points. The points
are arranged in such a way that their distances correspond to perception
similarities: similar people in a priori perception are represented by points
that are close to each other, dissimilar people by points that are far apart.
would be estimating class membership and model coefficients jointly (the standard Latent
Class Model (LCM)) and matching each latent class with class characteristics from Table
2.7. Table 2.8 shows the LCM estimated based only on alternative specific attributes or
28See (Wickelmaier, 2003) for more references on this concept.
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covariates. Matching the two tables on class membership, it should be the case that ‘‘class
4”, defined based only on attitudinal data consisting answers to Likert-scale questions from
table 2.8 is the same as ‘‘class 4” estimated using LCM based only on alternative specific
attributes. Then, I rename each class in LCM by its corresponding class match from Table
2.7. For instance, class 4 has a low class score (LCS) of 6 and is ‘‘unconcerned” group and
its corresponding Maximum Likelihood LCM based estimates is class 4 in table 2.8 and
should also be characterized as the ‘‘unconcerned” group.
Table 2.8. Latent Class Model (LCM) with 5 classes
Variables RP Model
Latent Class Model (LCM)
Class 4 Class 1 Class 3 Class 2 Class 5
Unconcerned Concerned Very Concerned Worried Very Worried
β2 [Groundwater] -0.0113 0.594* -0.0347* -0.0917*** 0.131** -0.0867**
(-0.75) -2.47 (-2.30) (-4.26) -3.12 (-3.08)
β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0000281*** -0.000106* 0.0000630*** 0.0000391** -0.000039* 0.0000163
(-3.67) (-2.16) -6.22 -3.12 (-2.02) -1.13
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00958*** 0.0132 -0.0171*** -0.0208*** 0.0265*** -0.00239
(-5.31) -1.37 (-8.61) (-6.11) -4.41 (-0.69)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.0175 0.0213 0.027 -0.214*** -0.0826*** -0.0298
(-1.67) -0.55 -1.69 (-5.17) (-3.57) (-1.85)
β6 [Cost] -0.0408*** -0.0346 0.0304*** -0.0466** 0.118*** -0.0373**
(-3.91) (-0.85) -4.00 (-3.18) -5.42 (-2.89)
Class Share 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.26 0.15
N 8424 8424 8424 8424 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Therefore, in table 2.8, we see LCM estimates and each class characterized by cor-
responding a priori environmental damage perception class categories. We also see that
the mean estimates of the coefficients of perception class do not vary much but mostly
statistically significant. The individual level of significance is also relatively higher among
the concerned, very concerned and worried group compared to the coefficients in the uncon-
cerned and very worried group. The most important conservation options choice decision
attribute for the ‘‘unconcerned group” is groundwater and aquatic habitat. All attributes
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are important decision variables for the ‘‘concerned” group except rural character. All
environmental attributes are important decision variables for the ‘‘very concerned” and
‘‘worried” groups. Groundwater and cost matters among the ‘‘very worried’ group. Other-
wise, all the coefficients have the expected sign except for the ‘‘concerned” and ‘‘worried”
groups for the payment vehicle (cost). Therefore, we can conclude that most coefficients
vary within perception latent classes and across models suggesting that heterogeneity could
probably be attributed to the difference in people’s a priori damage perception about the
environment. Moreover, the parametric estimates for each perception latent classes are
clearly significant and capture heterogeneity in preference (see Table 2.9). Compared to
the random effects model presented in Table 2.3, the magnitude of variances or random
effect (RE) relatively decreased implying that a larger share of variance is captured when
choices are evaluated considering people’s a priori damage perception. The ‘‘RP Model” in
table 2.8 is the combined random intercepts and slops estimates.
Otherwise, people among all perception groups want a better environment because at
least one or more better environmental attributes are considered important in their choice
decisions. That means the better conservation option is favored over ‘‘no action” status quo
option regardless of cost in all perception groups contrary to the theoretical expectation.
We can explore this conclusion further by investigating whether a priori perception
based choice is mainly composed of those choosing the status quo, as this may mean that
people are only interested in the ‘‘no action” status quo option or the improved options.
I demonstrate this in table 2.10 which shows the proportion of options chosen by each
perception classes. We see that the proportion of people choosing the ‘‘no action” status quo
option decreases with the decrease in the degree of concern, and the proportion of people
choosing improved and much improved options ‘‘Options 1 and 2 ” relatively increase with
the increase in level of concern as expected. For example, 26% and 19% of ‘‘unconcerned”
and ‘‘very worried” groups choose the ‘‘no action ” status quo option and 45% and 46%
choose ‘‘Option 1” respectively.
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Table 2.9. Parametric Estimates by Perception Group
Variable
Unconcerned Concerned V/Concerned Worried V/Worried
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
β2 [Groundwater] -0.049 0.0321 -0.026 0.109*** -0.094** 0.0281 -0.055* 0.143*** -0.025 0.154***
(-1.69) (-0.39) (-1.21) (3.33) (-3.07) (0.43) (-2.11) (4.29) (-0.77) (3.90)
β3 [Aquatic Habitat] 0.00004* 0.00002 0.00004** 0.00006*** 0.000008 0.00004 0.00005*** 0.00007*** -0.000002 0.00002
(2.53) (0.41) (3.24) (3.75) (0.46) (-1.34) (3.61) (3.44) (-0.07) (0.53)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.0029 0.014*** -0.009*** 0.020*** -0.009* 0.0136** -0.018*** 0.0211*** -0.0092* 0.019***
(-0.79) (3.51) (-3.43) (5.73) (-2.56) (-2.88) (-5.26) (5.45) (-2.52) (-4.44)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.036 0.099** -0.037* 0.110*** -0.068* 0.142*** -0.067*** 0.108*** -0.075*** 0.071
(-1.46) (2.89) (-2.32) (4.73) (-2.52) (3.91) (-3.71) (-3.99) (-3.65) (-1.76)
β6 [Cost] -0.025 0.108*** -0.0068 0.0789*** -0.0184 0.123*** 0.0015 0.0815*** 0.014 0.083***
(-1.17) (5.83) (-0.57) (8.04) (-0.87) (-6.12) (0.11) (7.05) (0.85) (6.20)
χ2(df m) 172.2 (5) 356.4 (5) 245.2 (5) 261.2 (5) 173.5 (5)
N 1008 2664 1242 2211 1296
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001
This same information can demonstrably captured using ternary plot. The ternary plot
is handy to compare each perception group individually. We see that each ternary figure
2.9-2.15, display the distribution and variability of three-part perception groups and options
chosen. The blue, red and green dots represents how one individual’s conservation options
choice given his/her a priori perception about the environment varies. Eyeballing only
the blue dots that identify percentage of the ‘‘no action” status quo option chosen, say
in figures 2.9 (a), the proportion of people choosing the ‘‘no action” status quo option is
higher among the ‘‘Concerned” group compared to the ‘‘Worried group” keeping the other
perception group constant. Similar to the conclusion made above, this also is in line with
our hypothesis and expectation that ‘‘less concerned individuals most likely choose the ‘‘no
action” status quo option.” Similar results are displayed in figures 2.9 (b)-12.15 where those
less concerned are choosing the ‘‘no action” status quo option more often than not.
In summary, society’s conservation option choice decision and motivations in the latent
class model are better characterized by a priori perception damage. These five distinct classes
highlight homogeneity within the heterogeneity of society in general and individuals‘ trade-
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Table 2.10. Proportion of Choices by Perception Classes and Options Chosen
Perception Probability OPTION 1 OPTION 2 STATUS QUO
Prob in Unconcerned
Mean 0.13214637 0.11050384 0.169073535
Std Dev 0.28369248 0.25239946 0.32327707
Min 0.00036217 0.00036217 0.000379354
Max 0.99954026 0.99954026 0.999684737
% of Total 44.87% 28.69% 26.43%
Prob in Concerned
Mean 0.33709525 0.36104842 0.337657894
Std Dev 0.39843135 0.39922659 0.392535781
Min 2.7771E-05 2.7771E-05 8.02407E-05
Max 0.99335077 0.99335077 0.993350768
% of Total 43.86% 35.92% 20.22%
Prob in Very Concerned
Mean 0.16000249 0.10847962 0.195271951
Std Dev 0.35675297 0.29881608 0.389091255
Min 9.22E-11 2.35E-10 6.40E-10
Max 0.99907244 0.99907244 0.998912948
% of Total 48.07% 24.92% 27.01%
Prob in Worried
Mean 0.23479019 0.28751599 0.174495784
Std Dev 0.37155628 0.39458614 0.321003557
Min 3.30E-11 2.02E-10 3.30E-11
Max 0.99933005 0.99933005 0.999330048
% of Total 43.89% 41.10% 15.02%
Prob in Very Worried
Mean 0.13596571 0.13245214 0.123500836
Std Dev 0.29343298 0.28613514 0.265423147
Min 2.62E-11 7.49E-11 6.65E-12
Max 0.99579583 0.99595174 0.994121894
% of Total 46.23% 34.44% 19.33%
offs among conservation attributes could be explained by perceived a prior heterogeneous






Figure 2.9. Options chosen by classes: ‘‘worried” vis-à-vis‘‘concerned” and






Figure 2.10. Options chosen by classes: ‘‘very concerned” vis-à-vis ‘‘wor-






Figure 2.11. Options chosen by classes: ‘‘unconcerned” vis-à-vis ‘‘worried”






Figure 2.12. Options chosen by classes: ‘‘very worried” vis-à-vis ‘‘con-






Figure 2.13. Options chosen by classes: ‘‘very worried” vis-à-vis ‘‘uncon-
cerned”, ‘‘very worried” vis-à-vis ‘‘very concerned” group compared
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2.10. Mean Willingness to Pay (MWTP) and welfare estimates
As stated above, I applied a choice modeling approach to value the benefits placed on
the environmental conservations options chosen and changes in environmental attributes.
Here I focus on the implication of preference and response heterogeneities on welfare, since
heterogeneity impacts the willingness to pay which is used to quantify gains (or losses) of
the environmental conservation policy options. Given the cost coefficient, I estimate the
willingness to pay values for each attribute. I calculate WTP values following from Hole
(2007) as before:
(15) E(WTP j) = −
E(βj)
(βLevy)
Then, I quantify gains or losses by multiplying the average estimated value obtained from
these estimations (willingness to pay) by the population of the study region. I assume
RDCO’s population to be about 100,000 households on average over the planning period. In
Tables 2.11 and 2.12, I present the willingness to pay estimates for conditional logit (CL),
random parameter (RP) and each perception category latent class models respectively.
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Table 2.11. Mean Willingness to Pay (MWTP) Estimates
WTP Groundwater Aquatic habitat Natural Habitat Rural Character
Panel A: Standard Conditional Logit
Mean WTP 9.2299834 -0.02088377 7.7683167 13.802641
Lower 95% -98.756915 -0.24446358 -73.349563 -131.95045
Upper 95% 117.21688 0.20269603 88.886197 159.55573
Panel B: Random Intercept Only
Mean WTP -8.3463145 0.0178702 -5.1942633 -8.4604849
Lower 95% -52.040483 -0.08329984 -35.332202 -57.98559
Upper 95% 35.347854 0.11904024 24.943675 41.06462
Panel C: Random Coeffients Only [Suppressed constant]
Mean WTP -8.5122388 0.00646589 -2.1216184 -10.979478
Lower 95% -29.348336 -0.00952953 -7.5759369 -39.71365
Upper 95% 12.323859 0.02246132 3.3327002 17.754694
Panel D: Random Intercepts and Random Coeffients
Mean WTP -0.3010169 0.00067951 -0.23291638 -0.45936837
Lower 95% -0.96563178 0.00030334 -0.34812454 -0.9898203
Upper 95% 0.36359797 0.00105567 -0.11770822 0.07108356
We see that the mean willingness to Pay (MWTP) estimates in both cases differ a great
deal across the models and perception groups. It ranges from $0.3 to $9.00 per $1000 in
property value for the decrease in the share of total water use from groundwater; from $7 to
$208 per $1000 in property value for each 10,000 salmon return; from $0.2 to $8.00 less per
$1000 in property value for a km2 loss in natural habitat; from $0.45 less to $13 more per
$1000 in property value for preserving rural character. However, the coefficients on property
levy (cost) in the standard conditional logit (CL) and the random intercepts only models
are not statistically significant and the MWTP amounts are not statistically different from
zero at 95% level of confidence. The combined random coefficients and intercepts and the
random coefficients with fixed intercepts models are statistically significant (see Table 2.3)
and the MWTP values are statistically different from zero at 95% level of confidence. We
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Table 2.12. Willingness to Pay Estimates (MWTP) by Perception Class
Perception Class (LC) MWTP Groundwater Aquatic Health Habitat Loss Rural Character
Unconcerned
Mean wtp -1.9907101 0.0016321 -0.11674358 -1.4519163
Lower 95% -5.070944 -0.00074366 -0.39054717 -4.076423
Upper 95% 1.0895239 0.00400785 0.15706 1.1725905
Concerned
Mean wtp -3.7794399 0.00601769 -1.3449238 -5.4631187
Lower 95% -14.929722 -0.01263812 -5.6868945 -23.497461
Upper 95% 7.3708422 0.0246735 2.9970469 12.571223
Very Concerned
Mean wtp -5.1224926 0.00042853 -0.51063972 -3.7174741
Lower 95% -15.524185 -0.00121883 -1.5745633 -12.012697
Upper 95% 5.2791996 0.00207589 0.55328386 4.5777483
Worried
Mean wtp 38.150655 -0.03348635 12.363005 46.314221
Lower 95% -636.34881 -0.61979144 -202.23106 -756.34234
Upper 95% 712.65012 0.55281874 226.95707 848.97078
Very Worried
Mean wtp 1.8609225 0.00008392 0.67550404 5.492792
Lower 95% -5.9178773 -0.00206085 -1.158074 -8.1843092
Upper 95% 9.6397223 0.00222868 2.5090821 19.169893
also see that willingness to pay values are statistically significant for aquatic habitat and
natural habitat under random intercepts and random coefficients models, implying that
scarce resources should be directed to these environmental attributes (see Table 2.11).
Similarly, the mean MWTP differs a great deal across the perception groups. It ranges
from $2 less for the ‘‘unconcerned” to $38 more for the ‘‘worried” per $1000 in property
value for the decrease in the share of total water use from groundwater; from $16 for the
‘‘unconcerned” to $335 for the ‘‘worried” group per $1000 in property value for each 10,000
salmon return; from $0.10 less for ‘‘unconcerned” to $12.00 more per $1000 in property
value per a km2 for natural habitat protection; and from $2 less for the ‘‘unconcerned” to
$46 more for the ‘‘worried” group per $1000 in property value for the protection of rural
character. Similar to the CL and RP models, the coefficients on property levy (cost) for the
perception groups are not statistically significant and the WTP amounts are not statistically
different from zero at 95% level of confidence (see Table 2.9).
I use these WTP estimates for the welfare analysis since heterogeneity of affects MWTP
estimates which is important for the quantification of gains or losses of the conservation
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policies in achieving the goals by 2040. Latent class perception groups allow us to differentiate
between groups of people with varying levels of concern about the environment and what
each proposed conservation options would mean to them. The fact that at least one or more
attributes are important decision variable for all perception group, improved conservation
option will allow people to enjoy higher benefit and quality environment by 2040. Even the
extreme case class members, the ‘‘unconcerned,” consider aquatic habitat as an important
decision attribute and are willing to pay for it. It is in the interest of the other environmental
damage perception groups to pay for improved environmental quality regardless of the
level of payment. we also note that cost is not important in all cases (if only figures in
Table 2.9 is considered).Farizo et al. (2014) suspects this kind of result could be a form of
‘‘rejecting paying for improvements (as a protest), or that the amounts required to achieve
these improvements are not important enough compared with the benefits pursued.”
Therefore, considering the perception group class share (class share row in Table 2.8), I
calculate aggregate welfare estimates (not discounted) under five possible scenarios, assuming
that each perception group could influence proposed environmental policy implementa-
tion. I specifically consider the following scenarios: the ‘‘unconcerned” group influences
environmental policy implementation; ‘‘concerned” group influences environmental policy
implementation; the ‘‘very concerned” group influences environmental policy implementa-
tion; the ‘‘worried” group influences environmental policy implementation; and the ‘‘very
worried” group influences environmental policy implementation. In Table 2.13, I show
welfare gains/loss using MWTP amount from the CL and RP models estimates (Table 2.11)
and LCM perception groups (Table 2.12) considering only the maximum MWTP values
and ignoring the signs. Assuming that there are 100,000 households in RDCO at the end
of the planning period, the cost/benefit would range from 85 million to 180 million under
the CL & RP models and from 4 million to 300 million among different perception groups.
The worried group, for instance, would definitely benefit more if they happen to be the
group influencing the proposed conservation policy option implementation. For that matter,
all perception groups would benefit from improved conservation policy options as at least
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Table 2.13. Welfare Estimates under perception groups influencing policy




CL& RP Models LCM
Cl & RP LCM Benefit/yr Benefit/30 yrs Benefit/yr Benefit/30 yrs
Unconcerned
Ground Water 9 2 0.12 100000 108 3240 24 720
Aquatic Habitat 208 16 0.12 100000 2496 74880 192 5760
Natural Loss 8 0.12 0.12 100000 96 2880 1.44 43.2
Rural Charcter 13 2 0.12 100000 156 4680 24 720
Total Benefit 2856 85680 241.44 7243.2
Concerned
Ground Water 9 4 0.32 100000 288 8640 128 3840
Aquatic Habitat 208 60 0.32 100000 6656 199680 1920 57600
Natural Loss 8 1 0.32 100000 256 7680 32 960
Rural Character 13 6 0.32 100000 416 12480 192 5760
Total Benefit 7616 228480 2272 68160
Very Concerned
Ground Water 9 5 0.15 100000 135 4050 75 2250
Aquatic Habitat 208 4 0.15 100000 3120 93600 60 1800
Natural Loss 8 0.51 0.15 100000 120 3600 7.65 229.5
Rural Character 13 4 0.15 100000 195 5850 60 1800
Total Benefit 3570 107100 202.65 6079.5
Worried
Ground Water 9 38 0.26 100000 234 7020 988 29640
Aquatic Habitat 208 335 0.26 100000 5408 162240 8710 261300
Natural Loss 8 12 0.26 100000 208 6240 312 9360
Rural Character 13 46 0.26 100000 338 10140000 1196 35880
Total Benefit 6188 185640 11206 336180
Very Worried
Ground Water 9 2 0.15 100000 135 4050 30 900
Aquatic Habitat 208 0.83 0.15 100000 3120 93600 12.45 373.5
Natural Loss 8 0.68 0.15 100000 120 3600 10.2 306
Rural Charcter 13 6 0.15 100000 195 5850 90 2700
Total Benefit 3570 107100 142.65 4279.5
one environmental attribute is considered important in their choice decisions and they are
willing to pay. This is an important observation in the sense that people have different
motivations and convictions in choosing conservation options and this approach could be
used by policy makers as one of the many ways to estimate benefits/costs of conservation
polices proposals. These benefit/cost figures could also be used as starting point toward




Continuing growth and development is placing increasing pressure on environmental
resources, such as ground water, aquatic habitats, natural habitats and rural landscape.
These resources provide environmental services that can undoubtedly be underestimated
and overlooked. I believe that individuals’ subjective damage perceptions about how growth
and development impact the environment mirrors the value they put on these environmental
goods and services.
The latent class analysis and characterization of the underlying reason for heterogeneity
is appealing in the sense that individuals level of concern matters in the trade-off among
conservation options. It was possible to distinctly show respondents dissimilarity in terms of
the degree of concern for the environment. This is interesting and one of the many ways both
preference and response heterogeneity could elegantly be explained. The proportion of people
choosing the ‘‘no action” status quo option is higher among the less ‘‘concerned” group
compared to the relatively ‘‘worried” group. This finding is in line with our hypothesis and
expectation that ‘‘less concerned individuals most likely choose the ‘‘no action” status quo
option. The fact that at least one or more attributes are important decision variable for all
perception group, improved conservation options are opted for and that would allow people
to enjoy higher benefit and quality environment. Therefore, contrasting the willingness to
pay values along this line is more informative and persuasive for policy recommendations.
In a nutshell, the probability that an individual in a given class behaving specific to a
priori environmental damage perceptions is in line with our claim that a priori environmental
damage perception actually matters in people’s conservation options choice decisions.
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CHAPTER 3
On Measuring Social Network Effect in
Conservation Option Choices: The Random Utility
Maximization Nested Logit Approach
3.1. Introduction
While Choice Experiment (CE) is generally one of the toolkits used for eliciting individual
preferences over hypothetical alternative scenarios, it assumes that every individual makes
autonomous choices, without considering the social impact. However, empirical studies
show that choice is social; people inhabit and are influenced by complex and evolving social
relationships and influenced by many factors beyond the attributes of the good (He et al.,
2014, Knoke and Yang, 2008, Faust et al., 2002, He et al., 2014).
The idea of social interactions as a determinant of behavior, while relatively recent in
the context of economic theory, is of course not new in fields such as sociology (Brock and
Durlauf, 2003). But, ‘‘connectedness” as a lingua franca of interaction of modern society is
only a few decades old (Easley et al., 2012). The basis of the network analysis comes from
human nature as social animal and from the relationships between people who recognize
each other as part of the network system (Diani, 2003; Diani and McAdam, 2003; He et al.,
2014, Golub and Jackson, 2010). Its strength lies in its ability to analyze both the behavior
of individual actors and the behavior of the whole network (Watts and Witham, 2012;
Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994).
Formally, a social network is defined as ‘‘a group of people who are connected to some
or all of the others following a random or particular pattern in network system (He et al.,
2014).” In network language, this translates into links between nodes in a graph (Watts
and Strogatz, 1998; Watts and Witham, 2012). Nodes show the position of different actors
in a network and links measure how involved an actor is, how connected the actor is (Diani
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and McAdam, 2003) and represent a flow of potential information and interaction between
those ‘nodes’ of individuals (Burt, 1984, Carrasco et al., 2008). Network positions could
facilitate or constrain actors (Diani and McAdam, 2003), and this can be measured by their
degree and other centrality measures (Freeman et al., 1979). Actors with high betweenness
centrality, for instance, have greater possibility to control the flow of resources (Watts and
Witham, 2012). This could increase the potential to locate and gain resources from the
network, but also increase direct influence - for example, in face-to-face meetings which
creates the ability to shape actions and priorities (Watts and Witham, 2012).1 Thus, we can
utilize social network analysis to describe, summarize and visualize individual interactions
and connections and their implications for decision making.
In this chapter, I investigate the role of interaction in people’s decisions in the context
of environmental conservation policy choices by introducing a social network centrality
measure into a traditional utility functions. I estimate individual’s choice coefficients and
parameters for hypothetical conservation choice options described by multiple environmental
goods attributes within a Nested Logit Model (NLM): nesting distinct conservation policy
options within broader and composite level environmental conservation policy outcomes.
The question I specifically examine is whether social networks influence choice decisions
and explains the variations in observed willingness to pay amounts among individuals for
environmental goods in a systematic way. The closest study utilizing the method employed
here is a paper by He et al. (2014) that examined the impact of social networks on consumer
preferences and choice behaviors in the adoption of new products. Their result illustrates the
need for considering social impact in forecasting new product adoption. To my knowledge,
no study empirically evaluated social network effect as source of systematic preference
heterogeneity in the context of environmental conservation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature
on social network theories and choice experiments. Section 3.3 outlines the theoretical model.
1For further reviews of the paradigm and techniques, see Scott (2011), Jackson et al. (2008), Carrington
et al. (2005), Wasserman and Faust (1994), Wellman and Berkowitz (1988), Carrasco and Miller (2009).
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Section 3.4 describes the survey methodology and the structure of network data. Section 3.5
outlines the NLM method and its appeal for analyzing data that has a hierarchical structure.
In section 3.6, I present results and discussions on choice decisions and the interdependence
of preferences in a network. Section 3.7 offers brief concluding remarks.
3.2. Literature Review: Social Network Theories
The importance of interpersonal interaction on decision behavior has been studied
by numerous researchers (McFadden, 2010, Lobel and Sadler, 2015, Bramoullé et al.,
2014, He et al., 2014, Jackson, 2010, Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996, Zhang et al., 2013,
He, 2012). McFadden (2010), specifically notes that ‘‘models that neglect to incorporate
sociality will not predict well in situations where individuals utilize their social network to
define their perceptions and preferences.” Manski (1993),Banerjee (1992), and Samuelson
(2004) highlight the importance of information obtained from social networks in influencing
preferences and choice decisions. Brock and Durlauf (2002) demonstrate interdependence of
choices and social interaction using a binary logit model. Stopher (1980) and Williams and
de Dios Ortuzar (1982) empirically test the inconsistent parameter estimates that can arise
when the choice set is considered by individual decision maker in social isolation.2 Narayan
et al. (2011) demonstrate peer influence on product attribute preference and show that peer
influence changes attitude. Dugundji and Gulyás (2008) shows consumer interdependence
by demonstrating that a given consumer’s choice is dependent on the overall market share.
Struben and Sterman (2008) illustrate a word-of-mouth effect in alternative fuel vehicle
choices. Tran (2012) demonstrates the important role that network influence plays in
accelerating energy innovation diffusion. Dugundji and Walker (2005) demonstrate the
impact of local social network effects on intercity travel mode choice behavior by introducing
local social network effects into the choice utility with varying network densities. Páez
et al. (2008) study residential location choice using simulated network data with varying
degrees of distributions and clustering parameters. Rasouli and Timmermans (2016) show
2see Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) and Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987) for more on this.
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the effects of vehicle, contextual, and social network attributes on the latent demand for
electric cars using fixed and random mixed logit models.
Applications of social network analysis to natural resources and non-market valuation
are also evolving recently. Some studies that incorporate social interactions into non-market
valuation include Bramoullé and Kranton (2007, 2003), Crona and Bodin (2006), Ostrom
(2015), Pretty and Ward (2001), Prell et al. (2009), Neilson and Wichmann (2014), Bouma
et al. (2008). Key results include the increase in the likelihood of collective action, opinion
formation, cooperation, resource sharing and social influence. For instance, Granovetter
(2005) demonstrates that overcoming the free-rider problem is more likely in groups with
a dense and cohesive social network. He argue that, ‘‘actors in dense networks typically
internalize norms that discourage free riding and emphasize trust and norms (shared ideas
about the proper way to behave) are clearer, more firmly held and easier to enforce the
more dense a social network is.” Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) show how social networks
can influence some individuals to contribute and others to free-ride. Neilson and Wichmann
(2014) argue that ‘‘social network structure with strong connection of individual members
with higher private values for the public good produces higher aggregate valuation.’’3 They
show that aggregate willingness to pay is related to network centrality. That is, societies
are willing to pay more in aggregate for a public good when that public good provides more
benefit to people more central to the society (Watts and Witham, 2012). In addition, Watts
and Witham (2012) claim that willingness to pay or willingness to accept are influenced by
the position of actors (opinion leaders) in a network. Newton (2010) analyzes the effect of
coalitional behavior on local public goods provision. ODea (2010) examines the relationship
between local public good provision and social network formation. Cho (2010) studies
3They highlight on many reasons why social network structure might impact valuation. ‘‘One is that
individuals may be altruistic and care about public goods that benefit their friends even if they do not
benefit themselves. For instance, the presence of a park might not generate any private utility for the
individual, but if the park gives her friends utility and she values those friends’ utility, she might have
positive willingness to pay for the park due to social utility. Second, people might use the public good in
groups. For instance, someone might like going to a park, but not alone, so to get enjoyment from the park
her friends must also like the park. She gets utility from going to the park with friends, but might also get
utility from going with friends’ and the utility of friends of friends may affect friends’ utility and so on.
This leads to network effect (Neilson and Wichmann, 2014).”
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endogenous formation of networks for local public goods in sequential bargaining games.
Chih (2010) incorporates interactive costs and social perception of free-rider behavior in a
model of local public goods and network formation. The overarching message addressed by
this literature is that social interactions generate variations in overall valuations of non-
market goods, and that treating individuals as independent units of analysis, as traditionally
done in economic science, overlooks this fact and that behavior is explained not only
through personal attributes but also through social structural attributes (Carrasco et al.,
2008, Neilson and Wichmann, 2014). Thus, in this chapter I investigate how individual’s
personal community networks (Egocentric network) affect conservation choice decisions
and the willingness to pay values. As Neilson and Wichmann (2014) say, ‘‘low marginal
utility agents are willing to pay more under social interaction because they benefit from the
higher marginal use values of socially connected agents. If agents are equally ‘‘important”
in the social network (i.e. they receive the same intensity of social connections), network
effects may alter individuals utility but overall welfare remains at the same level it would
be under complete social isolation. In this case, the network only works as a re-distributor
of benefits.”
None of the studies above have empirically evaluated the impact of social network on
public good conservation projects/options valuation. Therefore, this work is not only an
extension of the previous literature but a contribution in a sense that it illustrates the
procedure of social network data collection and application, social influence evaluation,
and choice model estimation using a choice experiment which incorporates social network
questions into non-market valuation surveys.
3.3. Social Network Model
In Egocentric Network (ENW), we are concerned with how people’s patterns of interac-
tion shape their individual-level outcomes (e.g. conservation option choices). Therefore, I
consider a model in which an individual’s discrete conservation option choice is influenced by
the number of ego’s network (alters) who usually interact with each other and discuss issues
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that matter the most to all of them. ENW is the local social network around an individual
consisting of a focal node (‘‘ego”) and the nodes to whom ego is directly connected to (these
are called ‘‘alters”) plus the ties, if any, among the alters. Each alter in an ego network has
his/her own ego network, and all ego networks interlock to form the human social network
(Borgatti et al., 2013, Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Most of the analysis of ego networks
uses ‘‘simple graphs (i.e. graphs that are symmetric, and show only connection/not, not
direction). If we are working with a directed graph, it is possible to define different kinds
of ego-neighborhoods. An ‘‘out” neighborhood would include all the actors to whom ties
are directed from ego. An ‘‘in” neighborhood would include all the actors who sent ties
directly to ego. We might want to define a neighborhood of only those actors to whom ego
had reciprocated ties (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Therefore, in this choice experiment
survey, ‘‘Ego” is the individual respondent and ‘‘Alters” are his/her contacts and we have
as many egos as the number of total choice experiment survey completed.
Formally stated, an ego network may consist of n ≥ 2 agents. Let these agents indexed
by i = 1, . . . N . Following Neilson and Wichmann (2014), I assume that people in the ego
network value each others’ utility not only from the consumption of a private good Y but
also improved public good Ψ that depends on new conservation policy outcomes. Then,
individual utility associated with choosing new conservation policy may take the following
form:
(16) V Ci = Fi(Vi(Yi,Ψ), V
i
e (Ψ))
This could be assumed to take additively separable interdependent functional form:





where Vi(Yi,Ψ) is the egocentric private utility associated with choosing environmental
conservation option ‘‘C”, Ve(Ψ) is ego’s social utility associated with his/her conservation
option choice and improved public goods that alters also benefit from its consumption, Ψ is
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exogenously provided but conservation policy dependent environmental goods (measured
by key environmental indicators/attributes), Υij ≥ 0 for all i and j is the relational ego-
alter and alter-alter tie, measured on each ordered pair of i, j = 1, . . . N .4 We can use









1, if there is ego-alter and alter-alter tie
0, otherwise
Υij represent the tie that may be reciprocated or not in a sense that Υij may be different
from Υji. In other words, the adjacency matrix could be asymmetric (Υij is not always
equal to Υji) and row stochastic matrix with dimensions n× n. A matrix is row stochastic
if it is a square matrix of nonnegative real numbers, with each row summing to 1 (Neilson
and Wichmann, 2014).
Social utility in egocentric network is assumed to be the average of alters utility. Neilson
and Wichmann (2014) formally states it as follows:







Where, V ie (Ψ) is ego i
′s social utility, ζ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that reflects the extent to which
social utility of alters is relevant to ego’s. The term (1− ζ) is the weight ego puts on own
private satisfaction vie(Ψ) by choosing conservation option ‘‘C”. In the network language,
ζ represents ego’s degree of social interaction measured by one of the network centrality
measures (i.e. degree, closeness, transitivity, clustering coefficient and/or eigenvector). Ego
i is said to be socially isolated if ego’s conservation option choice decision is independent
of alters. According to Neilson and Wichmann (2014), ‘‘when ζ = 0, ego i′s social utility
Ve(Ψ) is equal to his/her own private utility v
i
e(Ψ). Social isolation shuts down the social
4Neilson and Wichmann (2014) explains two venues through which the provision of Ψ can affect ego’s social
utility Ve(Ψ). ‘‘First, ego i obtains private utility Vi(Ψ) from the consumption of Ψ. This is the component
of social utility that is obtained from own consumption of Ψ and is independent of social effects. Second,
ego i may care about the enjoyment of her friends and, as a result, may obtain social utility.’’
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channel through which the provision of Ψ affects ego’s utility and the model simplifies to a
standard utility model without network effects.’’
Equation (19) shows interdependent utility and it can be rewritten in matrix notation
as5:
(20)
V = (I− ζ)v+ ζMV ⇒ V− ζMV = (I− ζ)v ⇒ V(I− ζM ) = (I− ζ)v ⇒
V = (I− ζM)−1(I− ζ)v
where I is the identity matrix, M is a diagonal matrix with mij in the i
th row. 6 Similar to
Neilson and Wichmann (2014) and Friedkin (1991), let Θ = (I−ζM )−1(I−ζ) ⇒ V = Θv.7
Θ represents ego-alter and alter-alter links capturing social utility and network effects on
choice decisions. Specifically, the ego-alter and alter-alter interaction and egocentric social
utility is determined by the matrix ζ M . Bramoullé (2001) calls it ‘‘primary network effect”
and Neilson and Wichmann (2014) refers to Θ as the ‘‘induced network”. They argue that
the circuitous links between agents emerging from links in the primary network induce
further ego-alter and alter-alter interaction impacting ego i′s social utility. They note that
this arises from Neumann infinite series approximation, further explained in Meyer (2000)8:
(I− ζM )−1 = (I+ (ζM ) + (ζM )2 + . . .)












Ego 0 0.5 0.5
Alter1 1 0 0










5see Bergstrom (1999), Neilson and Wichmann (2014) for the derivation and further details.
6See Bergstrom (1999) and Neilson and Wichmann (2014) for the detailed explanation.
7 Friedkin (1991) refers to Θ as ‘‘the total interpersonal effects matrix and which bases several measures of
centrality on it”
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Alter1 0 0.5 0





















Ego 0.28 0.28 0.44
Alter1 0.14 0.64 0.22










From M, we see that ego interacts with both alters with a positive weight of 0.5 each.
However, here is no alter-alter interaction. Even though the alters may not even know each
other, both alters interact with the ego and their utility may depend on ego’s utility leading
to interdependent utility. The resulting ego-alter and alter-alter utility may look like Θ
matrix. Element-wise, from Θ matrix, we see that Θ(Alter2 Alter1) have a positive utility
of 0.06, even though they do not know each other, 0 weight from matrix M. We also see that
social utility is not reciprocated such that Θ(Alter1 Alter2) is greater than Θ(Alter2 Alter1)
(0.64 > 0.06) because, from ζ matrix, the weight ζAlter1 = 0.5 and ζAlter2 = 0.
From equation (20), V = (I−ζM)−1(I−ζ)v, ego’s ‘‘total social utility can be formalized
as a function of alters private utility profile (Neilson and Wichmann, 2014).”






where θij is an element of the square matrix Θ.
9 Substituting equation (21) into equation
(16) for social utility, gives us ego i’s overall utility function, which we can use measure
ego’s willingness to pay amount for a change in public good as a consequence of choosing
9See Neilson and Wichmann (2014) for all the proofs that ‘‘agent i’s social utility is a convex combination
of the private utilities of all agents”
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any conservation option (Neilson and Wichmann, 2014, Bergstrom, 1999).











Egocentric willingness to pay values and the associated benefit associated with the
change in level of environmental attributes under prosocial conservation option chosen can
be determined using equation (22). That is, the amount of levy associated with a particular
conservation option that results in a discrete change in the levels of environmental attributes
Ψ from Ψ0 to Ψ1 could be Γi amount that solves the following equation:
10
(23) V Ci (Income
i,Ψ0) = V Ci (Income
i − Γi,Ψ
1)
From equation (22) and normalizing Vi(Yi,Ψ) to 1, the compensating welfare measure
associated with the change in the levels of environmental attributes under egocentric
network takes the following form (Neilson and Wichmann, 2014):







































From equation (21), willingness to pay under egocentric network can be rewritten as a
change in total social utility:
(26) WTP egocentrici = V
i
e (Ψ
1)− V ie (Ψ
0)
10See (Neilson and Wichmann, 2014) for more on this.
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Or from equations 25, prosocial willingness to pay can be summarized as the weighted























(28) WTP egocentrici = θij
∑
WTP private ⇒ WTPegocentrici = ΘWTP
Private
‘‘The same induced network Θ determines both social utility and willingness to pay under
network interaction (Neilson and Wichmann, 2014).”
The influence each member of the egocentric network exert is the row normalized sum
of the elements in the induced Θ matrix (Neilson and Wichmann, 2014). Friedkin (1991)
states this process that ‘‘the total interpersonal effect of one actor on another which is
related to the number and length of the various paths and sequences that join them in the
network of interpersonal influence.”
I present the application of the model using survey data collected in the Regional
District of Central Okangan (RDCO) of the British Columbia of Canada. In the survey I
incorporated network questions with the choice experiment designed to eliciting individual
preferences for a hypothetical environmental conservation programmes.
3.4. The Survey: Social Network Data
The interest in the data collection effort here is to measure how each ego’s choice
decision is influenced by the alters network. In egocentric network, unlike sociocentric social
network which use as its sampling frame a census of a particular bounded group, targets
unbounded individuals as cases. The focus on individual rather than group outcomes makes
egocentric social network analysis superior compared to the sociocentric (i.e. whole) network
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analysis (Chung et al., 2005). The boundaries of egocentric networks are defined in terms
of each neighborhood or number of alters a ego is directly connected to (Hanneman and
Riddle, 2005). The issue in egocentric network approach however is that, tie strength is
measured only from the ego perspective, for both ego-alter pairs and alter-alter pairs. This
is because it is prohibitively expensive to interview both egos and alters (Carrasco et al.,
2008). Otherwise, the potential sampling frames and data collection strategies are relatively
easier and flexible in a sense that it can be collected incorporated into large-scale surveys
such as choice experiment.
Similarly, I developed a online egocentric network survey instrument integrated with
choice experiment, modifying the survey developed by Burt (1984). It covered a variety of
aspects about egocentric network’s interaction patterns. The main ones include: information
on the social structure of individuals (egos) and alters (contacts), socioeconomic and lifestyle
attributes, with whom they talk and perform social activities, related communication
patterns (e.g. frequency and type of media used), how growth and development are
impacting the environment and if they talk with others to learn more about issues like these,
and their feeling or opinions on the environment in the Okanagan. Specifically, questions
related to network members (name generators), kind of relationship (name interpreter),
strength of contact between/among contacts, frequency of contact, length of time knowing
each other, reason of connection, political affiliation and what people talk about in general
were asked. After prompting the number of network members, further questions included
contacts gender, education, income and approximate physical distance. Respondents were
only required to provide initials of their contacts making sure that each individuals are
unique and mutually exclusive. Specifically, in the name generators section. the question
reads:
i. During the last six months, who have you talked with about how
growth and development are impacting the environment in the Central
Okanagan? Please provide us up to 5 people’s initials. The initials you
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provide will be used as part of questions later in this survey. Please
ensure that each set of initials is unique.
With this type of question we can only measure tie strength between egos and each alter,
and between alter-alter pairs.11 After eliciting network members, a second set of questions
is the name interpretor which is usually performed to obtain more information about the
characteristics of each alter (e.g. socioeconomic status, relationship with ego) and ego-alter
relationship (e.g. frequency and characteristics of interaction) (Carrasco et al., 2008). The
following questions have been asked in this section:
ii. How close (familiar) are you with these people? Choose ‘‘very close
(very familiar)”, ‘‘close (familiar)” or ‘‘Acquaintance” for each of
the people you have identified;
iii. Please think about the relations between the people you just mentioned.
Are they very close (very familiar) to one another, close (familiar) to
each other or strangers in the sense that they would not recognize one
another if they met on the street. . . . please select as ”Very close (very
familiar)(VC)”, ”Close (familiar)(C)”, ”Stranger (S)” to indicate
how familiar the person named in the row is with the person named
in the column. While in many cases we expect the familiarity to be
the same in both directions, it is possible that the familiarity may not
be the same in both;
iv. On average, how often do you talk with the people you have identified
(text,Twitter, Facebook, visit, phone, email or write)? Daily /Almost
daily; at least ; once/week; at least once/month; 3 to 4 times/year;
approximately once/year; less than once/year; do not know;
11 As before, the chosen indicator will affect which tie strength measure is collected, with emotional closeness
being the most usual and accepted (Campbell et al., 1986).
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v. How long have you known these people? less than a year; one to three
years; three to six years; six to nine years; more than nine; do not
know;
Vi. What is the political affiliation of your contact? (Your best guess if
not sure);
vii. Below are some environmental topics that people talk about. Over
the last six months, which environmental issues can you recall coming
up in your conversations?
Some of the key challenges in this data collection effort include: that people do not easily
recall their network members and need appropriate ‘prompts’ to elicit them; that Networks
are very large; that egos and alters may have different importance and priorities depending
on their unique individual characteristics; that this questions added to choice experiment
overburdens respondents limiting amount of information in a non-tedious, relatively short,
and reliable way.12
Overall, a total of 3000 households were invited, 550 started the online survey, which
yielded 468 completed questionnaires (16% response rate). Each ego named 3 alters on
average yielding about 1464 nodes or observations. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 presents the complete
undirected egocentric network and ego-alter and alter-alter network separately. 13
Similar survey was conducted by Carrasco et al. (2008) which they call it ‘‘a ‘meso’
approach, since it captures structural features, such as size of the network, approximate
density, and aggregated composition according to aspects such as role and gender, and the
ego’s characteristics. They claim that their approach contrasts with a ‘micro’ approach
mostly adopted in the interviews, which also captures more disaggregated aspects, such as
each alters characteristics (e.g gender, spatial location), and each interaction between alters
and the respondent.
12See Carrasco et al. (2008) for similar issues and problems with ego network surveys.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1. The figure show complete ego-alter map. It is computed by the
author based on survey data using Gephi software (Bastian et al., 2009). Each
point represents a person, either an ego or an alter. All nodes are one-step
away from ego and all of the ties among all of the alters to whom ego has
direct connection. People who did not list or did not talk about these issues



























Figure 3.2. Egocentric network involving an ego with 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0
alters labeled (a) , (b) , (c) , (d) , (e) and (f). For clarity, all show undirected
ego-alter and alter-alter ties. The measures included the number of alters
with whom the ego named as having a close relationship (degree), the average
strength of these relationships (closeness), and the connectedness of the named
alters to each other according to the ego (transitivity).
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In the survey, we exhaustively tested for mistakes and relevance and many changes
have been made. Researchers who have done similar study were contacted to comment on
the first draft and on the improved versions of the whole survey.14
3.5. Egocentric Network Measures
The most basic metric in network measure of tie strength is degree. It is number of
alters or ties a focal node or ego name, ranging from 0 to the maximum 5 (Freeman, 1978,






Where Φij is the adjacency matrix whose elements takes the value of 1 if there is an edge
between vertices’s i and j and 0 otherwise. It is interpreted as how connected, important,
or influential a node is or as the immediate influence of a node for catching whatever is
flowing through the network (some information) (Opsahl et al., 2010, Easley et al., 2012).
In the case of a directed network (where ties have direction), we usually define two separate
measures of degree centrality, namely indegree and outdegree. Indegree is a count of the
number of ties directed to the node and outdegree is the number of ties that the node directs
to others. When ties are associated to some positive aspect such as friendship, indegree is
often interpreted as a form of popularity, and outdegree as outgoing or social (Opsahl et al.,
2010, Wikipedia, 2016). The mean average degree in my case is 2-4 persons (see Table 3.2
for the summary statistics). The second important measure is closeness centrality which rely
on and length of the shortest paths linking two nodes, either directly or indirectly(Opsahl
et al., 2010). This measure can be formalized as follows:
(30) Φi,j = min(Aik + · · ·+ Akj)
where k is/are intermediary node/s on paths between node i and j. The closeness of an
egos relationships is, therefore, the average strengths of their reported ties (Omalley et al.,
14 See the specific items in part B6 of Appendix B of the questionnaire
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It is believed that closeness have greater discriminatory power than degree (Opsahl et al.,
2010). The third important measure in egocentric networks is transitivity. It is defined as
‘‘the average value of the relationship between all pairs of alters (Omalley et al., 2012).” It
is assumed that relationship in egocentric network is mutual and that the relationship from
j to k is the same as that from k to j). Omalley et al. (2012) formally state transitivity Ti
as follows:
(32) Ti = 2δ
−1




Where δi is the degree of ego i and ζjk is the strength of the relationship between alter j and
alter k. In the context of egocentric network , transitivity is a local measure specific to an
ego and interpreted as ‘‘the proportion of pairs of alters for which some form of relationship
exists (Omalley et al., 2012).”
The fourth tie strength measure is a clustering coefficient. The basic idea behind a
clustering coefficient is that ‘‘if two people in a social network have a friend in common,
then there is an increased likelihood that they will become friends themselves at some point

















) , if δn ≥ 2
where δn the degree of node ‘‘n” and En is the number of edges in the ego network. Li et al.
(2017). The mean clustering coefficient of a ego network with a minimum degree δ ≥ 2 is
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defined by Li et al. (2017) as :





More specifically, if there are three nodes in a network, i, j, and k, and i is connected to j
and k, the likelihood that j and k are also connected with each other is greater than the
probability of a tie randomly established between two nodes (Opsahl and Panzarasa, 2009).
The clustering coefficient of a ego A therefore is the probability that two friends of A are
friends with each other (Easley et al., 2012). It quantifies how close neighbors are to being
a clique ‘‘the friend of my friend is also my friend” (Watts, 1999)
In egocentric network, we deal with the local clustering coefficient which is based on
ego’s network density or local density (Scott, 2011, Wasserman and Faust, 1994). it is
formally stated ‘‘as the fraction of the number of ties connecting i′s neighbors over the total
number of possible ties between i′s neighbors (Opsahl and Panzarasa, 2009).”It is considered
to be an effective measure of the local connectivity or ‘‘cliquishness” of a social network Li
et al. (2017). It is called ‘‘small-world’’ network if a network has high average clustering
coefficient and a small average distance (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The mean local
clustering coefficient for my data is about 30% (See Table 3.1 for the summary statistics).
The fifth important measure is Eigenvector centrality (also called eigenvector centrality).
It is a measure of the influence of a node in a network. ‘‘Where degree centrality gives a simple
count of the number of connections a vertex has, eigenvector centrality acknowledges that not
all connections are equal. That means connections to people who are themselves influential










where ψi is the centrality of vertex i, ψj is centralities of i
′
s network neighbors, and λ is a
constant. In matrix notation with ψj = (ψ1,. . . , ψn), yields:
(36) Λψ = Φ.ψ
where now ψ is the adjacency matrix solved by the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of
Λ (Ruhnau, 2000). That means, ψi is proportional to the average of the centralities of
i
′
s network neighbors (Newman, 2008). ‘‘The eigenvector centrality defined in this way
accords each vertex a centrality that depends both on the number and the quality of its
connections: having a large number of connections still counts for something, but a vertex
with a smaller number of high-quality contacts may outrank one with a larger number of
mediocre contacts (Newman, 2008).”
Table 3.1. Social Network Parameters Summary
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Degree 2.0894 2.7449 0.0000 9.1667
Indegree 1.0458 1.3748 0.0000 5.0000
Outdegree 1.0436 1.3710 0.0000 5.0000
Closeness 0.2644 0.2999 0.0000 1.0000
Transitivity 0.3915 0.5376 0.0000 2.0000
Clustering Coefficient 0.2898 0.3675 0.0000 1.0000
Eigencentrality 0.0796 0.1972 0.0000 0.8333
3.6. Econometric Model: Nested Logit Model
The logical assumption in this chapter is that conservation options under investigation
are similar to each other at least in an unobserved way such that the correlation of error term
is expected. NLM also called the ‘‘hierarchical logit model” is appropriate in this context in
sense that it allows interdependence between the pairs of alternatives in a common group
(McFadden, 1978, Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985, Börsch-Supan, 1990). In other words, it
relaxes the strong assumptions of independently and identically distributed (IID) and the
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) inherent in conditional models by clustering
similar alternatives into nests (Heiss et al., 2002, Henser et al., 2005). Similarly, I group
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each conservation alternative by similarity such that each belongs to exactly one nest:
‘‘Improved” conservation alternative comprising Option 1 and Option 2 and ‘‘Unimproved”
conservation alternative comprising the ‘‘no action” status quo alternative. The tree
structure of individual’s decision about which conservation option to choose considering
their income may look like:
Choice
Improved
Option 1 Option 2
Unimproved
Status Quo
At the bottom of the tree are the individual conservation options, indicating that there
are some random shocks that affect the decision to choose one of the options independently.
Above the elemental options are the two groupings, indicating that other random shocks
affect the choice between the two composite groups. At the top level is a node, representing
the individual making the decision. Hence, in the first level, a composite environmental
conservation categories is chosen: the ‘‘Improved” or the ‘‘Unimproved” conservation option.
In the second level, a specific environmental conservation option is chosen : Option 1,
Option 2 or Status Quo.15
15Note: I assume that ‘‘all alternatives within an alternative set (levels one and two) are available to
someone making a choice at a specific stage. That is, only those that are nested within all higher-level
decisions. Moreover, although decision trees in nested logit analysis are often interpreted as implying that
the highest level decisions are made first, followed by decisions at lower levels, and finally the decision
among alternatives at the bottom level (StataCorp, 2005),’’ no such temporal ordering is implied here .
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The intuitive appeal of nested logit is that the probability of individual i choosing
alternative j: Pr(yi = j), is equal to the product of the probability to choose some
alternative in nest Ω: Pr(Q(j) ∈ Ω), and the conditional probability to choose exactly
alternative j given the alternative is in the same nest Q(j): Pr(yi = j|Q(j) ∈ Ω) (Heiss et al.,
2002). Specifically, the probability of choosing Option 1: Pr(yi = Option 1) is equal to the
probability that ‘‘Option 1” is in the ‘‘improved’’ nest: Pr(yi = Option 1 ∈ Q(improved))
times the conditional probability that ‘‘improved” environmental condition was chosen.
The joint probability that the decision-making entity i chooses elemental alternative j
within the nest Q(j) (P (j|Q(j))) among all possible alternatives in its choice set Ω is then
given by:
(37) P (j|Ω) = P (j|Q(j))× P (Q(j)|Ω)
I introduce the social network structure into the utility function in the spirit of Neilson
and Wichmann (2014), Dugundji and Gulyás (2008), Brock and Durlauf (2001), and Brock
and Durlauf (2002) allowing the systematic utility to be a first-order function, linear
in parameters of observable characteristics of the decision-making entity and observable
attributes of the public good of the choice alternative. Formally stated:
(38) Vij = βaαij + vi(ci(xik), ψ(zij)) +
∑
αijvi(ψ(zij)) + ǫikj
where vi(ci(xik), ψ(zij)) +
∑
αijvi(ψ(zij)) is the deterministic or systematic’ (to the
modeler) part, composed of private utility from the consumption of private goods xk which
is a function of income ci, and social utility from the enjoyment of friends or alters well-being









1, if i,j are connected
0, otherwise
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The error term represents unobserved heterogeneity. Such unobserved heterogeneity
may arise from unobserved attributes of the choice alternatives, unobserved characteristics
of the decision-making entities, or simply measurement errors in observed attributes and/or
characteristics (Dugundji and Gulyás, 2008). The term βa is an alternative specific constant
included to explicitly account for any underlying bias for one alternative over another
alternative (Dugundji and Gulyás, 2008). In other words, βa reflects the mean of the
difference in error terms (ǫikn − ǫikj); that is, the difference in the utility of alternative
n from that of j when all else is equal (Dugundji and Gulyás, 2008). The variable αij
is the interaction patterns variable as demonstrated in the seminal work of Aoki (1995),
Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002). It follows that αij ≥ 0 for all i and j is the social utility
parameter or interaction parameter capturing interaction effect when decision makers are
linked on the basis of social circles. Within NLM framework, I estimate this interaction
effect in such away that individual’s discrete conservation option preferences is influenced
by egocentric social context that emerges from interactions within the network.
Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and assuming the Gumbel-distributed distur-
bances ǫikj with a scale parameter θI , the probability that agent i chooses alternative j
within nest Q(j) (P (j|Q(j))), conditional on having chosen that nest, has a convenient
closed-form expression:
(40) P (j|Q(j)) =




k∈Q(j) ∆k exp(θI [βaαij + vi(ci(xij), ψ(zij)) +
∑
αijvi(ψ(zij))])
where, ∆j is an alternative availability indicator defined as 1 if elemental alternative j
is available to decision-making entity i and 0 otherwise. θI is a scale parameter.
Similarly to Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), under the assumption of Gumbel-distributed
disturbances ǫikj with , the probability P (j|Q(j)) that agent i chooses the particular
alternative in choice nest Q(j) among the set of Ω nests also has a convenient closed-form
expression, given by:
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(41) P (Q(j)|Ω) =




Q(j)∈Ω ζk exp(θI [Γaαij + ui(ci(xij), ψ(zij)) +
∑
αijui(ψ(zij))])
Where j is the elemental alternative (Option 1, 2 and status quo) , Q(j) is the composite
alternatives (‘‘improved” and ‘‘unimproved”) and Γa is a composite alternative specific
constant included to explicitly account for any underlying bias for one composite alternative
over another. It is the allowance for the possibility of shared unobserved heterogeneity at
the nest level which is the unique advantage NLM. However, Dugundji and Gulyás (2008)
notes that‘‘without loss of generality, the shared observable attributes at the nest level may
be defined at the elemental alternative level and explicit definition of availability at the
nest is superfluous.” Moreover, the NLM will reduce to the multinomial logit model if the
scale parameter θI for the lower nests is equal to the scale parameter ζ for the upper nest
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985, Dugundji and Gulyás, 2008).
The Maximum likelihood techniques are used to estimate parameters of the NLM models.









where ηij is 1 if individual i chooses alternative j and 0 otherwise, Pij is the probability




















η(i,j|Q(j)) lnP (i, j|Q(j))
where η(i,Q(j)) is 1 if individual i chooses nest Q(j) and 0 otherwise, P (i, Q(j)|Ω) is
the probability that individual i chooses nest Q(j), η(i,j|Q(j)) is 1 if individual i chooses
alternatives j in the nest Qj and 0 otherwise, and P (i, j|Q(j)) is the probability that
individual i chooses alternative j in the nest Q(j).
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3.7. Results and Discussion
In this survey, respondents were required to tell us about the people they usually talk
to about things affecting the environment in the Okanagan. They were required to name
at least 5 and including the following: their contacts’ preferences for conservation options;
their contacts’ socio-demographics (e.g., income, age, education); if the contacts were
neighbors, family, co-workers, social clubs, etc.; how they interact (text, Twitter, Facebook,
visit, phone, email or write); and the activities they usually undertake that involve the
environment (bird watching, hiking, boating etc). A total of 468 survey participants named
on average 3 alters (contacts). McPherson et al. (2006) reports similar number of alters for
their survey.
Building on the insights obtained from this data and its quantitative analysis, it was
possible to measure tie strength (who is linked to whom) between egos (survey respondents)
and each alter (contacts) and between alter-alter pairs and determine how each individual’s
actions have implicit consequences on the actions of everyone else in the egocentric network.
Centrality measures were calculated to help identify the most central and prosocial individual
with most influence over others. Then, parameter coefficients were estimated on network
centrality measures, attributes and other covariates based on full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) nested logit model as outlined in the econometric model above.
Essentially, we could fit a conditional logit model but, the conditional logit may be
inappropriate. The conditional model assumes that the random errors are independent, and
as a result it forces the odds ratio of any two alternatives to be independent of the other
alternatives, a property known as the IIA (McFadden et al., 1978, Henser et al., 2005, Heiss
et al., 2002). However, assuming that unobserved shocks influencing a decision maker’s
attitude toward one alternative have no effect on his attitudes toward the other alternatives
may seem inappropriate (StataCorp, 2005). For instance, individual would choose say the
‘‘no action’ status quo option influenced by friends. Therefore, FIML, though an extension
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of the conditional logit model, allow groups of alternatives similar to each other in an
unobserved way to have correlated error terms (Henser et al., 2005).
The nested tree structure specified for the model using the choice experiment data may
take the following form: With these two levels that define the two types of conservation
Table 3.2. Tree structure specified for the Nested Logit Model
Conservation Group N Option N k
Improved Conservation Option 5616
OPTION 1 2808 1262
OPTION 2 2808 965
No Action (Unimproved Option) 2808 STATUS QUO 2808 581
Total 8424 2808
k = number of times alternative is chosen
N = number of observations at each level
options, I examine how the alternative-specific attributes (share of total water use from
groundwater, aquatic health, natural habitat health, rural character, and cost) apply to
the bottom alternative set (the three conservation options) and how individual-specific
covariates (including social network centrality measures) apply to the alternative set at the
higher composite decision level (improved and unimproved conservation options).
The network attributes are characteristics of the individuals and can enter individuals’
utility expression at the elemental (bottom alternatives) or composite (upper alternatives)
choice levels. I believe it fits well in the composite utility expression level (‘‘improved” and
‘‘unimproved”) because individual’s interaction with his/her network may influence his/her
attitude toward the overall conservation option choice at a composite level more than at
elemental or specific policy alternatives level. However, I contrast the model result with the
elemental utility expression, interacting network centrality measures with environmental
attributes and see if people actually talk about individual environmental attribute than the
environment in its totality.
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Following the nested logit structure outlined above, and incorporating the egocentric
social interaction attributes (measured by indicators such as degree centrality, closeness
centrality, transitivity, clustering coefficient and eigenvector centrality), I estimate many
models with and without social network. The utility function equations for the three
‘‘conservation ’’ options may be formalized as follows:
(44)
U(SQ,Op1,Op2) = α1Ψij +Ψij[β2(Groundwater) + β3(Aquatic Health)
+β4(Natural Habitat) + β5(Rural Character) + β6(Cost)] + ǫ
(45)
U(SQ,Op1,Op2) = α1Γij + [β2(Groundwater) + β3(Aquatic Health)
+β4(Natural Habitat) + β5(Rural Character) + β6(Cost)]
+Γij[Composite dummy] + βi(Income) + ǫ
Where U(SQ,Op1,Op2) is the utilities associated with the three conservation options. Equation
(44) is the utility expression at the elemental (bottom alternatives) and equation (45) is
the utility expression at composite (upper alternatives) choice levels. These equations
recognize interdependencies between choices. Since alternatives essentially constitute
bundles of attributes, the interdependence of alternatives comes from the interdependencies
of attributes, some of which are unobserved (Henser et al., 2005, Heiss et al., 2002). ‘‘The
parameter estimate inclusive value or expected maximum utility (IV index) as the natural
logarithm of the denominator of the nested logit model at the elemental alternative level is
the statistical test for the relevance of the interdependency (Henser et al., 2005, Heiss et al.,
2002)”.
Thus, I evaluated a series of regression models relating individuals’ egocentric network
measures to their environmental conservation choice behavior. The strongest result I found
is that all environmental attributes including cost are important decision variables when
network is introduced at the lower elemental level compared to the ‘‘without network’’
model. In addition, there is association between a respondent’s degree, closeness, transitivity,
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clustering coefficient and eigenvector measures and alternatives chosen. The scatter plot
matrix in figures 3.3-3.5 below show correlation between alternatives chosen and network
centrality measures. We see that ‘‘Options 1” and ‘‘Option 2” are positively correlated
while the ‘‘no action” status quo options is negatively correlated with egocentric network
centrality measures. That means individuals with higher centrality measures prefer to
choose ‘‘Option 1” or ‘‘Option 2”. I call these options, ‘‘prosocial” conservation options.
 
Figure 3.3. Correlation Plot for alternatives chosen and centrality measures.
We see that the ‘‘no action” status quo options is negatively correlated with
egocentric network centrality measures.
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Figure 3.4. Correlation Plot for alternatives chosen and centrality measures.
We see that ‘‘Options 1” is positively correlated with egocentric network
centrality measures. Central actors are ‘‘prosocial” and prefer prosocial
conservation options.
 
Figure 3.5. Correlation Plot for alternatives chosen and centrality measures.
We see that ‘‘Option 2” is positively correlated with egocentric network
centrality measures. Central actors are ‘‘prosocial” and prefer prosocial
conservation options.
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When network is introduced at higher composite level, the likelihood of choosing
improved conservation option compared to the ‘‘no action” status quo option is higher and
this result is statistically significant for all but eigenvector centrality measure. Specifically,
both alternative and individual specific estimates for all options (attribute and intercept
coefficients): the [α] and [β] in the utility equations above, have the right sign and are
statistically and significantly different form zero (See tables 3.3-3.7). For instance, degree
centrality measure is statistically significant, implying that higher degree is associated with
improved conservation option and that the individual is prosocial (see Composite Model
in Table 3.2). For high degree individual all attribute except groundwater are important
decision attributes compared to the Without Network Model (See Elemental Model in Table
3.2).
On the other hand closeness centrality measure is not statistically significant for more
attributes compared to degree centrality at the elemental level, implying that closeness
is more discriminatory than degree as a measure of centrality in a sense that how close
each actor to all other nodes determine the spread of information (Omalley et al., 2012).
That means, ‘‘average relationship strength is likely to be lower if degree is higher as the
relative frequency of pairs with a non-close relationship increases (Omalley et al., 2012).” It
is, however, statistically significantly associated with improved conservation option and
that individual’s prosociality manifests at composite conservation options choice level (see
Composite Model in Table 3.3).
In egocentric networks,‘‘an ego’s transitivity is the average value of the relationship
between all pairs of alters (Omalley et al., 2012)’’, which I assumed to be mutual in a sense
that if we had a chance to ask the alters to name his/her alters, the ego who name him/her
would be one of them (i.e., the relationship from i to j is the same as that from j to i).
Hence, transitivity measure is statistically significant, implying that if ego directs a tie to
‘‘Alter 1’’, and Alter 1” directs a tie to ‘‘Alter 2”, then ‘‘ego” also directs a tie to ‘‘Alter
2” and this natural state toward which triadic relationships tend is associated with people
choosing improved conservation option and that the individual is pro-social (see Composite
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β2 [Groundwater] -0.00523 -0.000377 -0.00495
(-0.89) (-0.20) (-0.90)
β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0109*** 0.00219* 0.0102***
(-3.970) (-2.39) (-3.9)
β4 [Habitat Loss -0.00450*** -0.00111*** -0.00421***
(-6.04) (-5.01) (-5.77)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.00679 -0.00389* -0.00651
(-1.50) (-2.30) (-1.52)
β6 [Cost] -0.762 -0.973** -0.715
(-0.57) (-3.28) (-0.57)
Individual- specific: Composite Options
β7 [Middle Income 0.237 0.245 0.227
(-1.75) (-1.8) (-1.67)
β8 [Upper Middle Income] 0.342* 0.352* 0.332*
(-2.47) (-2.53) (-2.39)
β9 [High Income] 0.859*** 0.852*** 0.835***
(-4.6) (-4.55) (-4.46)
δi [Degree centrality] 0.0382*
(-2.14)
Alternative-specific: Composite Options
τ [Constant] 0.955*** 1.359*** 0.893***
-(4.78) (-7.96) (-4.65)
Log likelihood -2921.5434 -2933.6641 -2919.1828
χ2(df m) 261.7 (8) 117.7 (8) 288.3 (9)
N 8424 8424 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001
Model in Table 3.4). Cost and Habitat loss are the most important decision attributes in
this case(see Elemental Model in Table 3.4).
Similar to transitivity measure, the local clustering coefficient is based on ego’s local
network density. Its main advantage is that it assigns a local score to each node (Scott,
2011, Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The score ranges between 0 and 1; 0 if no ties exist
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β2 [Groundwater] -0.00523 0.00752 -0.00474
(-0.89) (0.48) (-0.90)
β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0109*** 0.0211** 0.00973***
(3.97) (2.88) (3.85)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00450*** -0.0105*** -0.00403***
(-6.04) (-5.58) (-5.60)
β5 [[Rural Character] -0.00679 -0.0200 -0.00632
(-1.50) (-1.47) (-1.53)
β6 [Cost] -0.762 -4.518 -0.689
(-0.57) (-1.90) (-0.57)
Individual -specific: Composite Options
β7 [Middle Income] 0.237 0.273* 0.227
(1.75) (1.98) (1.67)
β8 [Upper Middle Income] 0.342* 0.379** 0.332*
(2.47) (2.69) (2.39)
β9 [High Income] 0.859*** 0.876*** 0.835***
(4.60) (4.64) (4.46)
C(i) [Closeness centrality] 0.470**
(2.90)
Alternative-specific: Composite Options
τ [Constant] 0.955*** 1.238*** 0.853***
(4.78) (6.96) (4.56)
Log likelihood -2921.5434 -2929.5012 -2917.2304
χ2(df m) 261.7 (8) 143.1 (8) 307.0 (9)
N 8424 8424 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001
between the neighbors, and 1 if all possible ties exists. Hence, we see that the coefficient
is positive as expected and statistically significant, implying that higher clustering means
an ego’s friends are also friends of each and that prosocial options are favored. Aquatic
health, natural habitat and cost are important decision attributes (see Elemental Model in
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β2 [Groundwater] -0.00523 -0.00866 -0.00493
(-0.89) (-0.87) (-0.89)
β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0109*** 0.00944 0.0102***
(-3.97) (-1.93) (-3.91)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00450*** -0.00735*** -0.00422***
(-6.04) (-5.76) (-5.82)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.00679 -0.0122 -0.00655
(-1.50) (-1.36) (-1.52)
β6 [Cost] -0.762 -4.396** -0.726
(-0.57) (-2.84) (-0.57)
Individual-specific: Composite Options
β7 [Middle Income] 0.237 0.189 0.184
(-1.75) (-1.38) (-1.35)
β8 [UpperMiddleIncome] 0.342* 0.295* 0.289*
(-2.47) (-2.11) (-2.07)





τ [Constant] 0.955*** 1.386*** 0.896***
(-4.78) (-8.27) (-4.67)
Log likelihood -2921.5434 -2928.5302 -2916.4611
χ2(df m) 261.7 (8) 127.0 (8) 290.2 (9)
N 8424 8424 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.5). At the composite level, higher clustering coefficient is associated with improved
conservation option and that individuals are prosocial (see Composite Model in Table 3.5).
The other important measure is Eigenvector centrality. We see that the coefficient has
positive sign as expected at the composite level, implying that higher Eigenvector centrality
is associated with improved conservation option and that individuals are prosocial (see
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β1 [Groundwater] -0.00523 -0.00345 -0.00485
(-0.89) (-0.25) (-0.90)
β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0109*** 0.0192** 0.00993***
(-3.97) (-2.89) (-3.88)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00450*** -0.0104*** -0.00411***
(-6.04) (-5.88) (-5.72)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.00679 -0.0212 -0.00642
(-1.50) (-1.74) (-1.53)
β6 [Cost] -0.762 -6.602** -0.704
(-0.57) (-3.02) (-0.57)
Individual-specific: Composite Options
β7 [Middle Income] 0.237 0.225 0.211
(-1.75) (-1.65) (-1.55)
β8 [Upper Middle Income] 0.342* 0.332* 0.317*
(-2.47) (-2.37) (-2.28)
β9 [High Income] 0.859*** 0.830*** 0.818***
(-4.6) (-4.41) (-4.36)
CL [Clustering Coefficient] 0.413**
(-3.14)
Alternative-specific: Composite Options
τ [Constant] 0.955*** 1.326*** 0.871***
(-4.78) (-7.81) (-4.62)
Log likelihood -2921.5434 -2922.4329 -2916.5046
χ2(df m) 261.7 (8) 155.6 (8) 300.6 (9)
N 8424 8424 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001
Composite Model in Table 3.6). However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. On
the other hand, Eigenvector centrality measure imply that not all connections are equal
and that connections to people who are themselves influential will lend a person more
influence than connections to less influential people (Newman, 2008). Therefore, prosocial
options are highly favored compared to the status quo when network is allowed to impact
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elemental decision attributes. Natural habitat, rural character and cost are important
decision attributes (see Elemental Model in Table 3.6). In all models, the income dummy





β2 [Groundwater] -0.00523 0.0162 -0.00519
(-0.89) -0.49 (-0.89)
β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0109*** 0.018 0.0107***
(-3.97) (-1.15) (-3.95)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00450*** -0.00658* -0.00445***
(-6.04) (-1.97) (-5.99)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.00679 -0.0675* -0.00674
(-1.50) (-2.37) (-1.50)
β6 [Cost] -0.762 -10.86* -0.752
(-0.57) (-2.56) (-0.56)
Individual-specific:Composite Options
β9 [Middle Income] 0.237 0.242 0.236
(-1.75) (-1.79) (-1.74)
β8 [Upper Middle Income] 0.342* 0.349* 0.341*
(-2.47) (-2.52) (-2.46)





τ [Constant] 0.955*** 1.465*** 0.944***
(-4.78) (-8.89) (-4.75)
Log likelihood -2921.5434 -2955.0973 -2921.2871
χ22(df m) 261.7 (8) 46.92 (8) 266.1 (9)
N 8424 8424 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001
coefficients are statistically significant and have positive sign, implying that higher income
increases the likelihood of choosing prosocial, improved conservation alternatives compared
to the lower income group.
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Near the bottom of the output are the dissimilarity parameter or inclusive values (IV),
which represents the expected utility for the choice of alternatives within the composite nest.
It measure the degree of correlation of random shocks within each of the two composite
conservation options (improved and unimproved) and the value greater than one imply
that the model is inconsistent with random utility parameter NLM (Heiss et al., 2002). The
IV parameter τ is within the unit interval and corresponds to a correlation of the two error
terms.16
In addition, I conducted the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT ) to see if the models with
and without network measures are identical. The test statistic is computed by taking the
difference in the log likelihood of the models compared. LRT χ2 distributed. Using Log
Likelihood figures, LTR is 2× (−2919.1828 + 2921.5434) = 4.7212 and 2× (−2919.1828 +
2933.6641) = 28.9626 for the ‘‘Composite model” versus ”Without Network Model” and the
‘‘Composite Model” versus ‘‘Elemental Model” respectively. Therefore, the LR ratio test
statistic is above the critical χ2 value of 3.841 for 1 degrees of freedom at 5% significance
level and we can not accept the null hypothesis that the parameters are equal between the
models, ‘‘With Network’’ and ‘‘Without Network”. The composite and elemental models
are also statistically significantly different from each other and all models exhibit similar
test results.
Finally, I focus on the implication of network effect on preferences and welfare. It is
recalled from the induced network model above that Θ determines both social utility and
willingness to pay under network interaction (Neilson and Wichmann, 2014).
(46) WTP egocentrici = θij
∑
WTP private ⇒ WTPegocentrici = ΘWTP
Private
Therefore, I use WTP egocentrici to quantify gains (or losses) of the environmental conser-
vation policy option, estimated using the estimated cost coefficient With Network” models.
16see Heiss et al. (2002) and Henser et al. (2005) on this. They discuss in detail that the conditional logit
model is a special case of nested logit in which all the dissimilarity parameters are equal to one. Equivalently,
the property known as the IIA imposed by the conditional logit model holds if and only if all dissimilarity
parameters are equal to one (Hausman and McFadden, 1984).
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Table 3.8 display WTP egocentrici for each attribute calculated following from Hole (2007) as
before:
(47) E(WTP j) = −
E(βj)
(βcost)
We can use these WTP estimates for welfare estimates since network affects WTP estimates
which is important for the quantification of gains or losses of the conservation policies in
achieving the goals by 2040. We see that the mean willingness to pay (MWTP) estimates
with and without network models differ a great deal. All MWTP values for a model that
does not accommodate network are not statistically significantly different from zero while
some MWTP with network effect are statistically significant. For instance, degree centrality
measure MWTP value is statistically significant for all but groundwater, implying that
individual’s have a statistically significant willingness to pay amount for a unit change
in these attributes levels. The amount ranges from $22.00 to $46.00 CAD per $1000 in
property value for every 10,000 salmon return, 0 to $0.23 CAD per $1000 in property value
for every km2 habitat loss reclaimed and etc.
The fact that at least one or more attributes are important decision variable with models
that accommodate network, and that both prosocial options have at least one improved
attribute, and that most people prefer these improved options, implying that ‘‘network
effect is welfare improving”. The most logical explanation is that some central individuals
in the network may have greater private values for those conservation attributes and
those attributes constitute improved conservation options and the options are prosocial
favored by the more egocentrically central individuals. Moreover, it is interesting to see
that cost is important decision attribute with models that accommodate network effect
(see Tables 3.2-3.6), implying that there is less possibility for ‘‘rejecting payment” as a
protest which could otherwise be the norm in many non-market valuation literature. In
summary, even though the focus on individual rather than group outcomes makes egocentric
network better methodological tool and a feasible way of obtaining network information
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Table 3.8. WTP values With and Without Network Effect
Mean WTP Groundwater Aquatic Health Habitat Loss Rural Character
Without Network
Mean WTP -0.00685735 0.01424591 -0.0059057 -0.0089078
Lower 95% -0.04059324 -0.03790537 -0.025491 -0.0427395
Upper 95% 0.02687854 0.06639719 0.0136797 0.02492387
With Network
δi [Degree]
Mean WTP -0.00038733 0.00224667 -0.0011446 -0.0039978
Lower 95% -0.0042044 0.00009619 -0.0017797 -0.0073168
Upper 95% 0.00342974 0.00439715 -0.0005095 -0.0006787
CL [Closeness]
Mean WTP 0.00166376 0.0046706 -0.0023209 -0.0044177
Lower 95% -0.00535134 -0.00098593 -0.0044848 -0.0106097
Upper 95% 0.00867886 0.01032712 -0.0001569 0.00177437
T i [Transitivity]
Mean WTP -0.00197078 0.00214794 -0.0016709 -0.0027698
Lower 95% -0.00642716 -0.00041124 -0.002682 -0.0065717
Upper 95% 0.00248561 0.00470712 -0.0006599 0.00103203
C(i) [Clustering]
Mean WTP -0.00052226 0.00290565 -0.0015709 -0.0032175
Lower 95% -0.00456596 0.0003534 -0.002454 -0.0067114
Upper 95% 0.00352144 0.00545789 -0.0006878 0.00027643
ψi [Eigenvector]
Mean WTP 0.00149337 0.00165621 -0.0006061 -0.0062162
Lower 95% -0.00488154 -0.00125638 -0.001267 -0.0114263
Upper 95% 0.00786828 0.0045688 5.491E-05 -0.0010061
on a large-scale (e.g.,augmented with other surveys) Omalley et al. (2012), it has several
limitations compared to a full sociocentric study. First, the most common survey methods
for gathering ‘‘sociocentric network data ask respondents to report on their outgoing ties
using a recognition format that reminds respondents of all alters deemed to be part of the
network under study (Marsden, 1990).” By contrast, typical survey methods for assembling
egocentric network data enumerate alters through free recall, and rely on the respondent
(the ego node) as an informant about the structure and composition of the entire first-order
zone. However, survey respondents do not recall a substantial fraction of their contacts
in this case (Burt, 1984, Frank, 2011). In addition, we do not observe alter’s view of
relationships and we can not validate the ego self-report, we can not ascertain directionality
of relationships Wellman (2007), Omalley et al. (2012). Therefore, other things being equal,
egocentric design typically understate degree and centrality measures. Second, there is
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uncertainty related to network relation or ties through which actors are influenced (Frank,
2011). It is very difficult to uncover if someone’s decision making behavior is influenced by
all those with whom they come in contact, or if there are specific types of relations that are
more influential for particular behaviors (Frank, 2011). The third limitation is related to
formats, in which combining different methods in one survey could be long and sometimes
confusing. This results in survey respondents to drop-off or skip questions making it less
useful.
3.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, it was shown that egocentric approach is a better methodological tool
not only to describe, summarize, visualize individual connections and interactions, but also
for its flexibility in data collection. The main finding is that egocentric network centrality
measure is one of a good predictors of environmental conservation options choices and
network effect is welfare improving.
However, this conclusion is over definitive in a sense that it requires further examination
fo any causal implication. Specifically, conservation and consumption decisions of many
of these goods and services are not only non-excludable along social or geographic links
(Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007) but generally are the result of interactions of combinations
of social factors (e.g. population, technology, and economic conditions); with huge social
consequences that must addressed in the context of citizen preferences interaction, constraint
interaction and expectation interaction (Manski, 2000, Brown et al., 2005, Watts and Dodds,
2007) within sociocentric or complete network framework broadly.
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CHAPTER 4
On Using Deliberative/Citizens Juries Approach to
Measure Preference Heterogeneity within Choice
Experiment Surveys
4.1. Introduction
Interest in determining monetary values for goods and services provided by the envi-
ronment has been growing. Some see such values as providing a more convincing way to
argue for environmental protection. However, not everyone agrees with this way of putting
a value on the environment. Some say that we do not relate to the environment the way
we relate to a market basket of goods from a store. The environment affects the whole
community, so when we think of the importance of the environment, we may also think
about the whole community and hence money can not be a ‘common denominator’ that
weighs heavily in the choices people make that have environmental impacts. Therefore,
there are disagreements on whether these monetary values reflect private values rather than
what would be the community or social value.
Regardless, over the past years, there have been efforts to measure the value that a
sample of residents place on some of these environmental goods and services using stated
preference environmental valuation techniques. Stated preference environmental valuation
techniques assume that the equilibrium prices in a competitive market represent social
values.1 Yet, many environmental goods and services do not have prices that meet this
assumption (Dietz et al., 2009).
One of the recently adopted methodological progresses to tackle this issue is Delibera-
tive/Citizen juries (CJ): the use of citizen groups convened to assess the costs and benefits
of proposed management options. Although it is relatively new to the field of environmental
1‘‘Individual responses are aggregated into an estimate of what society as a whole would be willing to pay
or accept in the traditional stated preference methodologies (Dietz et al., 2009).”
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valuation, participatory techniques have played a role in areas such as multicriteria decision
analysis and risk assessment (Howarth and Wilson, 2006, Vargas et al., 2016). The process
is believed to enhance citizen participation and improve the effectiveness, perceived quality,
and legitimacy of policy decisions and monetary values.
In the standard deliberative valuation, citizen juries (deliberative groups) of roughly
fifteen individuals carefully chosen to represent the community from which they are drawn
are used to gauge the public’s willingness to provide financial resources to support the
implementation of proposed environmental policies (Howarth and Wilson, 2006, Brown
et al., 1995, O’Hara, 1996, Jacobs, 1997). The jury is convened for a period of several days,
during which participants hear expert testimony and deliberate over the facts and values
that should guide collective decisions (Howarth and Wilson, 2006, Niemeyer and Spash,
2001).
This method is believed to overcome some of the following critiques directed towards
stated preference approaches: that people may not have preformed preferences for envi-
ronmental goods (Payne et al., 1999); the notions of community rather than individual
values (Sagoff, 1988); the problem with the development of a detailed concept description
of a resource improvement (Adamowicz et al., 1994a); reliance on the accuracy of the
information and completeness of any particular description of the good or service; time
constraints (Cummings et al., 1986, Mitchell, 2002, Dixon et al., 2013) ; the protocols to be
followed for carrying out surveys and other relevant considerations (Adamowicz et al., 1994a,
Ward, 1999); the values people hold towards matters of public policy and their sensitivity
to changes in issue framing (Ward, 1999); the sensitivity of respondents’ value estimates
to survey question context and perceived social importance (Schkade and Payne, 1994,
Schuman, 1996); and the opportunity for respondents to ask questions, to discuss questions
among themselves, and to get information from a diversity of sources (Ward, 1999). In
addition, respondents of surveys in choice experiments may face the following challenges:
they may have no predetermined preferences over different levels of the environmental
goods (Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b); they may believe citizen rather than individual
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preferences to be more relevant in social decision making (Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley,
2006b); they may have problems with the presentation of the scenario and good valued,
the attributes and the levels taken by these attributes (cognitive burden on respondents)
(Blamey et al., 1999, Morrison and Kingsford, 2010); and they may have problems with the
payment vehicle and the transaction method (Farber et al., 2002, Adamowicz et al., 1994a,
Ward, 1999).
In this chapter, I borrow from these qualitative methodologies (deliberative citizen juries
approach (Jefferson, 2016, Street et al., 2014, Brown et al., 1995) and the market stall
approach (Macmillan et al., 2002) to aid the survey design and examine the problem of basing
policy on ‘‘uninformed” individual preferences.2 I do this by extending the conventional
choice experiment approach and allowing people to deliberate in a citizen jury setting
and undertake the choice decision exercises for hypothetical environmental conservation
scenarios. I estimate the deliberation treatment effect on conservation choice outcomes by
removing any significant differences in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics between
the people who participated in the citizen jury (treatment group) and those people who did
the survey twice but did not volunteer (control group).
The next sections are structured as follows. In section 4.2, I discuss the existing literature
on deliberative and citizen juries related to environment and non-market valuation, giving a
context to our findings. Section 4.3 outlines the theoretical grounding of group deliberation
and social decision making. Section 4.4 discusses the citizen jury experiment procedures,
characteristics, sample, and econometric estimation methods. In section 4.5, I provide choice
data sorted and analyzed using propensity score method and environmental conservation
option operationalized as a dependent variable, described by attribute levels, and in terms of
deliberative and citizen jury processes. In addition, unobserved heterogeneity are captured
by estimating a mixed logit model, and WTP values are estimated and compared with
group value outcomes. The final section offers a conclusion and a brief discussion on policy
implications.
2See for example (Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b, Sagoff, 1998) for related issues.
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4.2. Literature Review
Howarth and Wilson (2006) firmly emphasize that deliberative valuation approach is
rooted in the principles of discursive democracy and social psychology and may be charged
with carrying out a variety of tasks, including the generation of narrative evaluations of
proposed policy alternatives. Sagoff (1998) introduced the idea of ‘‘citizen preferences’’ where
people have a preference for a social arrangement that may disadvantage them as individuals.
Such preferences are not captured with traditional valuation techniques (i.e. contingent
ranking, contingent choice, choice experiments) (Aldred and Jacobs, 2000; Álvarez-Farizo
and Hanley, 2006b; Macmillan et al., 2002). These critics argue that deliberation should be
part of the valuation procedure. The presence of lexicographic preferences and protest votes
in many valuation studies (Spash and Hanley, 1995), offer support for a deliberative process
that allows for the expression of values that cannot be measured using traditional methods
(Aldred and Jacobs, 2000, Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b, Macmillan et al., 2002, Sagoff,
1998). According to Sagoff (1998), society decides on issues like the environment based on
community preferences (rather than on individual preferences).” Howarth and Wilson (2006)
claims that ‘‘people can both understand the complex issues at stake and carefully consider
their preferences and values through reasoned deliberation with others in their community
and more informed decision can be achieved. Through such deliberation, new information
may be revealed that was not shared beforehand by everyone in the group.” Álvarez-
Farizo et al. (2009) consider whether citizen preferences reflect the community objectives
as responsible members of the society or personal objectives as self-interested individuals
during a traditional valuation exercise of non-market goods. Gregory (2000) claims that ‘‘a
well-designed deliberative group procedure can increase the likelihood that policy decisions
will meet with broad based approval and be viewed by taxpayers and elected officials as a
sensible way to spend scarce funds’’. Gregory (2000) adds that citizen participation should
be involved in: framing decisions, defining key objectives and establishing alternatives.
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More recently, deliberation techniques have been extended to stated preference surveys
(Powe et al., 2005, Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b) and the results have shown improved
information, methodological improvements and outputs beyond that of conventional non-
market valuation techniques (Schkade and Payne, 1994, Blamey and James, 1999, Brouwer
et al., 1999, Clark et al., 2000). Random sampling techniques are usually employed in
citizen jury selection (Howarth and Wilson, 2006). Deliberation is added to a valuation
study using focus groups at both the design and interpretation stage (Kenter et al., 2011).
For instance, Ahlheim et al. (2010) uses focus groups, formed from a sample of respondents
in the initial valuation study as ‘‘citizen experts’’ to aid in the design of a second round.
Ferreyra and Beard (2007) let the focus groups define success, and relate these definitions
to group composition. They find a relationship between group structure and types of
successes. Kontogianni et al. (2001) uses stakeholder focus groups to identify key attitudes
and opinions, and inform possible scenarios for wetland management on a Greek island.
These scenarios are then used in a contingent ranking experiment. They argue that this
mixed methodology informs policy options and relative trade offs better than either method
alone. Gregory and Wellman (2001) use insights from stakeholder interviews and expert
consultations to develop a workbook that is used by small groups of stakeholders to rank
policy options. Among other things, they argue that inherent ecological uncertainty renders
more sophisticated valuation estimates unreliable. MacMillan et al. (2006) examine the
impact of different levels of information, time to think, and deliberation on valuation
responses for a familiar (expanding wind power) and an unfamiliar (species introduction)
environmental good. Treatments improve value estimates for the unfamiliar good, while
not significantly impacting estimates for the familiar one. Urama and Hodge (2006) explore
the impact of participatory education on bid values in a contingent valuation study of
pollution abatement in a Nigerian river basin. Education increases the perceived severity
of the pollution and mean willingness-to-pay. This effect is particularly large among
respondents with limited formal education. Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley (2006b) conduct a
choice experiment with individuals and in a group setting to assess options for managing
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a Spanish river basin. They find that moving from individual to workshop valuation
significantly changes the value estimates. Dietz et al. (2009) compares individual responses
to an open-ended valuation survey on climate change policy with a carefully-structured
group deliberation designed to limit the dominance or group think. Deliberation leads
people to consider different issues - thinking like a policymaker rather than a consumer - but
willingness-to-pay values are unchanged. Lienhoop and MacMillan (2007) use psychological
measures of engagement to compare the behavior of deliberation participants with those
individually interviewed in a contingent valuation study related to a hydro development in
Iceland. Group participants are far more engaged with the material, and they suggest this
improves the quality of valuation estimates.
Similarly, this chapter add to this extensive literature by extending the methodology
further. The believe that ‘‘people can act as citizens whose primary concern is the public
good (i.e. people have values that lie ‘above’ simple self-interest (Howarth and Wilson, 2006)”
is shared. The claim that ‘‘participatory processes in the form of group deliberation are an
improvement from the traditional non-market valuation techniques and help citizens make
informed judgment on environmental issues (Christie et al., 2012)” is shared. While some
evidence suggests that people have difficulty suspending their self-interest (Niemeyer and
Spash, 2001), participatory processes most likely overcome this problem and are seen as a
legitimate mechanism for policy development (Howarth and Wilson, 2006). Specifically, the
congruity of results from deliberative methods and choice experiment is empirically assessed
and the validity of results from CE and CJ methods for eliciting citizen’s willingness
to pay for improved environmental goods and services is evaluated. Central to this is
an empirical investigation of the impact of deliberative juries on community (citizens’)
preference for environmental goods. I believe that integrating deliberative methods within
the choice experiment process enhances our understanding of how respondents discuss and
conceptualize the good valued, of respondents’ thought processes during the transaction,
of motivations for their responses, of adequacy of the valuation process used, and of the
public acceptability of the valuation exercise (Powe et al., 2005, Adamowicz et al., 1994a,
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Ward, 1999, Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b, Lienhoop and Völker, 2016, Rogers, 2013,
Schaafsma et al., 2013, Vargas et al., 2016). I test the following hypothesis: A) Participatory
processes combined with CE analysis captures community preferences better than CE alone
B) Group willingness to pay for enhanced environmental quality is greater than or equal
to the sum of individual willingness to pay in line with the claim of (Neilson and Winter,
2008).
4.3. Theoretical Methodology
Howarth and Wilson (2006) notes that ‘‘the theoretical concept of group deliberation is
similar to a process of social bargaining in which each individual’s conception of the social
good feeds into the construction of a mutually acceptable group value function. This helps
examine the connections between this value function and measures of willingness to pay for
environmental services at the level of both individuals and groups.’’
Formally, let us assume that we have a hypothetical deliberative group n of 10 people or
more, n ≥ 10. Suppose this group of people are asked to deliberate among peers and choose
from a set of proposed policy options of a given set (Xi,G)}, where X is a private good
and G is a public good. After thorough deliberation, they have to arrive at a collective
outcome, which all members support as a matter of mutual agreement or majority voting.
The ‘‘best outcome’’ is assumed to be Ψi(x
∗
i , g
∗) ∈ Θ(Xi,G). In the absence of agreement,
current (or status quo) policies would remain in force. Hence, it must be the case that
each participants value function ψi(x
∗
i , g
∗), summarized by his/her preferences, beliefs, and
moral judgments concerning the choice of the options under consideration is less than the
group value function Ψi(x
∗
i , g
∗) (Howarth and Wilson, 2006). Formally, this may take the
following from:
(48) ψi(xi, g) < Ψi(x
∗
i , g







∗) is community utility function (value function) representing
what is good for the society and how decisions should be made in the context of public policy.
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a personal perspective even though Ψi(x
∗
i , g
∗) > ψi(xi, g). In this event, the person’s value
function would reflect a willingness to sacrifice her personal interests in support of a social
or moral good (Howarth and Wilson, 2006).”
To relate individual valuation to collective outcome, Howarth and Wilson (2006) appeal
to a result from the theory of cooperative games (Binmore, 1998), in which a rational
individual, seeking to maximize her individual value function through a process of structured
negotiation with other group members will arrive at the outcome favored by the group
and that would maximize the group value function. This outcome holds if the negotiating




0), would arise in the absence of agreement (Howarth and Wilson, 2006).
The ‘‘increase in the value function for each participant i is, therefore, the multiplicative
aggregation of the difference in possible valuation functions that could arise as a direct
















This result is the ‘‘Nash bargaining solution in the game theoretic literature and can
be replaced by the more general value function in the case of unequal bargaining power















where, ωi, represent bargaining power of individual i.
The grand message of the model is that the negotiated outcome Ψ(x∗i , g
∗) is ‘‘pareto-




o) (Howarth and Wilson, 2006)).” However, in all consent-based
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valuation exercises, there is distributional equity issue and it is recommended that represen-
tatives/opinion leaders of the affected parties or the community consent or support when
social decisions should be made through mutual consent.
Another important message is the existence of trade-offs between group-based decision
processes and individual monetary valuation . A key question raised by Howarth and
Wilson (2006) is ‘‘how a deliberative group’s willingness to pay for environmental quality is
related to the underlying values of each individual participant?’’ In answering this question,
they suggest that individuals required to make an incremental tax payment to finance a
project that would provide communally shared environmental benefits that would raise the
level of environmental quality from the status quo level go to the enhanced level (go + ρ).
The individual i’s required payment τi would thereby reduce the effective income from the
status quo level Ioi to the new level (I
0
i − τi) (Howarth and Wilson, 2006).
It is plausible to assume the individual’s value function takes ψi(xi(I
0
i − τi), (g
o+ρ)) is a
strictly increasing function of environmental quality ρ and personal income Ii, and that the
conservation projects implementation would leave the derivatives of ψi(xi(I
0
i − τi), (g
o + ρ))




unchanged (Howarth and Wilson,
2006). Under these circumstances, implementing the conservation project would yield the
following net change in individual i′s value function (Howarth and Wilson, 2006):
(51) ψi(xi(I
o
i − τi), (g
































































is what is called the shadow price of environmental quality, or the marginal rate
of substitution between environmental quality and income (Howarth and Wilson, 2006).
Equation (51) ‘‘represents individual i maximum willingness to pay for project imple-
mentation and to measure the monetary value of the project’s benefits, this shadow price
is multiplied by the increase in environmental quality. By substituting equation (51) into






















Equation (52) states the net monetary value that each individual attaches to project
(Howarth and Wilson, 2006). Each individual’s share in the deliberative group’s willingness
to pay for the hypothetical conservation project would be τi = ζiWTP , where the share
coefficients ζi, are fixed, positive parameters that sum up to unity (Howarth and Wilson,
2006). That is similar to each individual’s payment in actual tax systems, in which the
share coefficient reflects one’s taxable income or assets levy such as property. Given this








(WTPi − ζiWTP )
Equation (53) says that ‘‘the deliberative groups’ maximum willingness to pay for increased
environmental quality would be a value of zero at level of WTP for which the group would
be indifferent between implementing conservation project or maintaining the status quo.
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That is, group willingness to pay for enhanced environmental quality is less than or equal
to the sum of individual willingness to pay (Howarth and Wilson, 2006).”3
4.4. Empirical Methodology: CJ procedures
Similar to Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley (2006b), the deliberation workshop participants
were made up of people who completed the general public survey and who showed interest
participating in the deliberation sessions. In the survey, I included a place for people to
provide contact information and indicate their willingness to participate in a deliberation
workshop. I also indicated that if there were more than 60 such volunteers, workshop
participants would be chosen at random to be invited to participate. If there were less than
60, all would be contacted and invited to participate. From 468 questionnaire completed in
the general public survey, about 55 people (12%) showed interest and all were invited to
the CJ sessions. Only 23 (42%) people actually attended (See Appendix G, H and I for
invitation to participate in a citizens’ jury, deliberation workshop protocol, participation in
a citizens’ jury consent form respectively).
Step one was grouping volunteer participants into two jury sessions: group 1 and group
2, to meet over two days. Each jury session lasted 90 minutes and was co-ordinated by two
facilitators who had experience working with citizens juries. The jury sessions began with a
briefing on the format and group norms. During this briefing, participants were reminded
that a choice experiment survey was implemented prior to the these jury sessions; that major
local environmental issues were identified through discussion with the Regional District of
Central Okanagan (RDCO) experts and Okanagan residents; that pilot study results were
used to prioritize environmental issues; that a stated choice experimental design software
was used to build hypothetical conservation policy scenarios; that the ‘‘no action” status
quo represents the continuation of the current environmental resources situation to 2040 if
it is managed using the existing actions and that this option does not involve any increase
in a household’s payment; that options 1 and 2 involve additional management actions that
3See the proof and details in Howarth and Wilson (2006) from which this model and discussion is heavily
drawn
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would lead to different environmental resources and services outcomes by 2040 and that
these options has to be paid for resulting in a reduction of household income available to
spend on something else each year for 30 years; and that the money will be saved in an
account specific to this conservation project. The facilitator also informed participants that
they would be spending some time talking about each of the four environmental indicators
they saw on the main survey, now presented differently in the form of decision challenge.
Moreover, the confidentiality issues were raised and the ‘‘Vegas rules” were explained by
the moderators. The ‘‘Vegas rules” state that what happens during the session stays in this
session. Each participant was required to respect the privacy of all other participants by
not revealing the details of the session to any outsiders. All opinions expressed were to be
taken as equally valid. Each participant had to treat all others with respect. All questions
were to be considered valid and answered in a respectful manner. After the session was
over, participants were allowed to continue the discussions with anyone else.
Step two was the information session based on invited expert witnesses recorded inter-
views. The recorded interviews, while avoiding specific details about the attributes, included
experts perspective on the environmental issues that form the basis of the survey and their
knowledge of it, and personal histories and their relationship to the environment. The
experts were identified from the networks of the research team, from community partners
such as the Okanagan Basin Water Board, the Regional District of the Central Okanagan
and the city of Kelowna. The two groups then were given the opportunity to prepare up to
two questions which were electronically delivered to the experts. The responses from the
experts were read to the participants during the second session.4 The recoded interviews
presentations took about 20 minutes and, each group took 20 minutes to ask questions.
The third step was deliberation and the decision challenge. At this stage, facilitators
replayed the answers back to the participants. Jury members were allowed to cross question
4The research attempted to include experts from the Okanagan Nation Alliance (ONA) to see if there is any
scope for ONA members to describe their perspective on the environmental issues included in the survey
but was not successful.
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each experts and each other based on expert answers and other issues raised by participants
during and in between the two sessions.
The fundamental idea behind the decision challenge is to attempt to combine the
desirable features of the Citizen jury (CJ) techniques with the particular requirements of
economic valuation and cost-benefit analysis (Macmillan et al., 2002). It is close to ‘‘Market
Stall” approach (MS) which fundamentally differs from CJ in that it explicitly combines
aspects of participatory methods, but still with the primary intention of producing WTP
estimates. 5 Hence, each participant was provided with two decision challenges inspired
by the issues raised in the survey. In the main survey, participants faced 6 choice cards
for different possible environmental futures with costs of achieving those futures. Here,
each participant was asked to vote on a few scenario combinations drawn from those choice
scenarios. That is, each participant was asked to consider two possible costs, $20 or $40
per household per year for 30 years (the same payment amount they knew from the main
survey). The total payment will be about $60 million if a $20 levy is collected per household
(See figure 4.1), or $120 million for a $40 levy per household (See figure 4.2).6 These amounts
will be collected and spent over 30 years. If $20 million is spent to enhance Kokanee returns,
we expect that returns will increase from 40,000 to 50,000. If $40 million is spent, returns
will increase to 60,000. Therefore, jurors were required, as a group, to tell us how they
would divide $60 million, and how they would divide $120 million, between four attribute
categories. In one possibility, they could spend $20 million to increase Kokanee returns to
50,000, another $20 million to reduce natural habitat loss to 50 km2, and a further $20
million to keep rural population density at 70 people/km2 , for a total of $60 million. In
another possibility, they could spend $40 million to increase Kokanee returns to 60,000 and
$20 million to reduce natural habitat loss, with nothing spent to limit rural population
growth or groundwater use.
5see (Macmillan et al., 2002) for the details on the Market stall approach
6These monetary figures were calculated considering the current and projected household size of 80,000 and
120,000 in Central Okanagan over the planning period.
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Accordingly, jurors were given 15 minutes to discuss the choices and issues related to the
answers given by the experts. They were then given 45 minutes to work with their group to
arrive at an agreed way of dividing the budget between the categories. The final decision
was done by a showing of hands in line with the majority rule collective decision mechanism
used in many CJ exercises (Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b, Coote and Lenaghan, 1997).
 
Figure 4.1. Decision Challenge Choice Card 1. No improvement is an
estimate of what things will be like in 30 years if no additional efforts are
made to protect or enhance the environment. For groundwater share, natural
habitat loss, and rural density, most improvement is like keeping things
close to where they are now; for Kokanee returns, most improvement is an
improvement over current returns of approximately 40,000. Participants are
required to allocate to each category in the allocation column $0,$20 or $40
million for any category. The total of the entries in the column must not
exceed $60 million. Within any category, going from no improvement to some
improvement costs $20 million over 30 years. Within any category, going
from no improvement to most improvement costs $40 million over 30 years.
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After the voting was completed, they completed a secret ballot where each could choose
differently from the group choice.
The sessions were conducted on February 20th, 21st and 22nd at the RDCO office
conference hall. After these sessions were completed, both CJ participants and those who
did not participate on the CJ were required to complete a shortened version of the original
CE. This will help us understand if the amount people are willing to pay to protect the
environment changes when people have a chance to hear from experts with special knowledge
and discuss with other people.7
7One of the unique feature of this exercise is not providing participants with experts who provided
information related to decisions. Expert opinions were limited to a set of questions, all information that the
group used in the decision challenge came from discussions within the group.
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Figure 4.2. Decision Challenge Choice Card 2. No improvement is an
estimate of what things will be like in 30 years if no additional efforts are
made to protect or enhance the environment. For groundwater share, natural
habitat loss, and rural density, most improvement is like keeping things
close to where they are now; for Kokanee returns, most improvement is an
improvement over current returns of approximately 40,000. Participants are
required to allocate to each category in the allocation column $0, $20 or $40
million for any category. The total of the entries in the column must not
exceed $120 million. Within any category, going from no improvement to
some improvement costs $20 million over 30 years. Within any category,
going from no improvement to most improvement costs $40 million over 30
years.
A debriefing exercise was completed at the end of group voting to see how participants
understood the approach as a means of establishing preference and willingness to pay values
(See Appendix J for debriefing questions).
Discussion and motivation topics. The four attribute indicators faced during
the survey were briefly described and discussed. Each were motivated by some kind of
emotional questions suggested by participants to relate to the environment around them and
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topics to be discussed. Facilitators read the attribute descriptions out-loud and suggested
topics for each indicator:
1. Groundwater : Groundwater is an important source of water we use and supports
springs and wetlands that are important natural habitats. Increasing ground
water use threatens these habitats. Most surface sources in the Okanagan are
fully allocated. Increasing the share of total use from groundwater also reflects an
increase in overall water use and in the amount of groundwater used.
Suggestions for discussions: Need to have a set of facts about springs, how
they work, animals that depend on them, and how they have been changing in the
Okanagan, particularly in the central Okanagan.
2. Aquatic Habitat health : Aquatic health is threatened by shoreline development,
invasive species pollution, etc. Species such as Kokanee salmon are sensitive to
the overall health of the aquatic environment. Since the 70’s, spawning Kokanee
numbers in Okanagan lake have fallen from over 1 million to about 40,000. Historic
returns were much higher than they are today. The decline is partly due to failed
efforts to enhance the kokanee fishery. Protection and enhancement of spawning
and rearing areas can help increase returns.
Suggestions for discussion: Why did salmon population fell? Relate to its life
cycle, the role it plays in the local ecosystem, reasons that the population has
declined, things that can be done to enhance the population, etc.
3. Natural habitats Loss : Natural habitats, such as wetlands, forests, natural grass-
lands, etc. provide a range of environmental goods and services. Loss of these
areas threatens the survival of some wild species within the Okanagan, and loss of
those areas which allow movement of these species threatens the health of their
populations. These environmental resources and services are largely lost if the land
is developed.
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Suggestions for discussion: Important endangered species in Okanagan, the
problem of invasive species,and the loss of natural habitat, particularly valley bottom
habitat, the importance of connectivity, and how as we lose more habitat, how we
lose options to connect to different areas.
4. Rural Character : Rural areas have a unique character that reflects their history
and close ties to the land. Increasing development and population growth in rural
areas increases traffic, reduces the amount of open space, increases conflict between
farmers and non-farm residents, and impacts natural habitats.
Suggestions for discussion: Facts about population growth, land development in
rural areas, changes in traffic volumes, etc.
4.5. Econometric Model
We need to determine whether there is any significant difference in preferences after
people have had chances to receive more information and to think collectively as citizens
rather than individually as consumers through discussions with the jury, family, and friends
(Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b, Álvarez-Farizo et al., 2009). This change of preference
is examined econometrically by testing whether the CJ system has any influence on the
heterogeneity of opinions. In other words, we examine if CJs can be used to elicit community
values as opposed to individual values that the traditional choice experiment models produce.
Community values are identified when heterogeneity in responses decrease in the citizen
jury sessions (i.e. among the treatment group) compared to the control and main survey
participants. This may be possible with models such as the Mixed Logit or Random
Parameter Logit Models (RP) and Latent Class models (LC) (Álvarez-Farizo et al., 2009).
I use the RP model to see if there is a decrease in heterogeneity as we move from traditional
CE model to CJ choice formats.
Formalize the RP model following from Revelt and Train (1998), let N represent a
sample of respondents with the choice of J alternatives on T choice occasions. Individual
i’s (i = . . . , N) utility function, from choosing alternative j on choice occasion t takes the
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following form:
(54) Uijt = Vijt + ǫijt ⇒ Vijt = βjxijt + γizit + ǫijt
where βj is a vector coefficients of attributes relating to individual i and alternative j on
choice occasion t, xijt is observable attributes of the alternatives, γi is individual specific
coefficients relating to individual i’s characteristics, zit is observable individual specific
characteristics and ǫijt is a random term that is assumed to be an independently and
identically distributed extreme value. The βi coefficients vary over decision makers with
density f(β|θ), where θ are the parameters of the distribution. Assuming that the decision
maker knows the value of his own βi and ǫijt for all j, he will choose alternative k if and
only if Vijt > Vikt, ∀ k 6= j. If the parameter βi is known, the choice probability would









If the parameter βi is not known, the mixed logit unconditional choice probability will be












where f(β|θ)dβ is the density function of β. We know that survey participants are making


















where yijt = 1 if the individual chose alternative j in choice situation tand 0 otherwise.
These probabilities are approximated by maximizing the θ parameters through simulation






























where R is the number of draws β from from f(β|θ) and where β
[r]
i is is the r
th draw for
individual i from the distribution of β. The implication is that we are allowing the fact
that different decision makers may have different preferences and the IIA property no
longer holds Hole (2007). Equations like 50 and 51 are called the Mixed logit probability
(Revelt and Train, 1998). It is the general specification that allows fitting models with
both individual specific and alternative-specific explanatory variables (Hole, 2007). The
maximum simulated likelihood estimator (MSLE) is the value of θ that maximizes SLL
(Revelt and Train, 1998, Hole, 2007).
4.6. Results
4.6.1. Citizen jury (CJ) Deliberation Treatment. The first task is to remove
any significant differences between the people who participated in the CJ (treatment) or
those who participated in the CJ sessions and also completed the survey second time and
the non-treated (control group) or those who did the survey twice but did not volunteer
to be part of the jury, in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics. This allows us to
attribute the changes in preferences to deliberation treatment only. The standard approach
for estimating the effects of interventions (deliberation treatment) on the probability of
choosing conservation outcomes would be randomized controlled trials (RCTs) (Austin,
2011). However, our data is observational. We suspect there is a treatment selection
problem (self-selection) and that the result would be influenced by subject characteristics.
That means, the baseline characteristics of those who attended the deliberation citizen jury
sessions would systematically differ from the control group (those who did not attend).
We overcome this issue using propensity score matching method (PSM). The propensity
score method forms matched sets of treated and non-treated subjects who share a similar
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propensity score value (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).8 It is a balancing score in a sense
that the distribution of measured baseline observed predictor is similar between treated and
non-treated subjects (Austin, 2011). Thus, the effect of deliberation on conservation option
choices can be estimated by comparing the outcomes directly between the two subjects
(Greenland et al., 1999).
The procedure in the PSM method is to check the overlap and the region of common
support between treatment and control group. One of the different ways suggested in the
literature is a visual analysis of the density distribution of the propensity score in both
groups (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This is the easier method in a sense that the support
problem can be spotted by inspecting the propensity score distribution and we may not need
to implement a complicated formal estimator (Lechner, 2000). The more formal approach
is comparing the minima and maxima of the propensity score in both groups (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008). Then we delete all observations whose propensity score is smaller
than the minimum and larger than the maximum in the opposite group (Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008). For instance, if the propensity score lies within the interval [0.06, 0.84]
in the treatment group and within [0.04, 0.90] in the control group, the common support
will be given by [0.06, 0.84] (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). ‘‘The idea of implementing the
common support condition is to ensure that any combination of characteristics observed in
the treatment group can also be observed among the control group (Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008)” Thus, propensity score values in the common support region is interpreted as the
predicted probability of the control group being selected into the treatment group. For
example, if the propensity score is 0.7 for one of the control group respondent, it means
she/he has a 70% chance of being selected to the treatment group. Table 4.1 shows the
estimated propensity score result in the region of common support.
8Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define propensity score as ‘‘the probability of treatment assignment
conditional on observed baseline covariates: Pscore = Pr(Mi = 1|Xi) , where we observe a p× 1 vector of
pretreatment covariates Xi and Mi is the probability of being selected into the treatment. Further, see
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Austin (2011) for the introduction of propensity score model and Abadie
and Imbens (2016) for the different methods in which it can be used to estimate treatment effects.
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Table 4.1. Estimated propensity score
Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Largest
1% 0.023415 0.023415 75% 0.292853 0.686780
5% 0.031324 0.023415 90% 0.419161 0.686780
10% 0.045892 0.023415 95% 0.559172 0.686780







It lies between [0.02, 0.70], implying that observations which lie outside this region can
be discarded from analysis. It is estimated using logistic regression model on the observed
predictors listed in Table 4.1., applying stata psmatch package (StataCorp et al., 2013). In
the logistic regression model, the deliberation treatment is 1 for the people who volunteered
to participate in the jury sessions and 0 for non-treated (control) group.
Hence, from figure 4.3, we see that propensity scores in the treatment group and the con-
trol are not overlapping perfectly, implying systematic differences in baseline characteristics
between deliberation participants and non-participants. Intuitively, we want the control
group to perfectly overlap or look a lot like the treatment group in terms of individual
background characteristics or covariates.
Using the estimated propensity score result in the region of common support information
[0.02, 0.70] and the groups overlap distribution, I created a new control group which is
relatively similar to the treatment group. I used a benchmark of 20% propensity score
value to include a respondent in the new control group. Those below 20% were excluded
from the analysis. Figure 4.5 shows the propensity score density distribution. We see from
the figure that, on average, treated and non-treated participants have similar distributions
of measured baseline covariates above a propensity score of 20%. In other words, after
matching, observed systematic differences between treated and untreated participants
appear to have been greatly reduced (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984) and the new control
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Figure 4.3. Treatment and Control Group Overlap
group (after removing participant with a propensity score below 20%,) very much look
like the treatment group. Therefore, any significant difference in the conservation options
choice outcome must only attributed to the deliberation treatment effect.
4.6.2. Random Parameter Model Result. The multinomial logit models (MNL)
do not allow us to test whether the CJ system has any influence on the heterogeneity of
choice options. In other words, MNL models cannot show that CJs can be used to elicit
community values as opposed to individual values. Community values are identified when
heterogeneity in responses decreases in the CJ sessions (i.e. among the treatment group)
compared to the control and main survey participants (Álvarez-Farizo et al., 2009). This is
possible with models like random parameter models (RP), which can test for heterogeneity
in certain attributes. We compare how both preference and response heterogeneity behaves
using the mixed logit model estimates for the treated group, the control group, and the
main survey group. Table 4.2 displays the mixed logit result.
From the deliberation treatment model estimates in Table 4.2 (columns 2 and 3), we see
that the parameter estimate on ‘‘Option 1’’ (alternative specific intercept) is statistically





Figure 4.5. Propensity Score Distribution Densities
Option 1 compared to the ‘‘no action” status quo alternative. The parameters on the
alternative specific coefficients (attributes) are not statistically significantly different from
zero. However, all have the expected sign. The coefficients on the standard deviation (SD)
of the alternative specific intercepts are not statistically significant, inferring that there is
no preference heterogeneity in the data and that people have no difference in tests between
the two conservation options compared to the ‘‘no action’’ status quo option. From the
magnitudes of the standard deviations relative to the mean coefficients, practically all
prefer ‘‘Option 1” and about 6% prefer ‘‘Option 2” compared to the ‘‘no action” status quo
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Table 4.2. Baseline Characteristics of the treatment and control group
Age Group Frequency Percent Cumulative percent
Young 18 0.87 100
Lower Middle Age 396 19.13 19.13
Upper Middle Age 918 44.35 99.13
Senior Age 738 35.65 54.78
Income Group
Lower Income 216 10.43 19.13
Lower Middle Income 846 40.87 60
Upper Middle Income 828 40 100
High Income 180 8.7 8.7
Education Group
Completed High School/Below 288 13.91 13.91
Have Diploma/Attended Univ 702 33.91 47.83
University Degree/Above 1,080 52.17 100
Household Characteristics
Couple with children living at home 504 24.35 24.35
Couple with children who have left home 846 40.87 65.22
Couple with no children 288 13.91 79.13
Group household/Sharing with friends 54 2.61 81.74
Living alone 324 15.65 97.39
Single parent with children living at home 54 2.61 100
Property tax Responsibility
Jointly or solely 1,980 95.65 100
Not Responsible 90 4.35 4.35
Gender
Female 684 33.04 33.04
Male 1,386 66.96 100
Dwelling Owner
Rented 234 11.3 11.3
Own/partner 1,836 88.7 100
Total 2,070 100
alternative. This figure is given by 100× Φ(−βk/σk), where Φ is the cumulative standard
normal distribution and βk and σk are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the
kth coefficients (Hole, 2007). This is the expected outcome in a sense that the two choices
are fundamentally similar in terms of absolute changes in attribute levels.9 Therefore, with
deliberation, individuals are more informed and ‘‘Option 1” is more attractive in terms of
9The sign of the estimated standard deviations is irrelevant and interpreted and reported as being positive.
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Table 4.3. Deliberation treatment, control group, and main survey results:
Change in Preference after Citizen Jury
Variable Del.Treatment Group Control Group Main Survey
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
β11 [Option 1] 3.950* 0.45 3.305*** 0.412 2.922*** 1.436***
(-2.45) (-0.46) (-3.38) (-0.3) (-11.22) (-5.63)
β21 [Option 2] 2.368 1.512 2.530** 0.353 2.224*** 1.728***
(-1.71) (-1.81) (-2.83) (-0.65) (-8.83) (-8.32)
β2 [Groundwater] 0.0541 0.164 0.00307 0.11 -0.0098 0.119***
(-0.68) (-1.55) (-0.06) (-1.34) (-0.63) (-5.23)
β3 [Aquatic Health] 0.0619 0.0106 0.035 0.06 0.0000286*** 0.0000459***
(-1.71) (-0.22) (-1.07) (-1.04) (-3.55) (-3.55)
β3 [Habitat Loss] -0.00904 -0.0092 -0.0083 0.0186** -0.0102*** 0.0210***
(-1.21) (-0.71) (-1.38) (-2.66) (-5.46) (-9.21)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.0362 0.222 -0.0489 0.0603 -0.0182 0.101***
(-0.52) (-1.63) (-1.22) (-0.57) (-1.68) (-5.92)
β6 [Cost] -0.0288 0.119* -0.0602 0.173** -0.0395*** 0.152***
(-0.66) (-2.51) (-1.56) (-3.15) (-3.85) (-13.86)
Log likelihood -96.41147 -158.54 -2097.9
χ2 (df m) 45.31 (7) 133.2 (7) 1630.8 (7)
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 396 648 8424
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001
cost and is chosen overwhelmingly. Moreover, the variance covariance coefficients on some
of attribute are statistically significant (see Table 4.3), implying that the variables are not
independent of each other and those who chose an option with a higher salmon return for
instance necessarily also want a decrease in the use of groundwater, sensitive ecosystem
protected (decrease in habitat loss) and unique rural character sustained.
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 4.2 shows the results from control sample. We see that all
the parameter estimates have the expected sign. The coefficients on the alternative specific
coefficients (Options 1 and 2) are statistically significant. The coefficients on the standard
deviations of these variables are not statistically significant, implying that there is no
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Table 4.4. Variance Covariance of Normally Distributed Coefficients: De-
liberation Treatment Sample
Groundwater Aquatic Health Habitat Loss Rural character Cost
β2 [Groundwater] 0.361*
(2.49)
β3 [Aquatic Health] -0.151* 0.0299
(-2.29) (0.80)
β4 [Habitat Loss] 0.0521** -0.000208 0.0156
(2.69) (-0.02) (1.27)
β5 [Rural character] 0.0282 -0.290** 0.0299 0.0787
(0.34) (-2.61) (0.32) (0.75)
β6 [Cost] 0.0908 -0.0533 0.0602 -0.0181 0.0583*
(1.78) (-1.32) (1.40) (-0.50) (2.33)
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
statistically significant evidence to support the increase in preference heterogeneity compared
to the CJ sample and in contrast to my expectation. However, from the magnitudes of the
standard deviations relative to the mean coefficients, people are indifferent between the two
improved options unlike the CJ sample who overwhelmingly chose ‘‘Option 1” compared
to the ‘‘no action” status quo alternative. This is probably attributed to cost which is
statistically significantly heterogeneous (statistically significant SD on cost), implying that
people are more responsive to cost in sense that it is a disutility per my expectation. On the
other hand, the standard deviation (SD) coefficients on habitat loss attributes is statistically
significant compared to CJ model, suggesting some evidence of response heterogeneity in
the data and that people react differently to a change in the levels of the attribute of each
option. In addition, unlike the CJ case, attributes do no covary (see Table 4.5), suggesting
that people only consider the change in the level of attribute of interest independent of other
environmental attributes in their conservation option decision. This is the expected result
in sense that private incentive would prevail among the control sample whereas deliberation
hampers private incentive and enhances community or group values among the CJ sample.
From the main survey model result in Table 4.2, the mean coefficients on the alternative
specific variables (Options 1 and 2) are statistically significant. The coefficients on the
attributes are also statistically significant, except for groundwater use and rural character,
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Table 4.5. Correlated Normally Distributed Coefficients: Control Sample
Groundwater Aquatic Health Habitat Loss Rural Character Cost
β2 [Groundwater] 0.170**
(2.58)
β3 [Aquatic Health] -0.0378 0.0717*
(-0.98) (1.98)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00668 -0.0101 0.0190*
(-0.83) (-1.34) (2.49)
β5 [Rural Character] 0.0720 -0.0863 0.0829 0.0252
(1.58) (-1.82) (1.95) (0.48)
β6 [Cost] -0.0478 -0.0120 -0.0253 0.0222 0.0761**
(-1.59) (-0.43) (-1.10) (0.83) (2.65)
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
implying that most are important conservation option choice decision attributes. The
coefficients on the standard deviations are highly statistically significant, implying a strong
preference and response heterogeneity in the data. That means, people have different tests
for conservation options and also react differently for the changes in levels of the attributes
compared to both the CJ and control samples. Cost attribute has the right sign (negative)
and highly statistically significant in line with a priori expectations that increases in the
cost of the conservation options reduces any of the options utility. Cost is not important as
a decision attribute in the CJ and control group cases, implying that utility of any of the
options does not depend on it. This is expected because discussion enhances deliberative
solutions as opposed to private solution. In deliberative exercises, ‘‘the common good
prevails and predictions of models based on narrow self-interest and negotiation may fail
Mendelberg (2002)”.
The variance covariance coefficients on the survey sample attributes are statistically
significant, implying that people do evaluate the environment as a whole and the attributes
are not independent of each other. This outcome is similar to the CJ case and that environ-
mental attributes are statistically significantly correlated in contrast to the control group
outcome. The important question here, motivated by Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley (2006a),
who inquired the same question, therefore, is whether ‘‘preferences change significantly
across CJ, control and main survey samples?” To address this question, I test the null
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Table 4.6. Correlated Normally Distributed Coefficients: Main Survey Sample
Groundwater Aquatic Health Habitat Loss Rural Char Cost
β2 [Groundwater] 0.134***
(6.54)
β3 [Aquatic Health] -0.0000165 -0.0000603***
(-1.29) (-6.31)
β4 [Habitat Loss] 0.0181*** 0.0144*** -0.0116***
(6.03) (5.33) (-3.62)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.000924 -0.0247 -0.0731* 0.0780*
(-0.06) (-1.39) (-2.53) (2.50)
β6 [Cost] 0.0280* 0.00341 0.00488 -0.0182 0.0868***
(2.41) (0.34) (0.42) (-1.06) (12.38)
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
hypothesis of the equality of parameter coefficients across CJ, control and main survey
samples. Formally, the null and alternative hypotheses would be Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley
(2006b):
H0 = βi (Deliberation Treatment) = βi (Control) = βi (Main Survey)
H1 = βi (Deliberation Treatment) 6= βi (Control) 6= βi (Main Survey)
The likelihood-ratio test statistic of this hypothesis is the ratio of the likelihood of the
simpler attribute only model with fewer parameters and the broader with alternative specific
intercepts model.





Asymptotically, the test statistic is distributed as a chi-squared random variable, with
degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters between the two
models (Greene, 2012, Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006b). Table 4.6 shows this test statistic.
Table 4.7. Likelihood Ratio Tests
LLAttribute Only LLAttribute+Intercept LRT
LRtreatment -103.0855 -96.5566 13.0577
LRControl -165.3333 -158.3627 13.9412
LRMain Survey -2322.7199 -2100.4806 444.4786
LRTC = βT (Treatment) = βC (Control) -165.3333 -96.5566 137.55346
LRTM = βT (Treatment) = βM (Main survey) -2322.7199 -96.5566 4452.3266
LRCM = BC (Control) = BM(MainSurvey) -2322.7199 -158.3627 4328.71434
127
Hence, we can not accept the null hypothesis of parameter equality across the different
survey samples and choice models as LRT values are above the critical χ2 value of 11.070
for 5 degrees of freedom at α = 0.05 confidence level.
The other important question we may ask is if preferences change significantly within
the same sample before and after the deliberation (among the treatment sample) and
before and after completing the survey the second time (among the control group). We see
from Table 4.8 that there is relatively more heterogeneity in the data before deliberation
compared to after in the deliberation treatment data. We observe statistically significant
SD on alternative specific intercept (Option 1) and coefficients (groundwater and habitat
loss), implying preference and response heterogeneity in the data at 95% confidence level
among treatment group before deliberation. Choices are consistent among the control
group, implying that completing the survey did not matter or did not change preference for
conservation options.
In summary, from the results demonstrated above, both preference and response hetero-
geneity relatively decreased but did vanish when people were allowed to deliberate among
peers and given more time. The overall goodness of fit did not differ considerably and from
the likelihood-ratio test for the joint significance of the standard deviations, we can reject
the null hypothesis that all the standard deviations are equal to zero (See Table 4.2 that
Prob > χ2). Nonetheless, the CJ result could most likely reflect group (community) values
rather than private values for at least two reasons:
1. Both Preference and response heterogeneity decreased relative to the control and
main survey samples;
2. Cost is not important conservation choice decision attribute under CJ model.
We see that cost is strongly statistically significant under the main survey sample, suggesting
that it is one of the essential choice factors. In contrast, cost is measurably unimportant in
CJ sample and not an important conservation options decision variable. This suggests a
decrease in dissent or protest to the expansion in property levy (cost) in contrast to most
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Table 4.8. Change in preference before and after deliberation (Treatment
group) and first and second time survey participant (Control)
Variable
Before Deliberation After Deliberation Control (First Time) Control (Second Time)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
β11 [Option1] 2.381* 1.608* 3.881* -0.637 2.823*** 0.370 3.305*** 0.412
(2.43) (2.44) (2.31) (-0.68) (3.36) (0.82) (3.38) (0.30)
β21 [Option2] 1.421 1.782 2.338 1.751 2.223** -0.701 2.530** 0.353
(1.53) (1.66) (1.61) (1.09) (2.83) (-1.22) (2.83) (0.65)
β2 [Groundwater] 0.0714 -0.164* 0.0582 0.181 0.0205 0.192 0.00307 0.110
(0.95) (-2.24) (0.72) (1.19) (0.35) (1.96) (0.06) (1.34)
β3 [AquaticHealth] 0.0000329 0.0000850 0.0609 -0.00866 0.0000731* 0.0000375 0.0350 0.0600
(0.86) (1.73) (1.68) (-0.16) (2.36) (0.88) (1.07) (1.04)
β4 [Habitat Loss] -0.00772 -0.0209* -0.00824 0.00727 -0.0120 0.0239* -0.00827 0.0186**
(-0.87) (-2.15) (-1.11) (0.57) (-1.46) (2.40) (-1.38) (2.66)
β5 [Rural Character] -0.0579 0.0856 -0.0232 0.214 -0.0641 -0.110 -0.0489 0.0603
(-1.15) (1.47) (-0.34) (1.42) (-1.65) (-1.58) (-1.22) (0.57)
β6 [Cost] -0.00684 0.0211 -0.0181 0.124* -0.0501 0.152*** -0.0602 0.173**
(-0.20) (0.72) (-0.45) (2.18) (-1.38) (3.83) (-1.56) (3.15)
χ2(df m) 40.17 (7) 45.02 (7) 116.6 (7) 133.2 (7)
N 396 396 648 648
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗p < 0.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001
non-market valuation outcomes. That means, it is expected that deliberation help build
consensus by narrowing the difference in views and entertaining the diversity of opinions
among the jurors related to the method of financing conservation options.
4.6.3. CJ Group Result. Based on the decision challenges inspired by the issues
raised in the survey, jurors were required to vote on a few scenario combinations drawn
from those six different possible environmental futures considering costs of achieving those
futures over the planning period. That is, each participant has to consider two possible
costs, $20 or $40 per household per year for 30 years (the same payment vehicle they knew
from the main survey) and allocate funding for each environmental attribute according to
the priority set by the jurors.
Given that there are approximately 80,000 households in the Regional District of Central
Okanagan (RDCO) presently, and likely to increase to about 120,000 over the next 30 years,
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the payment will raise about $60 million ($0.05 × (400, 000/1000) × 100, 000 × 30 years)
or if a $20 CAD levy per property value is collected per household, or $120 million
($0.10 × (400, 000/1000) × 100, 000 × 30 years) or if $ 40 levy is collected per household,
where the population is assumed to be the average of 80,000 and 120,000. Tables 4.8 and
4.9 show the result of this hypothetical CJ exercise.
Table 4.9. Scenario 1 Allocation: 60 million CAD
Attributes Level Chosen Allocation (mil CAD) WTP/yr/per WTP/30 yrs/per
Groundwater Medium use (15%) 20 8.333 250
Aquatic Health Medium Return (50000) 0.0 0.00 0.0
Habitat Loss Medium Loss (50 KM2) 20 8.33 250
Rural Character Av.Density (70 Per/KM2) 20 8.33 250
Total 60 25 750
Table 4.10. Scenario 2 Allocation: 120 million CAD
Attributes Level Chosen Allocation (mil CAD) WTP/yr/per WTP/30 yrs/per
Groundwater Moderate use (15%) 40 16.67 500
Aquatic Health Moderate return (50000) 20 8.33 250
Habitat Loss Moderate loss (50 KM2) 40 16.67 500
Rural Character Av.Density (70 Per/KM2) 20 8.33 250
Total 120 50 1500
The result was achieved by the highest votes from among the levels suggested by
participants in each option in the choice set. For example, the majority voted for a
moderate increase in the share of total water use from groundwater, moderate reduction in
habitat loss, and about average population density and allocated $20 million CAD for each.
Aquatic habitat was not given priority under this scenario. Groundwater use and habitat
loss were given priority under the second scenario, allocating $40 million CAD for each
over the the planning period. This means, an average person is willing to pay about $250
CAD over the planning period ($8 CAD per year) for each of the attributes except aquatic
habitat under scenario 1 keeping population constant at 80,000. An average individual
would be willing to pay about $500 CAD each for a policy that promote a decrease in
groundwater use and natural habitat loss and $250 CAD each for a policy that promote
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the return of salmon fish or maintain rural amenity under scenario 2 over the planning
period. Alternatively, if all environmental attributes are considered together, an average
individual would be willing to pay about $750 CAD ($25/year) under scenario 1 and about
$1500 CAD ($50/year) under scenario 2 conservation policy package respectively over the
planning period.
This result is expected to conform with the private MWTP outcome discussed in
section 4.5.2 above. Table 4.10 shows MWTP values calculated based on deliberation
treatment (treatment panel); control and main survey samples outcomes presented for
comparison. MWTP values are calculated following from Hole (2007): E(WTP j) = − E(β
j)
(βLevy)
and assuming cost to have fixed coefficient. We see that private MWTP estimates after
controlling for deliberation effect differ from group result a great deal and the values are not
statistically significantly different from zero at 95% confidence level (it is presented here
only for comparison). For instance, private CJ WTP is about $3.1 CAD less in average
additional charge per property per year for the increase in the share of total water use
from groundwater, $2.7 less in average additional charge per property per year for average
decline in salmon return, $0.04 less in average additional charge per year for a km2 loss
in natural habitat, $4.7 CAD more in average additional charge per property per year to
protect unique rural character. In other words, an average individual who participated in
CJ sessions and completed the survey the twice is willing to pay 10% and 40% more in
average additional charge per property per year for a decrease in groundwater use, 50%
and > 100% more in average additional charge per property per year for a aquatic health
(salmon fish return), 30% and 90% less in average additional charge per property per year
for a habitat loss, and 36% less and 95% more in average additional charge per property per
year to protect unique rural character, compared to the control and main survey samples
respectively. However, group MWTP value is approximately higher by more than 160%
and 75% in average additional charge per property per year for a decrease in groundwater
use and protecting rural character and by extremely large figure to protect natural habitat
loss than the treatment sample MWTP values respectively.
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The welfare implication is even more huge. It was shown that heterogeneity decreased
after deliberation treatment and the decrease in heterogeneity of preferences impacts
the willingness to pay which is used to quantify gains (or losses) of the environmental
conservation policy option. Hence, the undiscounted gain or losses, calculated using the CJ
willingness to pay values for each attribute and for the policy packages if implemented by
multiplying it with the average population size of the study region, and assuming population
of the region over the planning period to be about 100,000 households, associated with
group CJ MWTP is approximately higher by 130% under scenario 1 and 370% under
scenario 2 (see the last four columns of Table 4.11) than the private values associated
with CJ treatment sample. In conclusion, even though private MWTP values after
Table 4.11. Willingness to pay values after controlling for Deliberation
Effect, Control and Main Survey
Sample Group MWTP Groundwater Aquatic Health Habitat Loss Rural Character
Treatment
MWTP -3.11163 -2.71404 -0.03986 4.75790
Lower 95% -9.72592 -11.05628 -0.72069 -8.29893
Upper 95% 3.50266 5.62821 0.80040 17.81473
Control
MWTP -2.82303 -5.92658 -0.93139 7.48737
Lower 95% -14.96391 -35.52592 -4.07613 -27.46128
Upper 95% 9.31784 23.67277 5.93890 42.43601
Main Survey
MWTP 0.07007 -0.00097 -0.60401 2.43389
Lower 95% -2.27445 -0.00288 -0.09858 -0.44730
Upper 95% 2.41459 0.00095 1.30661 5.31508




Private WTP Based B/C CJ WTP based B/C
After Deliberation B/C/yr B/C/30 yrs B/C/yr B/C/30 yrs
Scenario 1
Ground Water 3.11 8.33 100,000 311,000 9,330,000 833,000 24,990,000
Aquatic Habitat 2.71 0.00 100,000 271,000 8,130,000 0.000000 0.0000000
Natural Loss 0.04 8.33 100,000 4,000 120,000 833,000 24,990,000
Rural Character 4.76 8.33 100,000 476,000 14,280,000 833,000 24,999,000
Total Benefit 10.62 25 1,062,000 31,860,000 2,499,000 74,970,000
Senario 2
Ground Water 3.11 16.67 100,000 311,000 9,330,000 1,667,000 50,010,000
Aquatic Habitat 2.71 8.33 100,000 271,000 8,130,000 833,000 24,990,000
Natural Loss 0.04 16.67 100,000 4,000 120,000 1,667,000 50,010,000
Rural Character 4.76 8.33 100,000 476,000 14,280,000 833,000 24,990,000
Total Benefit 10.62 50 825,000 31,860,000 5,000,000 150,000,000
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controlling for deliberation effect is not comparable with group (community) WTP values,
it performs better in approximating community values compared to control and main survey
samples. This result is in line with many studies that have compared private MWTP with
hypothetical stated preference methods MWTP values which found that CJ values usually
produce higher welfare by a factor of between 2 and 10 (Macmillan et al., 2002). Intuitively,
the treatment sample MWTP and group CJ outcome should have produced close results
given that time is not a constraint and that CJ sample participant are completing the
survey the second time after participating in CJ sessions. The most plausible explanation
and cautionary note would be that deliberation as a group activity forces decisions more to
the opinion of those who are more vocal and informed and that MWTP values could be
exaggerated.
4.7. Conclusion
Mendelberg (2002) states that ‘‘not only is deliberation about talk, it is about groups.”
We observed differences in control and treatment samples outcome after deliberation
treatment. Both preference and response heterogeneity essentially vanished when people
were allowed to deliberate more and the willingness to pay values reflect conformity with
the group dynamics.
In relation to my central hypothesis and evaluation of data from the jury, deliberation
improved individuals’ valuation processes in a way that I believe reflects community values
more so than the traditional CE valuation method. Most jurors’ evaluation sheets about
the content of the jury and the process of the CJ indicated that their knowledge about the
environment increased as a result of participation in the CJ. The majority also viewed the
decision-making process as fair and felt that their views were listened to and they believed
that they made well-informed and better choices. In summary, group-deliberation markedly
affected the kinds of considerations that most mattered to respondents, which consequently




In this dissertation, I investigated unobserved heterogeneity in citizens preferences for
conservation option choices in three essays. The results of the first essay show that the
random coefficient discrete choice models that allow for correlated errors demonstrate
statistically significant preference and response heterogeneity. The latent class model,
which allows respondents to belong to a class and preferences varying across, but not
within, classes, show a priori environmental damage perception as one of a potential source
of these heterogeneities. In addition, models are complementary with each explaining
something better than the other when compared to discover if one model performs better in
explaining unobserved heterogeneity. For example, while the latent class model capture the
possible sources of heterogeneity, the mixed logit model is strong in quantifying unobserved
heterogeneity.
In chapter two, I posit social network as another possible source of unobserved hetero-
geneity. I used egocentric centrality measures for data on a nodes first-order zone similar
to Freeman et al. (1979) centrality measures for complete (sociocentric) network data to
understand the structure, function, and composition of network ties around an individual.
A clustering coefficient was found statistically significant implying two friends of an ego
are likely friends with each other, resulting in sets of people among which many links exist
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998). A closeness measure is uninformative for egocentric data, since
all geodesic distances from ego to other nodes in the first-order zone are 1 by definition
(Marsden, 2002). Degree and eigenvector centrality measures are statistically insignifi-
cant and uninformative. In principle, the sociocentric (complete network) and egocentric
networks yield identical information on degree centrality (Frank, 2011). The eigenvector
centrality depends both on the number of neighbors and the quality of its connections and
the idea that a highly influential node influences one other node and then that influencing
the ego more in the chain does not standout in the egocentric data. The policy implication
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of this finding is that both conservation and consumption of environmental goods generally
are the result of interactions of combinations of social factors (e.g. population, technology,
economic conditions). Many of these goods and services are non-excludable along social
or geographic links (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007). Decision making in this situation can
not be thought as driven by private incentives only. Decisions around natural resources
have social consequences that need to be addressed in public policy formulations in the
context of citizens preferences interaction, constraint interaction and expectation interaction
(Manski, 2000, Brown et al., 2005, Watts and Dodds, 2007). Any policy that ignores these
interaction effects would be incomplete. Therefore, a thorough understanding of these
interconnections, including how information is exchanged, how residents are influenced by
members of their network, and how people choose or select their network could explain
citizen conservation program choices and preferences (Frank, 2011). Moreover, egocentric
social network analysis (SNA) is a methodological tool used to understand the structure,
function, and composition of network ties around an individual is cost effective compared to
the sociocentric (i.e. whole) network analysis. Egocentric network analysis share the basic
assumption that behaviors, beliefs, attitudes, and values of individuals are shaped through
contact and communication with others in unbounded setting unlike Sociocentric SNA which
has a limited inference beyond the bounded group. Egocentric SNA assesses individual’s
personal community networks across any number of social settings using name generators,
and is therefore less limited in theoretical and substantive scope. The focus on individual
rather than group outcomes. Egocentric SNA is concerned with how people’s patterns
of interaction shape their individual-level outcomes (e.g. conservation option choices).
Flexibility in data collection. Because sociocentric SNA must use as its sampling frame a
census of a particular bounded group, data collection is very time-consuming, expensive,
and targeted to a specific set of research questions. In contrast, because egocentric SNA uses
individuals as cases, potential sampling frames and data collection strategies are virtually
limitless. Egocentric data collection tools can easily be incorporated into large-scale or
nationally-representative surveys being fielded for a variety of other purposes.
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In chapter three, I evaluated the data from the citizen jury deliberation and if that
results in the change of preferences and improve individuals valuation process. The results
indicate that unobserved heterogeneity significantly declined, suggesting that relying only
on the conventional application of valuation in which individuals are asked to express the
value they attach to environmental public goods and services in isolation is inadequate.
Other researchers have also shown similar and significant difference in value between
those based on individual valuation and the more deliberative forms of valuation. Further,
‘‘environmental public goods allocation of services directly affects many people and raises
normative questions about social equity, and it is argued that carefully designed deliberative
methods will help ensure the achievement of social equity goals (Wilson and Howarth, 2002).”
Moreover, in contrast to estimates of willingness to pay derived from conventional methods,
the estimates from citizen juries would not reflect the budget constraints of the individual
participants and the values are social rather than individual (Wilson and Howarth, 2002).
In addition, the jurors place more value on programs containing actions related to the
preservation of the environment as a whole. This information should be of interest to policy
makers aiming to keep the environment alive and protect the ecosystem. Conservation
policy options and public investments are also justifiable based on the WTP estimates.
Therefore, this method could be used ‘‘to determine either a social/civic willingness to pay
(‘‘public WTP”) or a social/civic willingness to accept (‘‘public WTA”) for any particular
ecological change (Blamey et al., 2000).” O’neill and Spash (2000) notes that ‘‘for public
WTP values, citizen valuation juries can be asked to determine the highest levy, tax, or
other form of payment that the government should pay to obtain a particular ecological
benefit. For public WTA values, citizen valuation juries can be asked to determine the
highest monetary sum that the government should accept to avoid a particular ecological
loss.”
Overall, heterogeneity manifests itself in individual choice decisions. This has impli-
cations for both the marginal valuation of attributes and also for predicted changes in
conservation program choices. It also suggests a need for future policy design and adoptions
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that focus on the following: identifying higher value ecological spots, balancing private
property rights with the rights of the public, directing resources towards information and
education to ensure residents understand the value of the resource and the need to pro-
tect, designing a suitable and realistic adaptive management plan with compliance and
enforcement systems, maintaining the local settlements of rural population, preserving the
natural open spaces and traditional agricultural and forestry landscapes, among others.
Given that growth is likely inevitable, residents need to better understand the challenges
and consequences of different growth scenarios.
As a final thought, there are three major limitations in this research. The first two
limitations are related to social network analysis. The third is related to the general survey
design. First, the most common survey methods for gathering ‘‘sociocentric network data
ask respondents to report on their outgoing ties using a recognition format that reminds
respondents of all alters deemed to be part of the network under study (Marsden, 1990).”
By contrast, typical survey methods for assembling egocentric network data enumerate
alters through free recall, and rely on the respondent (the ego node) as an informant about
the structure and composition of the entire first-order zone. However, survey respondents
do not recall a substantial fraction of their contacts in this case (Burt, 1984, Frank, 2011).
Therefore, other things being equal, egocentric design typically understate degree and
centrality measures. Second, there is uncertainty related to network relation or ties through
which actors are influenced (Frank, 2011). It is very difficult to uncover if someone’s decision
making behavior is influenced by all those with whom they come in contact, or if there are
specific types of relations that are more influential for particular behaviors (Frank, 2011).
The third limitation is the length of the survey. Augmenting three different methods in one
survey is interesting but created a long, and sometimes confusing, survey for respondents
that probably resulted in drop-offs, skipped questions and a low response rate.
Finally, this research contributes to the stated preference environmental economics
literature by incorporating social network and citizen jury methods into discrete choice
modeling techniques. The choice experiment augmented with social network and deliberation
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B. Crona and Ö. Bodin. What you know is who you know? communication patterns among
resource users as a prerequisite for co-management. Ecology and society, 11(2):7, 2006.
144
B. Csuti, S. Polasky, P. H. Williams, R. L. Pressey, J. D. Camm, M. Kershaw, A. R. Kiester,
B. Downs, R. Hamilton, M. Huso, et al. A comparison of reserve selection algorithms
using data on terrestrial vertebrates in oregon. Biological Conservation, 80(1):83--97,
1997.
R. Cummings, D. Brookshire, and W. Schulze. Valuing environmental goods: an assessment
of the contingent valuation methodrowman and allanheld. Totowa, NJ, 1986.
V. M. Danthurebandara, M. Vandebroek, and J. Yu. Integrated mixed logit and latent
variable models. Marketing Letters, 24(3):245--259, 2013.
R. Dhar. Consumer preference for a no-choice option. Journal of Consumer Research, 24
(2):215--231, 1997.
M. Diani. Leaders or brokers? positions and influence in social movement networks. Social
movements and networks: Relational approaches to collective action, pages 105--122,
2003.
M. Diani and D. McAdam. Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to
collective action: Relational approaches to collective action. OUP Oxford, 2003.
T. Dietz, P. C. Stern, and A. Dan. How deliberation affects stated willingness to pay for
mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions: an experiment. Land Economics, 85(2):329--347,
2009.
S. T. Dissanayake and A. W. Ando. Valuing ecosystem restoration: tradeoffs, experience
and design.
S. T. Dissanayake and A. W. Ando. Valuing grassland restoration: Proximity to substitutes
and trade-offs among conservation attributes. Land Economics, 90(2):237--259, 2014.
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Table A.1. Data Summary: Variables by Future Environmental Manage-
ment Option Chosen
VARIABLE NAME OPTION 1 OPTION 2 STATUS QUO TOTAL
Family size
Child at Home 325 276 149 750
No Child/Left Home 882 639 423 1,944
Live in Group household/Sharing 55 50 9 114
Education
Completed High School 225 140 127 492
Have Diploma/Attended 493 340 246 1,079
University Degree/Above 544 485 208 1,237
Income
Low Income 189 108 105 402
Lower Middle Income 465 338 223 1,026
Upper Middle Income 410 378 202 990
High Income 198 141 51 390
Age
Young 56 47 23 126
Low Middle Age 195 169 128 492
Upper Middle Age 620 457 220 1,297
Senior Age 391 292 210 893
Gender
Female 445 365 198 1,008
Male 817 600 383 1,800
Dwelling Ownership
Owned 1,149 880 503 2,532
Rented 107 79 72 258
Other 6 6 6 18
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Table A.2. Data Summary: Variables by Future Environmental Manage-
ment Option Chosen
VARIABLE NAME OPTION 1 OPTION 2 STATUS QUO TOTAL
Property taxes(House rent)
Solely 41 49 18 108
Jointly 1,062 803 487 2,352
Pressure Before Survey
Not aware 205 117 116 438
Aware 1,057 848 465 2,370
Past 6 Months read remember
Not Aware 101 83 68 252
Aware 743 587 320 1,650
Very Aware 418 295 193 906
Shoreline Disturbed
Very Disturbed 611 495 298 1,404
Disturbed 413 294 205 912
Undisturbed 238 176 78 492
Share of the original wetlands
Almost No Original 873 700 413 1,986
Few Original 324 223 148 695
More Original 65 42 20 127
% Rely on Groundwater
Few Depend on 547 466 270 1,283
More Depend on 293 208 129 630
Almost all depend on 422 291 182 895
Share of jobs in Tourism
Few Jobs 194 146 85 425
Many Jobs 790 643 398 1,831
Almost All Jobs 278 176 98 552
Impact of Development and growth
Negative 569 498 206 1,273
Neutral 145 92 92 329
No Impact (Positive) 548 375 283 1,206
If Member of First Nation
No 1,248 955 581 2,784
Yes 14 10 0 24
Involved in Environmental Con.
No 1,205 913 528 2,646
Yes 57 52 53 162
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Table A.5. Partial Data List
Participant.ID Alt. Alternative Chosen Groundwater Aquatic Health Habitat Loss Rural Density Levy
7 STATUS QUO 0 High use Low return High Loss Above Average Density 0
7 OPTION 1 1 Low use High return High Loss Below Average Density 40
7 OPTION 2 0 High use Low return Low Loss Below Average Density 20
7 STATUS QUO 0 High use Low return High Loss Above Average Density 0
7 OPTION 1 0 Low use Low return Low Loss Above Average Density 20
7 OPTION 2 1 High use High return High Loss Below Average Density 40
7 STATUS QUO 0 High use Low return High Loss Above Average Density 0
7 OPTION 1 1 Moderate Medium return Low Loss Above Average Density 40
7 OPTION 2 0 Moderate Medium return High Loss Above Average Density 20
7 STATUS QUO 0 High use Low return High Loss Above Average Density 0
7 OPTION 1 0 Moderate High return Medium Loss Above Average Density 40
7 OPTION 2 1 Moderate Low return Medium Loss Above Average Density 20
7 STATUS QUO 0 High Low return High Loss Above Average Density 0
7 OPTION 1 1 High Medium return High Loss Below Average Density 20
7 OPTION 2 0 Low use Medium return Low Loss Below Average Density 40
7 STATUS QUO 0 High use Low return High Loss Above Average Density 0
7 OPTION 1 1 High High return High Loss Above Average Density 20





Thank you for participating in our survey. Your household was randomly selected from
a list of Central Okanagan addresses we collected using directories available on the internet.
Continuing growth and development is placing increasing pressure on environmental
resources, such as ground water, aquatic habitats, natural habitats and rural landscape.
These resources provide environmental services that can easily be taken for granted and
ignored. Our choices as a community about how growth and development happens in the
Okanagan reflects the value we place on these environmental resources and services. By
completing this survey, you will help us understand the balance between development and
environmental protection that you and other Central Okanagan residents would like to see.
The survey should take about 30 minutes to complete. As thanks for your effort, we
will draw five names from among those who complete the survey and send them a $250.00
prize. We do not expect more than 600 people to complete the survey.
You will also be invited to participate in a shorter version of this survey in about a
month. If you complete the second survey, your name will be entered into the draw a
second time. All prizes will be drawn after the second round of the survey is complete.
B.2. About this survey
This survey has four parts:
1. Information on environmental resources: we give you some information about
environmental resources and the services they provide in the Okanagan.
2. Your choices: we ask you to choose among alternative future levels of environ-
mental resources.
3. Your community: we ask you questions about the people you talk to about
environmental issues.
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4. Follow up : we ask some qualifying questions about the choices you have made
and some details about yourself.
B.3. Part one: Background
Environmental resources and the services they provide are important in the Okanagan.
Some examples include:
• Large valley bottom lakes create recreation and tourism opportunities (boating,
fishing, etc.).
• Natural areas along lake shores, streams, and wetlands provide habitat for fish and
wildlife, help improve water quality and reduce erosion.
• 48 of the 1,597 identified species at risk in British Columbia are found only in the
Okanagan.
These environmental resources are vulnerable to a range of pressures from ongoing growth
and development. These include shoreline modification, increasing use of surface and
groundwater, invasion by non-native species, land development, and overuse.
B.4. Your Views about the Okanagan Environment
1. Before receiving this survey, were you aware of the pressures on environ-
mental resources in the Okanagan?
2 No.
2 Yes.
2. In the past 6 months how often can you remember having heard or read
about environmental issues in the Okanagan?
2 None.
2 One or two times.
2 Three or four times
2 Five or six times.
2 Seven or more times.
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3. What share of the shoreline around the major valley lakes do you think
is undisturbed?






2 Do not know.
4. What share of the original wetlands in the Okanagan remain?






2 More than 90%.
5. What share of Okanagan households rely on groundwater (own wells or
from water utilities)?






2 More than 90%.
6. What share of jobs in the Okanagan are in tourism and related sectors?
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2 Do not know.
B.5. How Environmental Resources Have Been Changing
Growth and development have transformed the Okanagan environment. Changes
include:
• Groundwater use: Groundwater is a growing source of water for both private
households and water utilities.
• Aquatic species: Between 1973 and 2010, the shore-spawning Kokanee population
had decreased by 90
• Natural habitats: Natural habitats, including wetlands, grasslands, and forests
have been extensively modified, particularly on the valley floor.
• Rural character: Rural areas and communities have attracted many new residents
and been losing their ’country’ character.
7. Development and growth has led to large reductions in natural habitats.
These changes have also brought jobs and improved the standard of living









2 Do not know.
B.6. Management Options
There are a variety of ways to balance the demands for development with the environ-
mental impacts. These include:
• Undertaking research to better understand our impacts on the environment and
identify protection strategies.
• Modify provincial regulations to control groundwater pumping and potential con-
tamination sources.
• Invest in better monitoring of water quality, habitat health, groundwater levels,
etc.
• Strengthen regulations and increase enforcement to limit development on agricul-
tural and rural lands.
• Pursue covenants, incentives, and other voluntary arrangements with property
owners to protect sensitive habitats and rural character.
• Acquire land having important habitats and/or provides recreational opportunities.
• Tightly enforce official community plans and zoning to limit development that
harms the environment and/or changes rural character.
Over the coming 30 years, the future condition will depend on which of the additional
management actions/tools are used, how much and how often the actions/tools are taken,
how they are combined and when it is started.
B.7. Paying for It
Balancing growth and development while protecting the environment also means weighing
the value of protecting the environment against how much money your household will have
to pay for its protection. Moreover, any method of payment chosen will reduce the amount
of money that your household has available to spend each year on other things.
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Special levies on property have been used in many jurisdictions to raise money for
specific projects. For example, the H2O aquatic center in Kelowna was funded in part
by a levy on Kelowna properties of about $0.21 per $1,000 value for twenty years, and
ongoing activities to control Eurasian Milfoil in valley lakes is one of the things paid for by
a $0.057 per $1,000 collected for Okanagan Basin watershed issues. This last levy has been
adjusted as needed, being $0.21 per $1,000 in the 70’s, when valley waste water collection
and treatment systems needed upgrades to protect Okanagan Lake water quality. In the
70’s, community leaders in the Okanagan also opted to use a levy on all properties in the
Okanagan basin to fund waste water treatment upgrades, upgrades that have successfully
improved lake water quality.
In the scenarios that follow, we are proposing two different increases in a special levy on
property values, with the monies collected directed to achieving the environmental changes
described. These increases are $0.05 per $1000 and $0.10 per $1000. Per property, the
average additional charge would be about $20 or $40 per year. This levy will be in effect
starting 2015 and continuing into the future for 30 years.
B.8. Part Two: Comparing Outcomes/Your Choice
Like grades on a report card, indicators are often used to assess how we are balancing
development and growth with environmental protection. In what follows we will describe
several indicators that are related to different important environmental resources.
B.9. Management Scenarios
Question 8 is an example of several scenario combinations we would like you to compare.
Each scenario combination contains the status quo, option 1 and option 2.
The status quo reflects how we expect the indicators to change if no special policy
choices are made. There will also be no additional costs that your household will have to
pay. Options 1 and 2 offer improvements in some or all of the indicators, but also involve
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Figure B.1. Attributes and Indicators Description
a cost to your household. The number of images in each box shows the direction of the
change.
In the example below, option 1 has half as large an increase in groundwater use, 10,000
additional Kokanee spawning returns, and 5,000 less hectares of sensitive habitat lost. The
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number of people living in rural areas is no different from the status quo, and your household
will face a special property levy of $0.05 per $1000 in property value, or about $20 per year
for a $400,000 house, for 30 years.
Option 2 has the same increase in groundwater pumping and loss of sensitive habitat as
for the status quo. However there are 20,000 additional Kokanee spawning returns and a
lower rural population density. Achieving these changes will be paid for by a special levy of
$0.10 per $1000, or for a $400,000 house, about $40 per year for 30 years.
In the following pages, we will give you a number of scenario combinations like this
example, except with different combinations of changes. We would like you to compare
each of the two options with each other and with the status quo. If the improvements in
the environmental indicators are, in your opinion, worth the cost of the special levy, select
the option that you think is the best value. If you do not think that the improvements
justify the cost, then choose the status quo.
8. Please choose the future you like best. Remember that if you choose a





In Q9-Q14, you will see: A future for the Central Okanagan in 2040 that could occur if no
new tools are used to manage growth and development.
Two possible futures that could occur if some new tools are used. The reduction in the
amount of money that your household will have to spend each year is also shown with each
possible future.
Each of the next six questions offers different combinations of the two futures possible
if new tools are used. For these six questions, you choose that future, either the status quo,
where no new tools are used, or one of the two other possible futures, which you like best.
Remember that if you choose a future other than the status quo, your household will have
less money to spend each year.
9. Please choose the future you like best. Remember that if you choose a





Figure B.2. Choice Card-1.1
10. Please choose the future you like best. Remember that if you choose a





11. Please choose the future you like best. Remember that if you choose a





12. Please choose the future you like best. Remember that if you choose a





13. Please choose the future you like best. Remember that if you choose a





14. Please choose the future you like best. Remember that if you choose a
future other than the status quo, your household will have less money to
spend each year.
B.10. Follow Up
The following questions gather some further information about your choices. This
information will help us to see whether people who give similar answers to the above




provided here will be kept in the strictest confidence, and nothing will be released which
can tie back to you and the specific answers you provide.
15. Which of the following statements most closely describes the main rea-
son(s) why you chose Status Quo, if you did (Please tick all that apply).
2 I do not use any of the environmental resources described here?
2 I do not particularly care about the environmental resources management out-
comes.
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2 I would like to see some improvement in the condition of resources but I do not
have the money to make a payment.
2 I already pay enough in taxes and charges.
2 I do not think I should be the one paying for any additional management actions.
2 It is too long before we would see any changes in the environmental resources.
2 The additional management action options did not make sense to me.
2 I found making the choices too confusing, so I always chose the existing actions
option.
2 I think the Government should pay for the initiatives using existing revenues.
2 Other [please specify].
B.11. Part Three: Your Community/Network
You may talk with other people about how growth and development are impacting the
environment in the Okanagan. Sometimes we talk with others to learn more about issues
like these. At other times we look for people whose opinions are similar to ours, to share our
feelings about these issues. We would like you to tell us a little bit about the people you
have recently talked to about how growth and development are affecting the environment
in the Okanagan.
Understanding how our conversations with other people can help us find the right
balance between development and environmental protection is an important part of our
research. We will not be using the information you provide to contact anyone, nor will any
information about who you talk to be made available to anyone outside of our research
team. Further, we only want initials for those you identify, and those initials are used only
to help you answer questions that come up later in the survey.
16. NAME GENERATOR: During the last six months, who have you talked
with about how growth and development are impacting the environment
in the Central Okanagan? The initials you provide below will be used
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17. NAME INTERPRETER: How close (familiar) are you with these people?
Choose ‘‘very close (very familiar)’’, ‘‘close (familiar)’’ or ‘‘Acquaintance’’




18. CONTACT BETWEEN/AMONG YOUR CONTACTS: Please think
about the relations between the people you just mentioned. Are they
very close (very familiar) to one another, close (familiar) to each other
or strangers in the sense that they would not recognize one another if
they met on the street. For each row in the table below, please select as
‘‘Very close (very familiar)(VC)”, ‘‘Close (familiar)(C)”, ‘‘Stranger (S)”
to indicate how familiar the person named in the row is with the person
named in the column. While in many cases we expect the familiarity to
be the same in both directions, it is possible that the familiarity may not
be the same in both directions.
Contact Between/Among Your Contacts
 
19. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: On average, how often do you talk with
the people you have identified (Text,Twitter, Facebook, Visit, Phone,
Email or write)?
20. LENGTH OF TIME YOU HAVE KNOWN EACH OTHER: How long




Length of Time You have Known Each Other
 
21. REASON OF CONNECTION: Below are some of the ways in which
people are connected to each other. Some people can be connected to you
in more than one way. For example, a man could be your brother and he
could belong to your place of worship and work with you. Please select




22. POLITICAL AFFILIATION: What is the political affiliation of your con-




23. WHAT PEOPLE TALK ABOUT: Below are some environmental topics
that people talk about. Over the last six months, which environmental
issues can you recall coming up in your conversations? Please tick all
that apply.










2 Health and environment.
2 The Economy and environment.
2 Politics (Election) and environment.
2 Lake side activities (e.g. picnics, walking).
2 Other.
2 Do not know.
B.12. Part Four: About the Information Provided
Thinking about the information given to you in this survey, please tell us the option
that best describes how you found the survey.
24. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you (1)
Strongly agree, (2) Agree, (3) Somewhat agree, (4) Neutral (5) Somewhat
disagree (6) Disagree or (7) Strongly disagree
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About the Information Provided
 
B.13. We would Like to Know More
25. We are recruiting candidates for four citizens’ jury groups composed of
about 10 people each. In these juries you will have the opportunity to talk
with experts about some of the issues raised here, and to discuss these
issues with other people who have also completed this survey. If you
are chosen from among those who volunteer and participate in a group
meeting, we will give you $50 as thanks for your participation. We expect
that the group meeting will take no more than two hours of your time.
Are you willing to participate in one of the citizen juries?
2 Yes
2 No
2 Please provide us with your name and phone number so that we can contact you
if you are selected to participate. We will not use this information to contact
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you for any other purpose, nor share your contact information with anyone else.
NAME/PHONE NUMBER
B.14. Part Five: About You
To better understand how your choices are different from the choices made by other
people who have completed this survey, we would like to know some more information
about you. We will not share your private information with anyone. Any results from
our research will not contain anything that can identify you, and your responses will be
combined with those of other people in such a way that individual answers are not available.




27. How old are you?
2 19 - 24
2 30 - 34
2 35 - 39
2 40 - 44
2 45 - 49
2 50 - 54
2 55 - 59
2 60 - 64
2 65 - 69
2 70 - 74





29. What is the highest level of education you completed?
2 Didn’t complete high school.
2 Completed high school.
2 Attended college/university
2 Have a college diploma
2 Have a university degree
2 Attended university beyond first degree
30. Which one of the following best describes your household?
2 Couple with children living at home.
2 Couple with children who have left home.
2 Couple with no children.
2 Single parent with children living at home.
2 Living alone.
2 Group household/ Sharing with friends.
31. How many children live in your household? (Please write)
32. Is the dwelling you live in owned by you/your partner?
2 Owned by you/your partner.
2 Rented.
2 Other.
33. How often do you undertake each of the following activities in the Okana-
gan, if at all? Please answer ‘‘Never’’ if you have never undertaken that
activity in the Okanagan.
34. Have you had any formal or informal training in environmental sciences
such as in the following disciplines?
2 Ecology.
2 Biology.
2 Other related disciplines.
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2 None of the above.
35. Are you professionally or voluntarily involved in environmental conserva-
tion or environmental management?
2 Yes.
2 No.
36. Are you a member of first nation?
2 Yes.
2 No.
37. What was your total household income last year (total income before tax
and any deductions from all wages and salaries, pensions, allowances, and
investment)?
2 Less than $20,000
2 $20,001 - 40,000
2 $40,001 - 60,000
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2 $60,001 - 80,000
2 $80,001 - 100,000
2 $100,001 - 125,000
2 $125,001 - 150,000
2 $150,001 - 200,000
2 $200,001 - 250,000
2 More than $250,000
Thank you for completing this survey. To be considered for the draw, please provide
your contact information. This information will not be used to contact you for any reason
beyond informing you that you have won the prize. The draw will take place after the
second round of the survey is complete. The contact information you provide here will not




38. If you have any additional comments you would like to make, please enter
them below.
This survey is supervised by Dr. John Janmaat from the University of British Columbia
with support and funding from Environment Canada, the Okanagan Basin Water Board,
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and the Regional District of Central Okanagan. Our research results will be shared with
planners and policy makers across all jurisdictions to assist them in choosing environmental
protection and management policies. These results will not contain any information that
will link you with the answers you provide in this survey. We do not anticipate any impact
on you - positive or negative - as a result of completing this survey. While we hope you
will complete the survey, you are under no obligation to do so.
All of the information you give us in this survey is strictly confidential and will be
reported only in ways that ensure you remain anonymous. If you have any questions please
contact:
Dr. John Janmaat
Regional Innovation Chair in Water Resources and Ecosystem Sustainability.
I.K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences




Letter of Invitation for Pilot Test
39. Address
Date
Dear Sir or Madam,
We are developing a survey that will help us understand the value Okanagan residents
place on the services provided by the environment. We would be grateful if you help us by
completing a pilot test of our survey. Surveys are costly and time consuming to develop. If
the survey is poorly designed and not tested, the results may be of little use. Your input
will help us make the survey more clear and easy to understand, and thereby helping ensure
that we are collecting high quality data. With your input, the results of this research will
be more useful to those who make decisions that impact on our environment. We have
embedded a number of questions about the survey into the survey itself. As you work
through the survey, please bear the following in mind: Invited participants will be randomly
drawn from a list of Central Okanagan addresses.
• Are the facts and descriptions clear?
• Is it easy to understand what the questions are asking?
• Are there questions you are uncomfortable with?
• Is there anything in the survey that would make you stop answering it?
To complete and comment on the online survey, please go to: http://jjanmaat.research.ok.ubc.ca/
and enter the following information exactly as it appears here:
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Postal Code: V 1Z 2T7
Access Code: 22223A
If you have any problem accessing the online survey or if you do not have internet access,
but would still like to help with the pilot, please contact Dr. John Janmaat at 250-807-8021
or john.janmaat@ubc.ca. Note that the data obtained from this pilot will not be used for
the analysis. However, your name will be included in the draw to win $250.00 prize for







Dear Sir or Madam,
A couple of weeks ago we sent you a letter with an online link to a survey asking you to
help us to test a survey. This survey will help us understand the value Okanagan residents
place on the services provided by the environment. If you have completed the survey, we
apologize for contacting you again and are thankful that you took the time to complete the
survey.
If you have not completed the survey, we would be grateful if you took the time to
help us. You should be able to complete the survey in 30 minutes or less. Your input will
help make the survey easier to understand, and thereby help ensure that we collect high
quality data. The results we generate will then more useful to those who make decisions
impacting our environment. We know that it takes time and effort to complete our survey.
As a reflection of our gratitude, if you complete the survey, your name will be entered
into one of a number of draws for $250. Here below is the link we sent you to complete
or withdraw from the survey online. http://jjanmaat.research.ok.ubc.ca/; and enter the
following information exactly as it appears here:
Postal Code: V1Z 2T7
Access Code: 22223A
If you wish to help us with pilot survey, but do not want to do so online, please call
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Dr.Janmaat at 250-807-8021. We will then arrange a convenient time for you to complete
the survey with our help over the phone.
For any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Dr. John








We would like to invite you to participate in a survey to help us understand the value
Okanagan residents place on the services provided by the environment. From a list of
addresses we collected using directories available on the internet, you were randomly chosen
to receive this invitation. As you may have noticed, regional economic growth, population
growth, and climate change are placing pressure on environmental resources in the Okanagan.
These environmental resources provide ‘‘services” that we may not be aware of or take for
granted. Services like clean air and water, flood control, natural habitats and recreational
opportunities. The path of development we choose affects the levels of these environmental
services. This survey will help us understand how you and the other Okanagan residents
feel about balancing development and environmental services. We know that it takes time
and effort to complete our survey. Therefore, if we receive your completed survey, your
name will be entered into one of a number of draws for $250; one draw for each of the
most recent 150-200 responses. A number of volunteers will also have the opportunity to
participate in a group discussion about the issues in the survey, receiving a $50 payment
for their time. To complete or withdraw from the survey online, please visit:
http://jjanmaat.research.ok.ubc.ca
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and enter the following information exactly as it appears here:
Postal Code: A1A 1A1
Access Code: 11111111
If you wish to help us with our research, but do not want to do so online, please put the
enclosed postage paid card in the mail, or call Dr. Janmaat at 250-807-8021. We will then
arrange a convenient time for you to complete the survey with our help over the phone.
For any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Dr. John







A couple of weeks ago we sent you a letter with an online link to a survey asking you to
help us to test a survey. This survey will help us understand the value Okanagan residents
place on the services provided by the environment. If you have completed the survey, we
apologize for contacting you again and are thankful that you took the time to complete the
survey.
If you have not completed the survey, we would be grateful if you took the time to
help us. You should be able to complete the survey in 30 minutes or less. Your input will
help make the survey easier to understand, and thereby help ensure that we collect high
quality data. The results we generate will then more useful to those who make decisions
impacting our environment. We know that it takes time and effort to complete our survey.
As a reflection of our gratitude, if you complete the survey, your name will be entered
into one of a number of draws for $250. Here below is the link we sent you to complete
or withdraw from the survey online. http://jjanmaat.research.ok.ubc.ca/ and enter the
following information exactly as it appears here:
Postal Code: V1Z 2T7
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Access Code: 22223A
If you wish to help us with pilot survey, but do not want to do so online, please call
Dr.Janmaat at 250-807-8021. We will then arrange a convenient time for you to complete
the survey with our help over the phone.
For any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Dr. John
Janmaat at 250-807-8021 or by email at john.janmaat@ubc.ca.
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APPENDIX G
Project overview For Expert Witnesses
Hello Jason, Anna, Todd and Carol
The following is the project overview for expert Witnesses. Interest in determining
monetary values for the goods and services provided by the environment has been growing.
Some see such values as providing a potentially more convincing way to argue for envi-
ronmental protection. Money is a ‘‘common denominator’’ that often weighs heavily in
the choices we make that have environmental impacts.‘‘Over the past year we have been
conducting a study to investigate the value that a sample of Okanagan residents place
on some of these environmental goods and services. The participants in our study have
completed a survey where they compare several combinations of possible futures for the
Okanagan. Each future that has a ‘better’ environmental situation than a ‘business’ as
‘usual case also has a cost. Based on this cost, and with a fair bit of statistics, we can figure
out how much our sample is willing to pay to ‘purchase environmental improvements. Not
everyone agrees with this way of putting a value on the environment. Some say that we
dont relate to the environment the way we relate to a cup of coffee or a new mobile phone.
The environment affects the whole community, so when we think of the importance of the
environment, maybe we also think about the whole community.’’
In this part of our research, we plan to gather a number of people together who
participated in the first part of the work. We will present them with a number of video
interviews with people such as yourself, who are knowledgeable about the environment
in the Okanagan. In the interview we will ask you to speak a bit about yourself, about
your connection to the Okanagan, your views on some of the big threats, and some of the
opportunities we have.
We will also present these participants with a couple of decision challenges that involve
the environment. After they have had time to consider the videos that they have seen, we
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will ask them to put forward up to two questions for each of the people who were interviewed.
We will then send these questions by email to each of the people we interviewed. We will
relay the answers back to the participants when we meet with them a day or two later.
With the answers to their questions, and some more time for discussion, we will then ask
the participants to give a solution for their decision challenge.’’
We have scheduled these sessions for February 20th, 21st and 22nd, 2015. After these
sessions are completed, we will also ask those who participated in these sessions and those
who did not to complete a shortened version of the original valuation study. This will help
us understand if the amount people are willing to pay to protect the environment changes
when they have a chance to discuss these issues with other people, and to listen to the
views of people such as yourself with special knowledge.
We will follow up shortly with a telephone call. We can then answer any questions you
may have, and if you are able to help us, set up a time to meet. we will also send you the
questions that We will ask you during our interview. We expect that the whole interview
process should not take more than half an hour.
Thanks again for making the time for our interview. We will be showing the interviews to
our participants this afternoon at 4:00 pm. The follow up sessions will take place tomorrow
(Saturday) at 10:00 am and 1:00 pm.
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APPENDIX H
Expert Opinion: Issue Identification Stage:
Transcript
1. Principal Speaker: Dr. Johannus (John) A. Janmaat: Associate Professor of
Economics at University of British Columbia Okanagan
2. Jason Schleppe: President at Ecoscape Environmental Consultants Ltd.
3. Anna Warwick Sears: Executive Director of Okanagan Basin Water Board
4. Todd Cashin: Suburban & Rural Planning Manager at City of Kelowna
5. Carol Luttmer: Okanagan Collaborative Conservation Program Coordinator
Interview 1: Jason Schleppe
- (John Janmaat) Hello Jason Schleppe. Thanks for agreeing to this interview.
- (Jason Schleppe) No problem
(John Janmaat) First, can you tell us a little bit about yourself. How long have you
lived in the Okanagan? Where did you come from before moving here?
(Jason Schleppe) I am actually a fourth generation resident of the Okanagan. So Ive
been here for a long time, well my family has been for a long time. I am a registered
professional biologist by trade so I did my undergrad at the UBCO. I went to Lethbridge
and did my masters in parasitology that was in the early 2000s. I was unable to find a job,
so I came back to the college here and took the water quality technology program, which is
basic water and waste water treatment, water distribution systems, that kind of stuff. And
did all but one semester before I got a consulting gig at a local firm. I was there for a few
years and then I decided that I wanted to do things on my own and so with my current
business partner, started Ecoscape Environmental in 2006 and thats what Ive been doing
since.
(John Janmaat) Okay, so next question here: How would you describe your relationship
with the environment here in the Okanagan?
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(Jason Schleppe) Well, I believe Im fairy intimately tied to the environment here. Ive
mapped all the large lakes, Ive mapped a lot of the creeks, I spend a lot of time fishing,
those kind of out door recreational activities in the valley, whether thats on the valley
bottom or up in Okanagan highlands, towards big white or the other side up in the bear
lake water shed, I mean Ive been to many different areas so Ive seen a lot and Im only 39,
but Ive seen a lot in my time in the valley, a lot of change. I mean when I was six or seven,
orchard park was literally an orchard. So its changed dramatically in my time in Kelowna.
(John Janmaat) Okay, now kind of building on that, what does it mean to you to be
connected to the environment?
(Jason Schleppe) Well I think being connected to the environment probably means
something different to everybody. To me being connected to the environment is I always see
it from a biological side of things because thats where my passion lies. So being connected
comes with an understanding of what biodiversity is or what are natural ecosystems, and
what is takes to make those ecosystems work. I mean, Im a fisheries biologist, thats what
got me into doing what I do is that I love fish and so for me its seeing all the connectedness
between all those different systems. How food moves through to fish and how fish feed
eagles and all those connections. I think that thats what it means to me. Its understanding
that the environment is one big web. Theres nothing that is independent. You cant do
something to one part without having a consequence in another part. So everything is all
intimately tied together. Does that get at?
(John Janmaat) Well, I am curious about what your view is, so thats great thank you.
Can you describe a natural place in the Okanagan that is or was, if its not around anymore,
special to you, and what made it special?
(Jason Schleppe) For me it would be the mission creek corridor and mostly from the
east Kelowna road up so basically the layer cake mountain that area and thats because0 as
a kid and even as an adult I spent a lot of time just walking around down on the trails that
exist down there. For me that would be that would be you know definitely a low elevation
area that would be of importance after that it would be any lake that has good fishing up
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in the highlands around. But, I would say thats sort of a fairly special space just because of
whats there. Its an interface of all the different ecosystems; forests, grasslands, arguably
one of the more unique rock formations in the valley, all those different things sort of fit
into one space well one bigger space.
(John Janmaat) Okay, so How is your job and/or volunteer time related to the environ-
ment? Youve already given us a chunk of that, so follow along: What inspired you to get
involved with this?
(Jason Schleppe) My passion for fishing was what drove me to do what I do.
(John Janmaat) I guess you covered that already too.
(Jason Schleppe) Yeah
(John Janmaat) So what would you say is the most disturbing thing you have noticed
about changes in the Okanagan environment?
(Jason Schleppe) The rate at which natural ecosystems are being lost. Ill use Okanagan
lake as the example. In 2004, the shoreline of the lake was mapped using something called
Foreshore Inventory and Mapping. It was something that the regional district put together
in conjunction with the federal department of fisheries notions and the province, to map
shorelines and it followed a stream mapping protocol that have been developed. After
2004 we worked with DFO and RDCO and sort of revised how that data was collected
based upon how it was being used and that data was recollected again in 2009, I believe.
Following that assessment, I was able to calculate the rate of loss of natural shoreline on
Okanagan lake and the rate of loss ranged anywhere from -0.5 percent to -2.5 percent per
year. Which doesnt seem like a big number, but when you look at it from the fact that
theres only 44 percent of the lake thats left in the natural condition. If we are losing truly
losing 2 percent per year, it could be 20 to 30 years and theres no natural shoreline left.
Now obviously thats Im making a whole bunch of assumptions when I say that and thats
not ever going to happen because parks and other things. But, for me that was a big I
redid that math multiple times because the rate of loss was staggering. When you looked at
it and the amount of time and how fast. So I think its just a general issue right now, is that
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in my belief we are in an exponential population rate of growth across the world as a whole
and were also in sort of an exponential rate of loss of everything that is a natural system.
Its happening so fast that I dont think we can keep up with managing those rates. Its
changing so fast that, its changing faster than we can say: this is whats changing and whats
happening. We can even understand whats happening because its so quick. For me that
was a big aha moment. It was one that I found disturbing, very disturbing. Again, because
Ive been here for such a long time. If Okanagan lake, is the jewel of Okanagan and we are
losing that much natural shoreline it has more consequences than just environmental.
(John Janmaat) So, when did you first notice this?
(Jason Schleppe) Well, I noticed when I was doing work on the Okanagan. I was Its
not just Okanagan Lake I mapped either, Ive mapped wood, Kalamalka, Skaha, Osoyoos,
Mara, Mabel, Shuswap, Cootney. So you know the trends that I saw in the Okanagan, they
replicated across the province. Its not just the Okanagan lake, its what happens when land
gets developed or land-used changes. So when did I notice this? Well, as soon as you start
to pay attention and start collecting data, you go oh wow and you start to see trends. If
land is developed as single family residential. So we build one house on one lost on a shore
line. Inevitably, 20, 30 years from now after that lot is developed, it will typically remain
10 percent of it will be left naturally if that. That trans replicated across multiple different
lakes and jurisdictions. Its not its independent of anything to do with jurisdiction. Its just
when people buy lots, the first thing they do is: they cut down the trees and they then
put a house on it, and then when they put a house on, and then they want access down
to the lake, so then they build their trail down to the lake, and they want to have their
dock for their boat, or they want to have their beach area for the kids and with that comes
disturbance and with that disturbance comes changing natural to what we believe is more
suited to people.
(John Janmaat) What frustrates you about this issue?
(Jason Schleppe) A significant not a significant [Pause] regulatory processes is very
slow to catch up. The biggest hurdle were facing these days is the dramatic changes to
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the federal fisheries act, and what that means. Environmental regulation tends to follow
that of the economy. When economys high, theres more environmental regulation, and
when economy goes down, environmental regulation subsequently decreases and we saw
that with on the bus bill and the changes in the fisheries act a couple years ago. It was
all these changes happened to kick-start oil and gas and get that first streamline on those
processes. Those come back to consequences that I dont think people who dont practice
fully understand, they dont comprehend what exactly those changes mean. They made
it perceive them as being good things which, arguably Im all for reducing red tape and
allowing process to happen having said that I think we do need good public process in
order to make good decisions. I dont think that Im a believer that when government makes
decisions they should take all the information and make a decision on whether its right
or wrong, at that point in time based upon the information they have available to them.
Versus that of, lets just get rid of all regulatory process and what we dont know wont hurt
us. Thats what the new fisheries act kind of means in some ways. Its going the root of
self-regulation and self-regulation is a scary proposition I think. Its more complicated that
that, Im simplifying it a bit. But its definitely that would be highly frustrating for anybody
that does fisheries type of work.
(John Janmaat) Is there anything that gives you hope for the future of the Okanagan
environment?
(Jason Schleppe) I think that younger people are generally in tune with where they
want the world to go. I believe that in the good of people and that eventually we maybe
will figure things out. I just would hope that we figure it out before its too late. So rather
than a hindsights 2020, Im looking back and going oh we shouldve done it this way, maybe
we can use a bit of foresight and try and pre-emptively curb some of the things that are
bigger challenges. Theres a lot of good things going on in the Okanagan. The Okanagan
is a leader I believe when it comes to environmental policy. The regional district has the
environmental advisory commission a lot of the policy within British Columbia, people
look to the Okanagan for examples of how to build policies. So we have good policy here.
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Its just a question of with good policy, is it being implemented properly? You know, great
policy, but if you dont implement it then it doesnt mean anything anyways. So theres sort
of two sides theres policy and I think thats a huge thing that we have to our benefit, its
just whether or not it will be actually implemented to make effective change.
(John Janmaat) On the whole, you say youve become more optimistic or pessimistic
over the last five years or so?
(Jason Schleppe) Thats six of one, half a dozen of the other. Im optimistic about some
things and pessimistic about others. Quite pessimistic about the changes to the fisheries act
and maybe what it would take to go back and change some of those policies. Those changes
to policies made international news. It was other governments were looking at us saying
what are you doing to your fisheries act?, why are you gutting it?. I know lots of people
that work within those different agencies and the staff was handcuffed. There was nothing
they can do. Thats a very challenging thing for people who cared, have government change
legislation and not really understand what is it theyre changing or what those changes
mean. Im optimistic in the sense that we do have good policy here and there is people who
do care and that environmental issues whether its sustainability, or biodiversity, or theres
a whole gambit of different environmental issues. But they are more mainstream. They do
hit mainstream media, its not people are aware and as when I went to school, recycling
was the name of the game and now everybody does it. So I am optimistic in that sense that
people are aware and are becoming more aware with the advent of mass media and the
ability to disseminate information. So thats definitely could be good in the long run.
(John Janmaat) Before ending here, given all the stuff weve been talking about, any
other thoughts you have that youd like to share?
(Jason Schleppe) Not specifically no, I mean again, Ive been very involved in the
Okanagan and different committees and helping young people. Whether its find jobs or
mentoring them. Ive seen a lot of change; some for the good, some for the bad. Its a
challenging world. I would say that the environment is always on the forefront of peoples
minds when its in their backyard, but if it isnt in their backyard, it isnt necessarily on the
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forefront of their mind. The environment is always used as the card that people play. Its
always about the environment, again, when it affects them directly, but when it doesnt
affect them directly its less relevant. I think that thats something of interest its when
the environment becomes of relevance to people and how it becomes of relevance. What is
their motivation? Is it that theyre truly aware and truly care or is it just a card theyre
playing to suit their desires. Thats something that if we could change that perception and
build about a societal change that values the environment for what it is and what its worth.
This greenspace does have value, it’s how to value it thats challenging. But if you could do
that, then people understand that that means then that would probably factor into how
they carry themselves day to day, or how they perceive different scenarios as they come
up. Whether its land development or changes in policy or whatever that may affect the
environment. Just because they have a better understanding and perception of what it
exactly means. (John Janmaat) Well, thanks so much for your time, it was great! Interview
2 Expert: Anna Warwick Sears (John Janmaat) First, can you tell us a little bit about
yourself. How long have you lived in the Okanagan? Where did you come from before
moving here?
Interview 2: Anna Warwick Sears
I have lived in the Okanagan for almost nine years and I moved here from California,
but I grew up on Cootney lake and coming to the Okanagan was part of my heartfelt,
lifelong desire to return to the interior of British Columbia.
(John Janmaat) So how would you describe your relationship with the environment
here in the Okanagan?
(Anna Warwick Sears) I think the most important thing for me about the environment
and the Okanagan is the lakes. I was going through some old family photos over the
weekend and I found a photo of myself and my two sisters and we were playing on a log
with my uncle and it was probably about 8 years old. It just really captured my whole
childhood for me and how much I loved being in the lake. I was thinking about that picture
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and about how when we scattered my fathers ashes a couple years ago, he asked specifically
that we scatter them on the beach where he had played as a child. Before my grandmother
died, one of the things that she wanted to do with myself and my cousins was, take us to
the river where she had played when she was a child. It gave here great happiness to swim
the river with us and tell us all the stories about how shed been a young girl and they used
to jump off the trestles into the river, and show us those trestles and walk on them with us,
and she was quite elderly at that time, but she carried in her heart that memory of being a
child and playing in the water. I think that the experience of the lakes and the water itself
is really deep in my heart and its definably the most important part of being in the valley
for me.
(John Janmaat) I think you may already have answered this but, what would you say
it means to be connected to the environment?
(Anna Warwick Sears) I think being connected to the environment is having that deep
sense of feeling at home with some aspect to the environment. For some people its being on
a mountain; my sisters just like that. For some people its walking down a beach, for some
people its being out on a boat, but I think its where you feel really, really calm and soothed
and at home and being outside.
(John Janmaat) Can you describe a natural place in the Okanagan that is or was special
to you, and what made it special?
(Anna Warwick Sears) I think the most special place for me in the Okanagan is the
beach at Cousins Bay on Kalamalka Lake. Its very very calm and beautiful water. Its you
have to hike into it, so theres a bit of adventure just to get there. The water is very blue
and very clean and its quiet there.
(John Janmaat) Ok so how is your job related to the environment?
(Anna Warwick Sears) I think Im incredibly fortunate in that my job is to work on
protecting these things that I love the most and try to help to work with other people to
help protect the quality of the water and protect the health of the lakes. Its something
that I really care about personally and I feel incredibly fortunate to be able to work on
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something that makes such a difference in my life. (John Janmaat) What inspired you to
get involved with the work here?
(Anna Warwick Sears) I had worked I got my degree in biology and I always loved
natural things not just purely natural. I loved gardening, I loved anything that had to
do with living things. Having grown up in the interior and being around lots of beautiful
natural areas it always made a lot of sense to me. But, I also was really attracted to the
aspect of the work that has to do with working with people because, I think basically I look
at how people interact with their surroundings. I know that there is also a lot of people
who also really care about water and protecting nature, and keeping the world nice for
themselves and their families. But theres also a lot of you know theres politics and theres
squabbling, theres people maybe not being as careful as they want to be. I think what
inspires me is being able to work with people and find ways that we can all get along and
something that we all share common values for. Water is not arguable; everybody loves
that water. Everybody want that water to be clean to drink and to enjoy and to be around.
So I think this job is a really nice marriage between my own feelings about what make s
me happy; being around these big lakes, and also it makes me happy to be able to work
with people who also share that love and who want to have the world be a nicer place for
themselves and their families.
(John Janmaat) So in terms of things youve noticed changed in the Okanagan. What
changes would you say disturbed you the most?
(Anna Warwick Sears) I see a lot good happening in the Okanagan. I see a lot of
changes for the better. Particularly with peoples awareness about the water and peoples
commitments to personal commitments to wanting to work and help, and volunteer, and
the electric representatives acknowledging the importance of doing things like: cleaning up
the wastewater and making plans to avoid the impacts of drought, and restoring streams
for the salmon and these different things. I think the things in the Okanagan that I think
are a challenge are things that have to do with just the natural expansion of impacts as
more and more people come to visit the Okanagan more and more people come to live in
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the Okanagan, there is a bit of an inevitable slide. There are all the hardscapes that go in
when we put in new streets, when we repave them more traffic, pollution coming from the
cars, all these things. Its a bit inevitable and I dont think that we its right or even possible
to stop people coming to visit or stop people from moving here the world population is
growing from seven billion to nine billion over the next 20 years or so and people have to
move somewhere. We have some of the nicest places in the world to live and some people
are going to want to move here, but at the same time we need to work together to figure
out how we can reduce the impacts of all the additional pressures that are just inevitable
from more people walking on the beaches, more people swimming in the lakes, more people
driving cars and the run off from the streets and all those things.
(John Janmaat) So speaking of those challenges, do you think were making progress?
(Anna Warwick Sears) I think were making progress a really a theres a great deal of
more recognition going on at all levels. The personal level where people are looking at their
personal use of water and the use of resources and whether or not theyre picking up after
their dogs or dumping paint down the storm sewers. People are a lot more contentious than
they used to be about things like that. Theres just a much higher level of awareness. Theres
also a much higher level of awareness among the local governments who do development
permitting and theres a lot of reasons for having low impact development of different kinds.
Part of it is just that its much more economical and much easier to have people living closer
together so called densification. But if youre trying to figure out how to extend water lines
all the way out up the hill, its just going to cost a lot more to put those water lines in, cost a
lot more to maintain them over a long period of time. So the whole trend in development is
to move people in closer to each other and closer to the services, closer to shopping. Theres
a lot of studies that are showing theres a higher quality of life when for the people who are
living in those more urban environments. Particularly things like commuting, more ability
to support small businesses, because theres more rivalry neighbourhoods. At the senior
government level theres a lot more awareness about the importance of taking care of our
own potters. The kind of policies that are coming down through the water sustainability
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act some of the policies that were here from environment Canada these things, they add
up to a change in attitudes at all levels across the country and thats very heartening.
(John Janmaat) So on the whole then, do you say youve become more optimistic or
pessimistic about changes related to the environment or management of it in the last five
six years.
(Anna Warwick Sears) Ive become more optimistic about our relationship to water and
the environment over the last five or six years because I see people changing. I go and
speak at a lot of public meetings so the kind of questions that I get asked are much more
sophisticated. I am always finding people who are coming up to me, telling me their own
stories about water, or being a kid around the lakes, and how important it is for them to
protect the environment in the Okanagan and the water in the Okanagan. I think theres a
lot of pressures on the world on Canada, British Columbia and on the Okanagan. But I
think it comes down to that people making personal commitments and understanding what
the situation is and I think thats happening.
(John Janmaat) Okay, well thats the end of my questions, but is there anything that
comes to mind to you, over the course of these questions in this interview that youd like to
add as we wrap up here.
(Anna Warwick Sears) I just want to say one more time and emphasize that the most
important thing is that people coming together and working together on it. People in the
Okanagan do really value water, they do really value having clean drinking water, having
the agriculture around them with the fresh fruit and vegetables they value the ability to
go kayaking and boating and not having to worry about getting diseases. Its a beautiful
place to live and I think if we can all tap into that shared value system and learn how to
work together to keep the Okanagan beautiful then I think that theres not stopping us.
Interview 3: Todd Cashin
(John Janmaat) Hello Todd Cashin. Thanks for agreeing to this interview.
(Todd Cashin) No problem.
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(John Janmaat) First, can you tell us a little bit about yourself. How long have you
lived in the Okanagan? Where did you live before moving here?
(Todd Cashin) Sure, well my Im an army brad, my dad was in the military for 30 years,
my family is from Nova Scotia. I lived in six provinces Canada and moved to the Okanagan,
Kelowna right after I finished school. So I moved here in 1995 and been here ever since.
(John Janmaat) Ok, so how would you describe your relationship with the environment
here in the Okanagan?
(Todd Cashin) Well I guess I see it on a number of levels. I mean I moved here because
of the environment. My wife and I researched where we wanted to live in terms of weather,
climate, politics. We lived in Alberta for a number of years didnt necessarily agree with
the politics of the day in southern Alberta in Lethbridge. So were also looking for a place to
live that we can raise kids and that we could find work. So on that side of the environment
side I guess that we found it to be really great and were both skiers, weve skied quite some
times so weve had a lot of winter sports here as well. But then again on the intrinsic side,
the minute you drive into this valley it just catches your eye, its spectacular. Then of
course theres my wildlife biology environmental planning background this is a very special
place in terms of species at risk, in terms of the types of ecosystems we see here so its
attractive on many levels. I guess working in environmental planning in the forest sector
initially, and then in local government both regionally now and here at the city, I guess its
something that I always relate to work. So my kids dont know exactly what I do, but they
do know that Im sort of the environment guy. So that word does have a little bit of weight
on a number of different levels.
(John Janmaat) What does it mean to you to be connected to the environment?
(Todd Cashin) Well for me, connected to the environment, means understanding the
world that you are living in or your surroundings. You know I again relate back to my
kids, my kids make fun of me, but I think its a good thing. They understand that like I
understand when were going for hikes that what are all the plants are around them and
Im always boring them about the plants and what type of tree is that?, what type of
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shrub is that?, and it drives them crazy but that to me is being connected, understating
the ecosystems and being on a trail and moving from one ecosystem into another. But also
I guess on a broader scale understanding how our system is connected to other valleys and
so on and so forth, and how what we do can impact the other areas of our community.
(John Janmaat) Ok great. Can you describe a natural place in the Okanagan that is or
was special to you, and what made it special?
(Todd Cashin) Well Ive got a number I guess that Im attracted to. I mean Im always
I started fly-fishing back in college days in Alberta on the crows nest path, so for me and
working again in the forest sector and doing a lot of work around river restoration, and
channel assessment and that sort of thing. Im attracted to water, maybe its my nova scotia
background, I dont know. But Im always attracted to I cant not stop and look whether its
the Okanagan lake or you know if its over on highway 33, driving past the kettle river, or
up in Enderby, along the Shuswap and its when I worked in the forest sector all over this
province, I was always attracted to the water and trying to understand it and look at it,
how it flowed and that sort of thing. Thats the first thing I guess. Secondly its the places
that I take my kids, that I hike more regularly now that that really have that attraction
to me I live at the bottom of now mountain here in Kelowna and I know it very well. Bear
creek provincial park when I worked with BC parks back in my school days I had my first
summer job in BC was with BC parks here in the Okanagan. So I got to know a number of
the parks as a park interpreter but also I lived at bear creek provincial park for a couple
summers so I know that park fairly well as well. So I guess on a local scale, those are the
two that and of course getting up into the alpine is also another interest of mine. But its
always getting to new places and not necessarily going back to old ones.
(John Janmaat) Ok, so youve described your job a little bit. What inspired you to get
involved to get into the kind of work you do?
(Todd Cashin) I dont know if anything inspired me. I think its just the way I was
raised. My mum basically was the person that I think instilled the environmental ethic in
both my brother and I at a very young age. We joke all the time my mums been gone
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now 10 years but, we always joke that she knew she was way ahead of the curve in terms
of environmental issues of the day and was and you know when you were a kid just like
my kids today, its a bit of a pain to listen to your mom go on about you know protecting
the environment. But yeah we reflect back on that regularly and it was something that
was instilled with me at a very early age and when I look into going to school it was a no
brainer. I was going to be a conservation officer or a wild life biologist or fisheries biologist
or an oceanographer or something along those lines thats what I was looking at in grade 9,
10 and 11, looking into those types of things.
(John Janmaat) So, some more specific things. In terms of changes that youve noticed
in the Okanagan, what changes have you seen that would be the most disturbing to you
about the Okanagan environment.
(Todd Cashin) Theres a few, theres probably two or three. The land use changes has
probably been one of the larger ones. In terms of man the influence that I can see on a
daily basis with my job. Everybody wants to come to the Okanagan and everyone wants to
get their piece of pie, or small plot of land and do something. So the land uses the impacts
from the real estate booms and the influx of people thats slowly changing the environment.
I think at the same time though that the climate change issues that I see are, a lot more
moisture. You know every degree of temperature I think, or every its like seven percent
more moisture in the atmosphere for every degree of climate change and weve definitely
I think theres probably those out there that say well theres not enough data, but from
what Ive seen having walked rivers, Ive walked rivers since the early 90s, doing channel
assessments, river restoration projects, the peak flow events that we are now seeing are
fairly significant. There are significant rain events or rainfall events. Were seeing here in
Kelowna up on the south slopes in particular are starting to have some impact and I think
thats one of he bigger issue in the next couple of decades that wed have you keep our eye
on.
(John Janmaat) Okay, what would frustrate you the most about these issues?
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(Todd Cashin) I think thats a word I used to feel a lot: frustration. I as I get older I
recognise its not worth it to let things frustrate me or because its very simple this position
right now, both on the agricultural planning side and the environmental planning side,
anything can be frustrating. But, you I think for me its trying to identify what our goals and
objectives are and pick them one at a time and just move forward and try an be successful
at achieving what weve set out in those goals and objectives. I mean not to sound like
a bureaucrat, but thats really how you have to look at it because otherwise I think this
job could probably chew you up and spit you out if you let things frustrate you or you let
things get to you. I used to take my work home with me everyday. Used to be Id watch
wetlands one wetland after another slowly get degraded or slowly get infilled thats slowly
coming to an end I think. Weve put some pretty good policy and regulations in place it
was a tough fight on the front end in terms of stream protection, wetland protection, but I
believe that people are starting to understand that. But its very similar on the agricultural
planning side as well that I think were starting to see a bit of an interest out there in the
young farmers and take ownership of some of the farmland out there, and thats where we
need to put out energy, is in the young farmers who are going to sort of take it to the next
step and protect our farmland and protect it for the generations to come.
(John Janmaat) That kind of leads in to the next question. Is there anything that gives
you hope for the future of the Okanagan environment.
(Todd Cashin) Yeah, I mean everyday, I mean I work every single day on different files
and applications and we are slowly whittling away at protecting all the sensitive ecosystems
in our community. I worked both at the regional district and now at the city and Ive seen
it at both levels and I think that we are in a better place. Could we be doing a belter job?
Could we be protecting more? Absolutely, we could always be doing better. But I think
that people understand or people that are moving or people that have lived in Kelowna or
in the Okanagan valley understand or theyre starting to be a better understanding of what
it is that were are trying to protect and why you know people love this valley and they
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want to protect I think what makes it special so thats the goal. Its to convince people how
special these places are and to keep putting them aside for future generations.
(John Janmaat) Okay, so putting this all together. On the whole, are you more optimistic
or pessimistic about the future of the Okanagan environment?
(Todd Cashin) It depends on the day of the week. [Laughter]. Yeah I definitely have
become more optimistic. I think you know really coming out of school cant speak for all
students I guess but I found myself to be very idealistic about how the world should work
and it was very frustrating to use that word. Things werent going as you thought you
should or as quickly as you should and Ive learned to sort of reflect back on our successes
and try and learn from them to sort of accelerate those successes into the future and so
you have to be optimistic. Like I said, I dont think you could survive in the environmental
planning world these days without being optimistic. I think itd be tough to be a pessimist
and be an environmental planner at the same time.
(John Janmaat) So we are right at the end now. But given the conversation we had, is
there anything else thats come up for you that youd like to share?
(Todd Cashin) No I dont know just that I mean I always wanted a job where, you
know excited to get out of bed every morning and come to work and happy to be here
and Id consider myself lucky to be in a position to be able to do that. I mean this can
be stressful at times and it can be as you say frustrating at times and but for the most
part Im pretty happy individual. I always say Kelowna is the most beautiful or the best
city in the best province in the best country in the world. So I think if you start your day
everyday with that type of attitude, and keep working towards protecting agricultural and
protecting environmental the sensitive features on the environmental land base I think
and you keep reflecting back on all the land and policies and stuff that you put in place
that make Kelowna better its pretty easy to walk away with a smile on your [Video cuts
to next interview]
Interview 4: Carol Luttmer
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(John Janmaat) Hello, thanks for agreeing to this interview.
(Carol Luttmer) Oh no problem.
(John Janmaat) First, can you tell us a little bit about yourself. How long have you
lived in the Okanagan? Where did you live before moving here?
(Carol Luttmer) Well Ive actually only been in the Okanagan a year and a half. I ended
up here kind of on a whim. My partner decided to go back to school so we ended up here
in the Okanagan. I grew up in Toronto but I actually worked and traveled in every single
province and territory in Canada. Ive been on the move a lot doing different projects,
different areas and now Im here in the Okanagan.
(John Janmaat) You are with the Okanagan Conservation Collaborative Partnership?
(Carol Luttmer) Yeah its a bit of a twisted that name the Okanagan Collaborate
Conservation Program. So it was established in 2007, when several key partners like the
Allan Brooks Nature Centre and the Grasslands Conservation Council and several other
organizations wanted a better form to work with government and other individuals and
first nations, interested in conservation and stewardship in the Okanagan. So it really
formed out of a need for different organizations to be able to work together. We have 35
partners that have signed a statement of cooperation to work together on common goal
such as: protecting species at risk, balancing regional growth with conservation, and really
just trying to use data and information to make wise decisions about land use and land-used
planning. So I started as the coordinator for program about a year ago.
(John Janmaat) Okay. How would you describe your relationship with the environment
here in the Okanagan?
(Carol Luttmer) Well I think my relationship with the environment stemmed from when
I was really young. I grew up on the shores of Lake Ontario and Ive always been and
outdoors person. So for me, my relationship with the environment started with recreations.
Being able to ski, go for hikes, go sailing, going on canoe trips. Just being outdoors and
having that freedom and that space. Because I grew up with a passion for the natural
environment, I pursued education in that field. So I actually did an undergraduate degree in
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Water Resource Engineering and then I did a masters degree in geography. Then I worked
actually the first 15 years of my career, cleaning up environmental messes that weve created
in the past. So I did my masters work in California at a site called Owens lakes. What had
happened there was that the city of L.A bought up all of the firms on the properties in the
Owens valley, diverted the water to Los Angeles because L.A needed water and as a result
of all of those water diversions from the early 1900s, the lake that was in that valley is now
dry and its full of fine sediment and dust. So the wind was blowing and creating an air
pollution problem that was caused by diverting all of this water. So we were researching
how could we prevent these errors the dust emissions, which was a health hazard coming
off this lake. So sort of an environmental problem that happened. They didnt realize that
was going to happen when they started diverting the water. After that I worked for ten
years cleaning up contaminated sites in the Arctic. Old military sites and doing research on
the transportation of airborne contaminants from major centers in the U.S, Mexico sort of
are developed areas in the south that actually get transported by evaporation and through
air currents and get deposited in the arctic and so to me I really all those years cleaning up
these environmental messes, these military sites in the north, and when I came and moved
to the Okanagan and I said I dont want to be cleaning up messes anymore, I want to be
working proactively towards preserving the natural environment and how can we plan to do
that ahead of time instead of working in reverse and trying to clean things up. So for me
coming to the Okanagan and getting the job with the OCCP, the Okanagan Collaborative
Conservation Program, it was about trying to figure how we can work together and be
collaborative for protecting the Okanagan. I mean its a really unique landscape here. 0.8
percent of the land mass of B.C., but it has 30 percent of the species at risk in the province.
We have to recognize how unique it really is here.
(John Janmaat) What does it mean to you to be connected to the environment?
(Carol Luttmer) I think were all connected to the environment in different ways. I also
think we dont realise how much it gives to us emotionally for I dont know If I dont spend
half an hour outside everyday, my boyfriend doesnt want to talk to me at the end of the
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day. So I think I think its hard to define, but I think that its important for us as a species
to spend time outside.
(John Janmaat) Can you describe a natural place in the Okanagan that is or was special
to you, and what made it special?
(Carol Luttmer) Probably Ellison Park, because it was the first place that we arrived
that we went out and really explored the area. We could ride bikes out there and just
hiking along the shore and Im a water person and I just really enjoy the landscape there.
The contrast between the water and the rocks and the trees, it was just a really special day.
(John Janmaat) Okay, well you already told us about your job to a degree. So why did you
get into what youre doing?
(Carol Luttmer) I think I just really wanted to be proactive in terms of conservation
and stewardship and protecting our environment. A big part of the Okanagan Collaborative
Conservation Program part of our mandate is: to communicate and to share ideas about
protecting the environment and it really meant a lot to me. Ive had a lot of amazing
experiences hiking, sailing, camping and I want to be able to continue to do that and I
want my children and others to be able to enjoy the natural environment and so it really
inspired me when I saw the job opportunity and I think I thought this is a good way to get
connected to with community and the environment and to learn about the Okanagan.
(John Janmaat) What things have you seen around or heard about that most concerned
you or disturbed you about trends of the environment here in the Okanagan.
(Carol Luttmer) Well I think two of the biggest issues are increasing foreshore develop-
ment so a lot of development on the foreshore around out lakes protecting that important
ecosystem between the lake ecosystem and the upland ecosystems. We all want to live
on the water and have our docks and our boats and have that opportunity to live on the
waterfront but if we dont the cumulative effects of large developments along the foreshore,
we really have a large effect. So I think foreshore development is a big issue. I also think
just urban sprawl. So development in areas that are sensitive. So that idea of the Okanagan
having some really rare and sensitive ecosystems and how can we develop and grow our
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cities in a way that continue to protect those sensitive ecosystems because theyre very
important. Because if we protect those ecosystems and if were able to protect the habitats
for those species at risk, those are the same things we need to protect for ourselves. So I
think that really protecting the unique ecosystems in the Okanagan is really important.
(John Janmaat) You think were doing much about that?
(Carol Luttmer) I think we are. I actually think were working a lot with the regional
districts and the municipalities and hope to be working more with the province. I think
that here in the Okanagan, people come here because of the lakes, because of the mountains,
because of the dry arid climate and if we are able to communicate that if were not
responsible about our development, and if were not responsible with the way we live here,
the things that we came here for, arent going to be here anymore. I think people realise
that when you say well, you came here because you want to enjoy the lake, well, if were
not careful, you wont be able to swim in the lake anymore.
(John Janmaat) Is there anything that really gives you hope about the future here in the
Okanagan? (Carol Luttmer) Yeah, I think its that people do really appreciate the natural
environment here. They are here because of the mountains and the lakes and the recreation
opportunities and the climate. I do think we need to constantly remind ourselves of that. I
think we have to act we have to be diligent with we can just say we actually have to do
with our actions. I think its happening but I think its maybe happening too slow.
(John Janmaat) Would you say that your experience here has overall made you more
optimistic for our relationship with the environment as a people or less so?
(Carol Luttmer) I think moving here has really made opened my eyes to the species
at risk and understanding the value of protecting species at risk, just because there are so




CONTROL SAMPLE: Invitation Letter
A short while back you completed a survey for us that asked you to consider several
alternative futures for the central Okanagan environment. Since completing the survey, you
may have reflected on the issues posed, looked into the matter more, and talked with other
people. You may also have participated in a discussion group that we organized and run
February 20-21 at 1450 K.L.O Road, The Regional District of Central Okanagan office. Any
of these activities may have reinforced your views or lead you to change your perspective.
We would like you to complete a shorter version of the original survey, a version that you
should be able to complete in about ten minutes. Even if you do not think your views
have changed, we would like to hear from you. We can end up with very slanted results
if we only hear from people who have changed their view. If you provide your contact
information at the end of the survey, we will again enter your name in a draw for one of
five prizes of $250 that we will make in recognition of the help you are providing us.
To complete or withdraw from the survey online, please visit: and enter the following
information exactly as it appears here (including the space in the postal code): Postal Code:
PostalCode Access Code: AccessCode
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APPENDIX J




You have been randomly selected to participant in the jury deliberation from among
those who showed interest in the main survey and who provided us with their contact
details. We believe that your input will play an important role in influencing government
policy related to natural resources protection.
A Citizens’ Jury is an event at which a panel of citizens from Central Okanagan is given
the opportunity to hear experts, discuss and debate those environmental issues of concern
you encountered in the main survey and present your views and recommendations.
Unlike juries in the legal system, Citizens Juries make policy recommendations rather
than final decisions. The objective is to hear opinions of a cross-section of the general public.
This method is getting popularity in many parts of the world as an important tool in the
policy-making process.
Therefore, Citizens’ Jury will be held in Kelowna on --------------. at --------------. We will
have a welcoming refreshments and all the jury members will be paid $50.00 as a thank you
for participation. If you have any special needs relating to travel, health or other personal
issues, please let us know and we will make every effort to meet them.
Please complete the enclosed participation confirmation form and send it to us using
the pre-paid envelope enclosed with this letter of invitation before ----------------.
225
Your participation and the information you give us will assist our research. All informa-
tion will remain confidential and will not be passed onto any other organizations. We know
that it involves a considerable time commitment, but it is a unique opportunity to take
part in our research.
Please do not feel that you need to be an expert in the field. We are interested in the
views of all members of the public and would value your input. We very much hope you
are able to help us.
We would be grateful if you could send us back the prepaid envelop even if you could





1. Why deliberative Juries?
Deliberative juries enhance citizen participation decision making. Using deliberative tech-
niques (the use of citizen groups convened to assess the costs and benefits of proposed
management options) can improve the effectiveness of public participation in the policy
process, thereby enhancing the perceived quality and legitimacy of policy decisions. In our
research we use deliberative juries to provide adequate information to each respondent to
judging the environmental management options and the level of change in the provision of
environmental resources and services.
2. Who makes the citizen juries?
Random sampling technique will used to recruit participants who showed interest in the
main survey and who provided us with their contact details.
3. How we present the valuation exercise and Deliberation Options?
Jury members will be presented with three environmental resources management options.
These Options are the same options completed by general public in the main survey. It is
up to the jury to decide which of the three options is most likely to enhance the health of
the environment 30 years from now.
4. How are environmental issues identified?
Major local environmental issues were identified discussing with the Regional District
of Central Okanogan experts and Okanagan residents. Both were asked to prioritize
environmental issues based on the degree of their concern.
5. What are the environmental management options?
‘‘No action”-Status Quo: Environmental management ‘‘No action” is the continu-
ation of the current environmental resources situation to 2040 if it is managed using the
existing actions. This option does not involve any increase in household’s payment.
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Options 1 and 2: Option 2 and Option 3 involve additional management actions that
would lead to different environmental goods and services outcomes by 2040. These options
involve each household making an annual payment each year for 30 years starting in 2015.
6. How to provide information?
Experts from the Okanagan Basin Water Board, the Regional District of Central
Okanagan and University of British Columbia will make presentations and expert witness
the case to the jury related to each environmental resources management options. Jury
members will be allowed to cross question expert witnesses after their presentation.
7. How many Jury deliberations?
We will conduct two jury deliberations.
Jury session 1: Jury members will be brought together in a room with a moderator
(from the advisory group to be assigned from expert witnesses) taking charge. Step one will
be a briefing to participant about the environmental problems facing the Regional District
of Central Okanagan in not more than 20 minutes. Step two will focus on a questionnaire
to gather data on respondents’ general and environmental attitudes and their socioeconomic
situation. This questionnaire will also contain the choice experiment, which respondents
will complete individually, based on an instruction that will help them to consider their
choices from a self-interested perspective, having in mind their income and family situation
and the possibility of alternative uses of the resources, and what outcomes they imagined
would be best for themselves. The instructions will be identical to those to be used in the
main survey. We will collect the individually completed survey. In step three, a debate
between group members will be prompted wherein questions and problems arising from the
session will be discussed. Participants raising any concerns shall be accommodated related
to what they will do by the moderator. Lastly, members will be asked, in the time before
the next session, to discuss the issues raised in the meeting with family and friends, and/or
to learn more about the issues discussed from their own sources.
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Jury session 2: the brief summary of the problems facing environmental resources
and services in Regional District of Central Okanagan will be presented. Environmental
management options will be reviewed by the moderators and the other participants. Partic-
ipants could then raise any issues/questions which occurs to them in the period between the
two sessions. A debate will be on the consequences the policy alternatives related to partici-
pants’ perceptions, the community affected, and consequences for the environment itself.
Participants will be required to state and discuss what they thought is more important not
only for themselves, but for the wider range of their community. In addition, respondents
will be reminded that their role in the jury as a part of decision-making process will be to
select environmental management options and payment action, if any, which they would
choose on behalf of their community and if their decision has been influenced by people in
their network . These choices will be made by each individual separately and confidentially.
We will record any changes in beliefs, attitudes, or choices between the two sessions.
Finally, a collective-choice experiment will be implemented. Here, participants will
be reminded the desirability of having conversations and reaching out to people in their
network and discuss on issues including with family and/or friends. The issue of collective
responsibility for designing the policy action plan will be raised and discussed, along with
the implications for the community of any decisions taken. Participants will be told that
this meeting will be a good chance for influencing the policy action plan. Participants will
be reminded to make their choices on the basis of what they thought would be best for the
community. That is, to express their citizen values, but to make these choices collectively
rather than individually.
8. How to reach a Verdict in Jury?
This will be achieved by, for each option in the choice set, choosing that option with the
highest votes, but with a condition of not making any jury member unhappy. It is in line




Participation in a Citizens’ Jury: Consent Form
1. Who is conducting the study?
The principal investigator is Dr.John Janmaat, Regional Innovation Chair in Water Re-
sources and Ecosystem Sustainability, I.K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences, the University
of British Columbia Okanagan. john.janmaat@ubc.ca, 250-807-8021. Solomon Geleta, PhD
Candidate in Agricultural and Resource Economics at Colorado State University, USA,
Fort Collins, CO 80523-1172, solomon.geleta@ubc.ca , 250-808-5425, is a co-investigator on
this project. This survey forms a central part of Solomons doctoral thesis.
2. Who is funding this study?
Funding and additional support are provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC), Environment Canada, the Okanagan Basin Water Board, and
the Regional District of Central Okanagan.
3. Why are we doing this study?
As elsewhere, each person in the Okanagan has a unique perspective about the right balance
between development and protection of environmental resources, such as aquatic habitats
and rural landscapes. By participating in our research, you will be helping us to better
understand how Okanagan residents feel about these tradeoffs.
4. How is the study done?
You were randomly chosen from among those who volunteered to participate in a citizen
jury when completing a survey for us. During the jury session you will have the opportunity
to explore issues raised in the survey in greater depth by hearing from experts and discussing
with others who also volunteered to participate. This session should last about 90 minutes.
The jury session will be digitally recorded and a note taker will make written notes during
the session. Written notes will be typed and stored with the digital recording on a secure
server at the University of British Columbia. For analysis, recordings will be transcribed
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and participants identified as person 1, person 2, etc. Any names or other person identifying
information in the recordings will be changed to protect privacy.
5. Is there any way being in this study could be bad for you?
We do not think that participation in this study can be bad for you. Your responses are
valuable to us, and we will protect your confidentiality and privacy.
6. What are the benefits of participating?
We do not expect that you will directly benefit from participating in this study. However,
we hope that others will benefit from what we have learned, both here in the Okanagan
and elsewhere where there is tension between development and environmental protection.
7. How will your privacy be maintained?
Data will be stored on a secure server at the University of British Columbia for at least five
years, after which files will be deleted and any physical storage destroyed. Anything that can
identify you will be removed from the data before it is used for any analysis, and will likewise
be absent from any results that are publicly available. We ask you and all participants
in this session to respect the privacy and confidentiality of all those who participate by
not sharing what you have heard after this session. In most sessions conducted this way,
participants do respect each others privacy. However, we cannot guarantee this and as such
please be aware that there is a risk your privacy will not be respected by other participants.
8. Will you be paid for your time/ taking part in this research study?
We understand that participation in a jury session is a considerable time commitment. As a
sign of our appreciation, we will give you $50.00 for participation at the end of the session.
9. Informed Consent
By signing the consent record that we will be circulating at the beginning of the session,
you confirm that you are at least 18 years old, are legally able to give informed consent,
and are consenting for us to use your responses as we have described. If you have any
concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences
while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the
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UBC Office of Research Services toll free at 1-877-822-8598 or the UBC Okanagan Research
Services Office at 250-807-8832. It is also possible to contact the Research Complaint Line
by email (RSIL@ors.ubc.ca ).
10. Who can you contact if you have questions about the study?
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. John Janmaat, either by email at john.janmaat@ubc.ca,
by phone at 250-807-8021, or by mail, Dr. John Janmaat, Unit 8, I.K. Barber School of




Questions for Expert Witnesses
As described in the overview we sent to you, people will have the opportunity to suggest
some questions for experts. We took their questions and distill them down to two or three,
which are presented out to you as they were directed at.
1. Expert Witness 1: Jason Schleppe, President at Ecoscape Environmen-
tal Consultants Ltd., Kelowna.
The group has four questions for you, which we distilled down to the three below.
a. What recommendations would you make to maintain natural shoreline while
allowing development that incorporates human usage?
Answer: Shoreline maintenance is complicated for the exact reason identified in the
question, how do you achieve balance. To me, it means at minimum maintaining the
current shoreline condition and preferably improving shoreline function in all areas, but
particularly in areas of greater habitat value (e.g., shoreline spawning areas, high value
rearing areas, etc.). To reach these goals I think that: 1) Areas of higher value need to be
identified, and clear, measurable objectives to maintain or improve the shoreline need to be
developed. The challenge is balancing private property rights with the rights of the public
because the shoreline and lake are a public resource in many aspects (i.e., it is very likely
that a good portion of our economy is derived from the lake and the shorelines natural
value but private parcels do have inherent rights of access and protection). 2) ensuring that
adequate resources are directed to education. An adequate education system is needed to
ensure both lakeside and non-lakeside residents understand the value of the resource and the
need to protect it. And, 3) Since education has occurred, a suitable and realistic adaptive
management plan with compliance and enforcement systems should be implemented to
ensure that management goals are achieved. Finally, I would suggest that all levels of
government need to play an active role in shoreline management because it is a public
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resource and self regulation without adequate compliance monitoring is not likely to be
successful. Once resources are lost, they are much harder and costly to restore and each
level of government has some level of responsibility under the current legislative framework.
b. Is the measurement of shoreline loss based on actual disturbed shoreline or simply
based on whether the lot has been developed, and given that much remaining
shoreline is in parks, will the rate of loss slow down?
Answer: The measurements of shoreline loss are based upon data for Okanagan Lake
and there are many assumptions in the analysis. I define a disturbance as any deviation
from natural shoreline character, meaning that any private held, Crown, or municipal parcel
(Park or otherwise) can have both natural areas and disturbed areas. These trends have
been observed across many lakes in BC. For instance, single family residential areas range
in levels of disturbance from as high as 70 to 90% in many cases on many lakes. Generally,
as density of development increases, so does the level of disturbance. The rates of loss
likely vary spatially, meaning that some areas will have higher rates (e.g., say 2%), while
others have lower rates (e.g., say 0 to 0.5%). I would think that as privately held parcels
increase in density (i.e., going from rural to single family residential or from large parcel
single family residential to multi family, etc.), there is an increase in the observed rate of
loss. Once the amount of disturbed shoreline increases to some point (maybe between 70 to
90%, this is just a guess, and likely complicated to calculate, but possible), the rate would
slow down simply because there is not as much natural area left. So, is it possible to reduce
the rate, I would suggest yes but this will be challenging. Once natural capital is lost it is
very challenging to restore it.
c. How does increasing the population density in the city core affect quality of life?
Answer: I am not sure I am qualified to comment on quality of life, this is likely a
matter of preference. The urban versus rural debate has always been and will continue to be
challenging. From a biological perspective, I think that densification of previously disturbed
areas will concentrate impacts to the environment, and reduce the spread of habitat loss in
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natural areas, both shoreline or upland. Further, I believe that densification is a more tax
efficient land development strategy than sprawl. However, I can appreciate the desires of
those that prefer a more rural character because this is why I am a biologist. Ultimately,
I think growth will occur, and local residents need to become involved to help guide and
direct how the places they live develops and grows. Given that growth is likely inevitable,
residents need to better understand the challenges of and consequences of different growth
scenarios. I believe that if the core doesnt develop, it is probable that other areas will and
these areas may have very high natural capital value also. So, ultimately, the tradeoff is
deciding where and what natural capital is worth protecting and what is worth sacrificing
to more dense development scenarios.
2. Expert Witness 2: Anna Warwick Sears, PhD, Executive Director,
Okanagan Basin Water Board.
The group came up with questions they would like to put to Anna Warwick Sears.
a. Can we deal with the pressure that continuing population growth is putting on
agriculture and environmental resources by putting a cap on how much more we
grow?
Answer: In the near term, say the next several decades, where population growth
occurs is more important than how many people move here. For the best use and reuse of
resources, people should be concentrated in urban centres, near services. Putting a cap on
growth without controlling the form of growth accelerates resource waste and over-inflates
property values.
b. Is wastewater a problem in the Okanagan and are there good methods for disposal
and reclamation?
Answer: Wastewater must be constantly maintained and improved to avoid becoming
a problem. This is an area where we do NOT want to have deferred maintenance. Right
now, there are no major problems, but some systems are nearing capacity and will need to
be expanded. Keep in mind that there is very little margin of error. Kelowna Wastewater
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treatment plant for example must run near perfectly 24/7/365 as long as there are people
living in the city.
c. What part can pricing of environmental resources play in supporting conservation?
E.g. water pricing policy.
Answer: pricing of environmental resources plays a relatively small role in their
conservation. It depends somewhat on the price of course. People drive less in Europe
because the gas prices are so much higher. But a bigger and more immediate influence
for conservation is people’s moral and community values and what is seen as the socially
responsible right choice. Currently, poor spending choices are socially acceptable, as is
excessive water use.
3. Expert Witness 3: Todd Cashin, Agriculture and Environment Services
Manager at City of Kelowna.
The group came up with three questions they would like to put to Todd Cashin.
a. What would be the best way to protect farmland for this, and the next, generation?
Answer: It has three parts: Continue supporting the ALC and it’s mandate to protect
farmland, Continue supporting strict policies regarding farmland loss and fragmentation such
as exclusions and subdivisions, Continue to enforce illegal uses, non farm uses and misuse
of existing policies that impact agricultural lands or agribusinesses such as industrial and
commercial land uses on farmland, soil removal and placement and non-agricultural retail
operations (or activities or businesses that become the primary land use over agriculture).
b. How does increasing the population density in the city core affect quality of life?
Answer: Tough question to answer given that quality of life means different things to
different people. For example, someone who grew up in rural Manitoba will have had a
completely different life experience than someone growing up in Surrey and therefore each
individual is going to have a completely different expectations of quality of life impacts or
benefits. However, I think that(if planned well) densification can sustain businesses and
services downtown which can create a livelier downtown core and therefore create a rich mix
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of economic activities, mix of housing stock and mix of employment opportunities in the
downtown area. However, if not done correctly, housing supply may see a significant rise in
real estate values which can squeeze out activities and residents. Quality of life impacts
in downtown Kelowna in the short term (e.g. next 5 years) will include: construction
noise, traffic and parking disruption during significant construction projects and increased
frustration with parking, traffic and transit.
4. Expert Witness 4: Carol Luttmer, OCCP Coordinator, Okanagan Col-
laborative Conservation Program.
The group came up with three questions they would like to put to Carol Luttmer.
a. Are you in favour of vertical expansion (high rise buildings) instead of urban
sprawl?
Answer: I am in favour of vertical expansion instead of urban sprawl. It allows us to
protect natural areas and farmland.
b. Which is the best venue for protecting foreshore areas - local, regional or provincial?
Answer: All three are important. Jurisdictions for who regulates the foreshore are a
result of century old understandings that water-bodies and watercourses are essential for
marine commerce and streams are important for potable water and irrigation. Therefore, I
am not an expert in the regulations and laws, but my understanding is that the federal
government is responsible for navigation and the province, through the Land Act, is
responsible for approving any development below the high water mark. Hence, if a landowner
wants to build a dock, they have to get approval from the Province. The Okanagan has
the Large Lake Protocol which the province uses to and there is also the Riparian Act
Regulations which is provincial legislation that requires local governments to protect riparian
areas. Local and regional governments can affect foreshore development through zoning
and bylaws. I think a coordinated approach from all levels of government is necessary- but
also really important is public education. An informed public, that understands the need
to protect the foreshore to maintain fisheries and water quality- that will go a long way.
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Communities, developers and landowners need to make decisions because they understand
and care about the implications of their actions.
c. How does increasing the population density in the city core affect quality of life?
Answer: I think increasing density in the city core increases quality of life. It allows
for more services in a smaller geographic area (who doesn’t like to be able to walk to their
favorite coffee shop or pub?), for residents to have a more sustainable lifestyle, and to
protect our natural areas and farmland. I am a firm believer that being connected to the
natural environment is critical to quality of life- but this doesn’t mean we all have to live on
hobby farms or acreages. As we increase density I think that quality of life and connection
to nature can be maintained by designing city cores to incorporate natural features, such as
boulevards with trees down the center, green spaces and living walls in buildings and by
increasing opportunities and access to the natural environment within and on the outskirts




Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements, where
1 is strongly agree and 7 is strongly disagree
Table N.1. Debriefing Questions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Environmental problems in the Okanagan will be worse than predicted
We cannot influence the future of the Okanagan environment
There are other priorities more important for government spending than the environment
Government do not listen to the input form the public when making decisions that affect the environment
This exercise has helped me to better understand different perspectives about the Okanagan environment
This exercise has helped my views about protecting the Okanagan environment
This exercise has left me better informed about environmental issues in the Okanagan
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